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Chapter 1: Introduction  
 
Happiness as a subject has received growing attention academically in 
recent decades, as attested by the numerous studies in the fields of positive 
psychology, economics and sociology. Different methodologies are used at 
different levels of analysis. These range from micro-level psychological 
studies in which the underlying mechanisms of an individual’s happiness 
are studied, to macro studies comparing happiness across regions or 
countries and/or over time. In this research, such comparative studies play a 
crucial role.  
 
1.1. Notions of ‘happiness’ 
 
The word ‘happiness’ has been used, to denote different meanings. In this 
dissertation the word happiness is used in one particular sense: the 
subjective enjoyment of one’s life as a whole, as defined by Veenhoven 
(1984). To grasp this meaning and to situate it among the divergent uses of 
the word, I will start with a short review of the various meanings of 
happiness commonly used in philosophy and the social sciences. 
 
1.1.1. Meanings of the word in classical western philosophy 
In classical western philosophy, the word happiness is used to express the 
‘good life’; this conception differs from one school to another, as 
highlighted by McMahan (2006). One difference is in the value attached to 
pleasure: some schools, such as the Hedonists and the Epicureans, endorse 
pleasure, while others, like the Cynics or Stoics, avoid it. This opposition, 
as we will see, is still somewhat present today. Hedonists are the 
intellectual descendants of Aristippus of Cyrene and they take pleasure to 
be a key value for a good life. As materialists, they give little credit to the 
immaterial world and only consider feelings, such as pleasure or pain. To 
the Stoics and the Cynics, happiness is not material and has nothing to do 
with physical pleasure. Human beings should avoid desire, and stay away 
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from the quest for happiness. The wise must avoid passions and feelings. A 
good life is a virtuous life, which should lead to a state of ataraxia
1
.  
Aristotle, one of the most influential philosophers in the field of 
happiness studies, stands in between these currents; he considered pleasure 
to be a byproduct of reaching higher virtue. Aristotle wrote about 
eudemonia, the ‘good demon’, a principle still considered to be a pillar of 
the philosophy of happiness. Before Aristotle, beliefs about happiness were 
strongly related to fortune: daimonia means ‘to distribute’ in Greek, hence, 
happiness was distributed and one may or may not have this fortune, 
without being able to do much about it. One of the main contributions of 
Aristotle was to promote the idea that happiness was a changing, movable, 
interior concept, and that one could have an influence on one’s own 
happiness. As Bruni (2010) has argued, Aristotle’s fortune can be 
decorrelated with happiness thanks to virtue. Eudemonia also includes, to 
some extent, pleasure as a signal that the pursued action is intrinsically 
good.  
 
1.1.2 Meanings addressed in modern western philosophy 
Following the schools of the ancient philosophers, modern philosophers 
have contributed to our reflections on the good life while still heavily 
relying on classic categories. Montaigne, in a hedonic vein, emphasizes the 
importance of pleasure and writes about the beauty of life. Similarly, 
Spinoza, another philosopher of joy, states in his Ethics (1677) that 
happiness is to be attained through the intellectual love of God (amor dei 
intellectualis)
2
. 
The formation of nation states gradually gave rise to a shift in 
attention from individual behavior to collective social arrangements, and 
happiness gained a political dimension. Much of the development in the 
17
th
 and 18
th
 centuries was characterized by discerning the political 
meaning and implications of happiness (cf. Ott 2012). The French 
Encyclopédie states that everyone has a right to be happy. The Scottish 
philosopher Francis Hutcheson (1729) uses the famous formula ‘the 
greatest happiness for the greatest number’, a formula further used by 
                                                 
1
 Ataraxia is a Greek term that depicts a state of tranquility 
2
 Ethics, part V, prop.32. 
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Adam Smith (1776) and reconceptualized by Jeremy Bentham (1789). In 
the latter part of the 18
th
 century happiness became an official right, when it 
was incorporated in the American (1776) and the French (1793) 
Constitution. In the 19
th
 century, John Stuart Mill (1863) further developed 
this notion by distinguishing happiness from contentment, valuing the 
former more than the latter
3
. In an Aristotelian way, Stuart Mill considers 
happiness to be a by-product of larger pursuit, a phenomenon denoted by 
Sidgwick (1874) as the ‘Paradox of Hedonism’ the paradox being that 
pleasures cannot be acquired directly, but only when striving for higher, not 
immediately pleasurable aims.  
 
1.1.3 Meanings of the word in contemporary social sciences 
There are currently two main conceptions of happiness in use: one of which 
is more eudaimonic, the other more hedonic. Recent discussions of this 
difference can be found in Waterman (1993) and Keyes (2002). Proponents 
of the eudaimonic view use the term ‘happiness’ to denote a set of desirable 
personality characteristics, such as ‘identity’, ‘autonomy’, ‘self-respect’ and 
‘meaningfulness’, which is also referred to as ‘positive mental health’ 
(Jahoda 1958). Proponents of this view (cf. Huppert 2009) tend to criticize 
‘hedonic happiness’ as superficial pleasure seeking. The word ‘hedonic’ is 
used in different ways. In contrast to ‘eudaimonic’ it means ‘satisfaction’ 
(right bottom quadrant in Table 1.1) and is sometimes assimilated with 
‘pleasure’ (left-top quadrant in Table 1.2). However, this conception of 
‘hedonic happiness’ is too restrictive. The subjective enjoyment of one’s 
life can, and should, also include long-term enjoyment. This broader 
conception of happiness is the one I have adopted in this dissertation; it will 
be further elaborated in the section below.   
      
1.1.4 Meaning of happiness addressed in this dissertation 
Starting from a philosophical discussion of the good life, Veenhoven (2000) 
distinguishes four different qualities of life, all of which have sometimes 
been called ‘happiness’. I will specify the concept of happiness I use in this 
dissertation by taking us through these distinctions. 
                                                 
3
 Mill(1863) stated that it was “better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied.”(p 
260) 
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Four qualities of life: qualities of life can refer to a person’s outer 
environment as well as to a person’s inner environment, to her or his mental 
world. Qualities of life can also be distinguished from a chance or result 
perspective. This taxonomy results in four qualities of life. 
 
Table 1.1: the four qualities of life 
 
 
Outer qualities 
 
 
Inner qualities 
 
 
Life-chances 
 
 
Livability of 
environment 
 
 
Life-ability of the 
person 
 
 
Life-results 
 
 
Usefulness of life 
 
Satisfaction with life 
Source: Veenhoven 2000 
 
The top-left quadrant of Table 1.1 denotes the presence of favorable 
external living conditions; a western-centric metaphor could draw a 
continuum going from ‘hell’ to ‘paradise’. This definition is central in 
‘objective’ conceptions of happiness: that is, in the conceptions in which 
the conditions that humans will thrive are central. This definition of 
happiness is the one commonly used by policy makers. 
   The top-right quadrant of Table 1.1 denotes the inner qualities one 
requires to cope with environmental conditions. This definition is central in 
the ‘capability approach’ and to the related notions of ‘eudemonic 
happiness’. This definition of happiness is favored by educators and 
therapists. 
   The bottom-left quadrant of Table 1.1 denotes the effects of one’s 
life on their environment, for instance how helpful one is to one’s fellow 
humans and what one contributes to human culture. This rather intangible 
characterization of happiness is a favorite among moralists. 
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   All these above definitions of the concept of happiness concern an 
objective notion, and imply that one can be happy without knowing it, 
without acknowledging that one is happy. In contrast the fourth happiness 
definition is essentially subjective. The bottom-right quadrant of the table 
denotes the quality of life in the eye of the beholder. Happiness in this 
definition is equaled with ‘life satisfaction’ or ‘subjective well-being’. In 
this dissertation, I deal with happiness as defined in the bottom-right 
quadrant of Veenhoven’s (2000) ‘four qualities of life’ diagram.  
 
Four kinds of satisfaction 
The bottom-right case can in turn be broken down into four categories. 
Indeed, we need to define whether we are talking of satisfaction within 
certain life domains or with life satisfaction as a whole and whether we are 
talking about passing or enduring feelings of happiness. This gives us four 
new subcategories of happiness arising from the bottom-right quadrant of 
Table 1.1, these are shown in Table 1.2. (Veenhoven 2000) 
 
Table 1.2: the four satisfactions of life. 
 
 
Passing 
 
 
Enduring 
 
Part of life 
 
Pleasures 
 
 
Partial satisfaction 
 
 
Life as a whole 
 
Peak experience 
 
Satisfaction with life 
 
The top-left quadrant of Table 1.2 includes passing satisfaction with 
a part of one’s life that is often called 'pleasure'. Pleasures can be sensory or 
mental. The idea that we should pursue such satisfactions is called 
'hedonism', or ‘Epicureanism’ if the pleasures are weighed against the 
potential pains.  
The top-right quadrant of Table 1.2 includes enduring satisfaction 
with a part of one’s life and is referred to as 'partial satisfaction' and is 
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about satisfaction within specific life domains, such as that of family, 
leisure or work.  
The bottom-left quadrant of Table 1.2 is about passing satisfaction 
and can be about life as a whole. This kind of satisfaction is usually referred 
to as 'peak-experience'. When poets write about happiness they usually 
describe an experience of this kind. Likewise in religious writings, the word 
happiness is often used in the sense of mystical ecstasy. Another word for 
this type of satisfaction is 'enlightenment'.  
Finally, the bottom-right quadrant of Table 1.2 is about enduring 
satisfaction with your life as a whole and is called 'life satisfaction', which 
is commonly referred to as 'happiness'. In this dissertation, I will be 
discussing happiness in the ‘life satisfaction’ sense of the term. 
 
Definition of happiness 
Several definitions of happiness are concerned with the meaning of the term 
indicated above (cf. Diener (1984), Michalos (1985) and Veenhoven 
(1984)). Diener (1984) defines life satisfaction as “a cognitive judgmental 
process dependent upon a comparison of one’s circumstances with what is 
thought to be an appropriate standard” (p. 71). Michalos (1985) proposes a 
multiple discrepancy theory (MDT) in which happiness depends on the 
satisfaction of 5 main aspects and the self-perceived discrepancies between 
what one has and what one wants
4
. The definitions as operationalized by 
both Diener (1984) and Michalos (1985) focus on the cognitive evaluation 
of life, assuming that the affects do not significantly enter in the evaluation 
of one’s life.  
Veenhoven (1984) defines overall happiness as “the degree to which 
a person positively evaluates the overall quality of his/her life as-a-whole. 
In other words, how much the person likes the life he/she leads” (p.22). As 
compared to Diener (1984) and Michalos (1985), life satisfaction as defined 
by Veenhoven acknowledges the presence of both affects and thoughts in 
the evaluation of one’s life. In this dissertation I follow the 
conceptualization of Veenhoven (1984), who distinguishes between 
                                                 
4
 1. Basic needs and wants 2. What one was accustomed to having earlier in life 3.What 
one expects to have later in life 4.What others in society have 5. What one deserves.   
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‘overall happiness’ and two ‘components’(cognitive, hedonic) which I 
develop below (see section 1.1.5 for motivation). 
 
Components of happiness 
When appraising how much we enjoy our lives, we use two sources of 
information: our affects, and our thoughts. In this research, I refer to these 
two sources respectively as hedonic level of affect and contentment.  
Hedonic level of affect is how well one feels most of the time, which 
Veenhoven (1984) calls the ‘affective’ component of happiness. 
Contentment is the degree to which one perceives one gets what one wants 
from life. Veenhoven (1984) calls this the ‘cognitive’ component of 
happiness.  
Although these components tend to go together, they are not the 
same. One can feel good most of the time, but still have many wants unmet, 
or vice versa, one can have many wants met but still not feel good most of 
the time. I summarize the refining of my definition of happiness in Figure 
1.1 below.  
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Figure 1.1: Definition of ‘happiness’ as used in the frame of this 
dissertation
 
 
 21 
 
1.1.5  Why focus on happiness in this sense? 
I will focus on happiness in the sense of life satisfaction, which some call 
‘hedonic happiness’ as we have seen above. The first reason for this is 
theoretical. Life satisfaction (hedonic happiness) is a much clearer concept 
than ‘eudaimonic’ happiness; hedonic happiness is how much one likes the 
life one lives, whereas notions of eudaimonic happiness are more variable 
and cover much more. Eudaimonic happiness depicts not only other states 
of mind, as in a sense of ‘meaning’, but also personality traits such as 
‘wisdom’, and behaviors such as ‘social involvement’, which are better 
analyzed as conditions for happiness than as parts of it. The second reason 
for preferring a hedonic notion of happiness is that this is better measurable 
than eudaimonic happiness. The factors used in the measurement of the 
livability of a given environment or the life-ability of a certain person can 
be numerous, and their relative importance varies from one actor to another. 
The last reason for preferring happiness in the sense of life satisfaction is 
ideological. I follow Bentham’s utilitarianism in which happiness is 
defined in this way. As a consequentialist philosophy, it prevents 
philosophical speculation, or worse, paternalism. If one is to measure the 
livability of the environment or the life-ability of a certain person to 
increase the satisfaction of the actors, one might as well ask them directly 
what they think, unless one considers that he or she knows better what is 
good for them.  
 
1.2. Measurements of happiness 
 
Since I define happiness as something that people have in their minds, one 
way to measure it is by using questionnaires. Direct questioning is the most 
commonly used method to determine a person’s state of happiness. 
Respondents are asked to judge their life in general and not a particular 
moment. Indirect techniques, such as analysis of diaries are also 
occasionally used to measure levels of happiness. (Veenhoven 2006) 
 
1.2.1 Measures of overall happiness 
As a combination of a hedonic and cognitive component, life satisfaction 
questionnaires mainly includes mono-item questions. A number of different 
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scales exist, i.e. 3-step, 4-step, 5-step, 10-step and 11-step, but the questions 
used show little change: ‘Taken altogether, how satisfied are you with your 
life as a whole these days?’ The most common question asked to probe 
people’s impression of their life satisfaction is: ‘In general, on a scale from 
0 (or 1) to 10, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole?’ Unless 
otherwise mentioned, all the data used in this thesis was collected based on 
the above type of questioning. 
 
1.2.2 Measures of the affective component 
There are several ways to ask people to assess how well they feel in 
general.  One way is to invite the respondent to offer a general estimate, for 
instance with the question: ‘How often have you felt happy during the past 
6 weeks?’ A second method used to assess happiness is multi-moment 
assessment, and this involves answering a series of repeated questions such 
as: ‘How happy do you feel right now?’ A third approach to assessing 
hedonic level is to ask first about various specific affects experienced in the 
recent past, both positive affects such as ‘joy’ and negative affects such as 
‘anger’, and then computing an ‘affect balance score’ by subtracting 
reported negative affects from reported positive affects.  
 
General estimates 
Respondents are asked a single question on how they feel at the moment of 
the question on a scale from 0 to 100 for instance, or how they have felt in 
the past: i.e. the day, the week, the month or the year before. 
 
Multiple moment assessment 
Different methods can be used to measure or probe happiness on a multiple 
moment assessment (Sirgy 2012). These methods are mostly used to 
measure affects. 
Kahneman (1999) defines happiness as, essentially, momentary 
experiences of pleasures. To measure it, Kahneman uses the Experience 
Sampling Method (ESM) whereby subjects are beeped and asked at random 
moments during the day how much pain or pleasure they are experiencing. 
When completed, such a study gives a level of a subject’s happiness as an 
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integration, in the mathematical sense, of their pleasures over the time of 
the study. 
Recently, the Day Reconstruction Method (DRM) has been 
developed to tackle the shortcomings of ESM, such as the costs of the 
studies and the inconvenience of a study for respondents (Sirgy 2012). In a 
DRM, time-use survey questions about the previous day are used 
(Kahneman et al. 2004). Respondents are asked to remember the previous 
day, divide it into episodes and describe each episode in combination with 
time use survey data. The DRM is in some senses more complete than the 
ESM, as an attempt is made to get full coverage of the respondent’s day, 
whereas the ESM only samples several moments during a respondent’s day 
(Kahneman and Krueger 2006).  
 
Affect balance scores 
Affect balance scores are a sum of pleasures and pains; pleasures typically 
receive a ‘plus’ and pains a ‘minus’. These scores for pain or pleasure are 
added and averaged and then the average score of pains is subtracted from 
the average score for pleasures. Regarding pleasure and pain, they can 
either be rated on a scale, i.e. from 0 to 10, or most commonly by response 
using a binary yes or no.  
 
1.2.3 Measures of the cognitive component 
Contentment can be measured in various ways. One way to measure it is to 
use a general question, such as: ‘How successful are you in getting what 
you want from life?’ 
 A more refined method to assess happiness involves three steps. 
First, respondents are asked to enumerate the aspects they want from life. 
Second, respondents rate how successful they are in reaching each of these 
aspects. Finally the investigator computes the respondents’ average success 
in meeting their wants, eventually weighed by importance.  
  A variant of the above approach does not ask respondents for 
personal ‘wants’, but rather refers to notions of the good life. The first step 
is to ask people what they think of as the ‘best possible life’ and next what 
constitutes the ‘worst possible life’. After priming the respondents with 
these open questions, the respondents are presented with a ladder and asked 
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to imagine that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life they 
have just described and that the bottom of the ladder represents their 
concept of the worst possible life. As a last step, respondents are asked to 
rate their present life on the ladder. In some variations of this approach, this 
is done after respondents have been asked to rate their lives 5 years before 
the survey date and how they envisage their lives might be 5 years from 
now. This method is known as Cantril’s (1965) ‘ladder of life scale’.  
 
1.2.4 Key terms used in survey questions on happiness 
The word happiness can refer both to a concept and to terms which are used 
to measure happiness. The meaning of the word can differ depending on the 
context; for instance, ‘how happy are you with your life’ denotes ‘overall 
happiness’, whereas ‘how happy do you feel today’ is related to the 
affective component of happiness. In Table 1.3 below, I explain which 
terms correspond to which concept in this dissertation.  
 
Table 1.3: concept and terms used in happiness-related questions 
Concept Terms  
Overall happiness Life satisfaction 
General satisfaction 
Happiness 
Affective component Mood 
Affect balance 
Happiness 
Cognitive component Best-worst life 
Realization of one’s wants 
 
One can see that ‘happiness’ appears as a general ‘concept’ as well as twice 
in the ‘terms’ column. This is because the surveys using the term happiness 
are numerous and varied. In the frame of this dissertation, I consistently 
refer to happiness as a concept in the sense of life satisfaction. When I use 
happiness in another sense, e.g. in its affective dimension, I explicitly state 
it.  
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1.3. Development of research on ‘hedonic’ happiness 
 
1.3.1 Rising interest 
After the Second World War, and in particular in the late 1960s with the 
falling influences of the Church, nationalism and traditional family ties, 
rising individualism and the possibility, or even an obligation, to identify 
with self and less with a community or several communities, happiness 
gradually became a more prominent life goal and a social norm to strive for 
in modern societies (Pawin, 2013).  
The scientific world has followed this societal trend, and in turn, has 
reinforced it. A new strand of research has arisen within psychology, 
positive psychology, the focus of which is less on ailments and 
psychological issues and more on what is going right for the client and how 
things might go better. Different items, different questions and different 
measures have been developed to ensure the validity and reliability of this 
field. Psychologists have largely created these tools, and the sciences of 
happiness have thus contributed to the scientific consecration of 
individualistic aspirations.  
As the amount of literature dedicated to positive psychology has 
increased, so have the number of related questions. In 1960, Gurin, Veroff 
and Feld worked on a measure of happiness that could be used to replace 
traditional mental health indicators. This measure was used in a large-scale 
study by Bradburn and Caplovitz in 1965, and this paved the way to 
extensive cross-regional and cross-national comparisons of happiness. In 
1972, the following question was asked in the United States General Social 
Survey (GSS): ‘Taken all together, how would you say things are these 
days—would you say that you are very happy, pretty happy, or not too 
happy?’ To answer this question, Cantril (1965) developed a self-anchoring 
scale where the respondent chooses the lowest point and the highest point 
in terms of quality of life and ranks his/her life on a self-defined scale. 
Veenhoven (2000) has described a double movement that has 
gradually begun to operate in the field of happiness studies in the last 
decades with: 1) a shift from chances to results and 2) a move from 
objective to subjective measures, i.e. a move from top left to bottom right in 
Figure 1.1. The first movement was the shift from looking at opportunities 
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in a given environment (Veenhoven’s assumed quality of life as in the 
Human Development Index (HDI)) toward an emphasis on actual results 
(which Veenhoven calls apparent quality of life). The emphasis used to be 
on the environment, assuming that livability of an environment more or less 
directly resulted in livable conditions for the people concerned. As a result 
of this first move, what matters most is not so much what happens in 
someone’s life, but more how that person feels about it. Not that the 
environment no longer matters, it does, but to the extent to which the 
respondent expresses that it matters. The second move is a swing from 
experts’ views to respondents’ opinions. There used to be a clear distinction 
between the knowing and the unknowing, historically analogous to the 
classical sacred/profane dialectic. Gradual democratization has resulted in a 
blurring of this frontier and in increasing trust in the opinion of actors. This 
leads to a shift from a priori considerations about a given situation and its 
effects to assessments of the actors themselves.  
This shift is related to deeper waves of societal changes toward 
more democratic appraisals, carried by the actors themselves, which has left 
less room for philosophical speculation and expert opinion. Once 
psychologists began to ask questions about reported well-being and 
happiness, economists and sociologists, political scientists and politicians 
began to wonder whether subjective indicators such as happiness ratings 
could be used as realistic and objective indicators for public policy. 
Recently, the government of Bhutan has decided to care more about the 
quality of life of its people and to work on gross national happiness, rather 
than increasing gross domestic product (GDP). The term gross national 
happiness was coined by Bhutan's fourth Dragon King, Jigme Singye 
Wangchuck, and is used in order to evaluate how Bhutanese policies 
increase happiness, as measured by the Gross National Happiness (GNH) 
indicator, which is then converted into the Bhutan GNH Index. The GNH 
Index provides an overview of performance across 9 domains of GNH in 
Bhutan. These include psychological well-being, time use, community 
vitality, ecological resilience, cultural diversity, health, living standards, 
education and good governance. This example of the use of indicators has 
paved the way for other indicators to be used worldwide by researchers 
trying to understand how people experience their lives. Since the 1970s the 
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Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has 
carried out one indicator program and has only recently, in 2011, 
incorporated a subjective question in its Better Life Index. While not being 
able to predict the future, it seems highly plausible that subjective 
indicators such as the ones developed by the OECD will gain importance in 
the years to come, as indicators such as national GDP fail to capture what 
matters in post-materialistic societies
5
.  
 
1.3.2 Growing output 
The evolution of happiness research has resulted in a wide number of 
publications, findings, infrastructure, journals, etc., and the number of 
publications has increased dramatically in the last years as can be seen in 
Figure 1.2, in which the growth in numbers of publications on happiness-
related topics over the last century is shown. The publications covering 
happiness defined in the sense of satisfaction with one’s life as a whole 
only represent a small proportion of the total publications on the theme of 
happiness. To date (March 2015), there are 1.26 million publications 
containing the word ‘happiness’ in the title, abstract or text to be found on 
Google Scholar. 
 
Figure 1.2: Yearly number of scientific publications on happiness in the 
sense of subjective enjoyment of one’s life as a whole (Source: 
Bibliography of Happiness) 
 
                                                 
5
 As most citizens in developed societies have reached high materialistic standards, 
aspirations have shifted to non-material values such as self-development, a phenomenon 
described by Inglehart (1971) as post-materialism. 
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The major source of data for my dissertation, and the sciences of happiness 
in general, is the World Database of Happiness, first set up in the 1980s by 
Veenhoven and updated and expanded continuously since that time.    
 
World Database of Happiness 
Most of the empirical findings on happiness in the sense of subjective 
enjoyment of one’s life as a whole have been collected and placed in the 
World Database of Happiness (Veenhoven 2015). This database ‘findings 
archive’, to date (March 2015), consists of 30,000 ‘pages’ in which a large 
number of varied research findings are described in a uniform way. The 
World Database of Happiness consists of quantitative data, mainly 
stemming from surveys of national populations, but also from a few 
experiments with particular groups such as students or medical staff, plus 
data from psychological follow-ups. The quantitative data of the WDH can 
be split into two kinds of research findings: distributional findings and 
correlational findings. The distributional findings provide information on 
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how happy people are in particular populations, using data such as means 
and standard deviations that can be calculated for countries, regions or age 
groups. The correlational findings provide data on things that have been 
found to go together with more of less happiness in populations, such as the 
statistically valid association of income with education. 
The World Database of Happiness is built on a bibliography of 
happiness that covers as many research publications as could be found, in 
which happiness is defined as satisfaction with one’s life as a whole.  
 
Number of research findings  
To date (March 2015), the World Database of Happiness contains some 
25,000 research findings divided into the distributional and correlational. 
These findings are further classified into either a micro-level, i.e. defined 
groups or organizations, or a macro-level, i.e. nations. Crossing the two 
criteria produces 4 categories, which are shown in Table 1.4. While this 
may not be exhaustive, Table 1.4 classifies most of the existing 
correlational findings and the vast majority of distributional findings and 
provides an overview of the number of publications per category. In this 
dissertation, I mostly use findings on the macro-level that are taken from 
the bottom two categories; macro distributional and correlation findings. 
 
Table 1.4: Findings on happiness 
 Distributional findings Correlational findings 
Micro 1,908 12,684 
Macro 9,103 1,099 
 
1.4. Findings on happiness 
 
1.4.1 Distributional findings 
Distributional findings about how happy people are in a given population 
are typically summarized in a mean and standard deviation. Distributions 
can be observed at a macro or a micro-level
6
.  
                                                 
6
 Meso level is not considered in this dissertation as the studies at the meso level of 
organizations is scarce as for now (Veenhoven 2015) 
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Micro-level 
Within a general population, studies can be done to look at specific 
subpopulations, leading to distributional findings within an organization, a 
family or a given group of individuals. There is a mosaic of happiness, i.e. 
micro-level data that add up to a total score for a nation.   
 
Macro-level 
Distributional findings at the macro-level deal with the level of happiness in 
a (multi)national sample, as well as with the inequalities of happiness or 
other distributional characteristics across different countries.   
 
1.4.2 Correlational findings 
Correlational findings are findings about factors that are statistically 
associated with happiness and that are typically summarized in correlation 
coefficients. Happiness research makes the distinction between intrinsic 
and extrinsic factors. A brief summary of some of the current research 
literature in terms of internal and external determinants at the macro and 
micro-level is given below.  
 
Micro-level 
 
Intrinsic determinants of happiness are typically personality characteristics. 
For instance, when studying women in Germany looking for a job, Muffels 
and Kempermann (2011) found a significant positive contribution on 
happiness for extraversion and a negative influence for neuroticism. 
Studying a particular organization, Headay et al (1993) found a positive 
link between empathic feeling and happiness.  
 
Extrinsic determinants of happiness are related to environmental 
characteristics. External determinants at the micro-level include the effects 
of urban settings, organizational environments, and local, socio-economic 
or cultural influences. The influences on happiness of characteristics of 
districts and cities have been studied, for example, by considering the 
impact of local safety and the quality of environment (Shields et al, 2009); 
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the quality of natural environment (Andrews and Whitey, 1976) and the 
impact of city size (Jiang et al, 2012). When studying organizations, Sirota 
(2005) underlines equality in treatment, equality in organizational success 
and a friendly ambience as three factors improving happiness. Ventegodt 
(1995) studied the happiness of middle managers in large and small 
companies, and found higher happiness among the former group. In 
longitudinal studies of managers at AT&T, including issues of career 
improvement, Bray and Howard (1983) found small positive contributions 
of career boosts on happiness.  
 
Macro-level 
 
Intrinsic determinants of happiness: among the different inner determinants 
of happiness, there are average psychological or personality traits at a 
national level. This represents life-ability as depicted in Table 1.1 (top right 
quadrant). This strand of research presents happiness first and foremost as 
an internal value, and what matters is not so much what happens in one’s 
environment but how one perceives and values what happens. On top of the 
diverse philosophical and religious beliefs, psychologists have looked into 
the 5 big traits as defined by Costa and McCrae (1992); neuroticism, 
extraversion, openness, conscientiousness and agreeableness which have 
received considerable attention as noted by Francis (1999). These articles 
tend to show that happiness is often positively correlated to extraversion 
and negatively to neuroticism, as for instance in Lynn and Steel (2006) who 
showed these trends in a cross-national comparison.  
 
Extrinsic determinants of happiness: external determinants depict the 
livability of an environment as in Table 1.1 (top left quadrant). This 
includes ecological, as well as societal, organizational and familial 
conditions. In particular, reasons for differences in average happiness 
across nations have been sought by looking at various factors, such as 
climate (e.g. Barrington-Leigh, 2008), economic development (e.g. Schyns 
(1998), Frey & Stutzer (2002), Layard (2005), Bjornskov (2007), Stanca 
(2010)) and institutional quality (e.g. Ott (2010)). The underlying 
hypothesis of most of these studies is that happiness is mostly derived from 
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external factors. Diener and Suh (2000) set a major landmark in the strand 
of research linking happiness and cultures. Their important findings are that 
people use different proxies when evaluating their life satisfaction, whether 
they come from individualistic nations where self-esteem is of major 
importance or if they come from collectivistic nations, where social 
equilibrium seems to be prime (Sirgy, 2012). Inglehart et al. (2008) define 
cultural areas from a macro-perspective. I used Inglehart’s pioneering work 
to compare the geographic distribution of the cognitive/hedonic 
components of happiness as reported for this dissertation in Chapter 2. I 
summarize these findings in Table 1.5 below. 
 
Table 1.5: Type of correlational findings per category  
 Micro Macro 
Internal (Life ability) Personality trait in a 
given group 
Average personality 
traits 
External (Livability) Effect of urban setting  
Effect of an 
organizational 
environment 
Quality of the 
environment 
Impact of city size 
Climate 
Economic development 
Government 
effectiveness 
Cultures at the national 
level 
 
1.5. Happiness in France 
 
The World Database of Happiness list of average happiness in 149 nations 
shows France ranking 48
th
, with an average 6.6 on a ten-scale between the 
extremes Togo (2.6) and Costa-Rica (8.5). If the ranking is to be interpreted 
with care, the relatively low position of France is not what one would 
expect it to be when looking at indicators such as economic prosperity, 
social security and inequalities.  
 There have been several studies on satisfaction in various domains 
in France, such as those of Buchanan and Cantril (1953), Fisher (1973) and 
Clément (1980), but research into the happiness of French people in general 
is much more recent and largely the work of economists. To Algan and 
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Cahuc (2007), this relatively low level of happiness might be due to high 
state intervention and the low trust that French people have of their 
institutions, justice, trade unions and people in general. Clark and Senik 
(2011) first worked on the relatively low levels of satisfaction in Germany 
and France. Later, Senik (2014) worked further on the French example, 
discussing ‘the French unhappiness puzzle’, i.e. the divergence between the 
objective quality of living conditions in France, material affluence and 
cultural sophistication, and the French people’s subjective satisfaction with 
life. Looking at the integration of migrants and French living abroad, Senik 
(2014) concludes that French unhappiness is largely embedded in mentality, 
which she describes as “the set of specific intrinsic attitudes, beliefs, ideals 
and ways of apprehending reality that individuals engrain during their 
infancy and teenage, via education and socialization instances such as 
school, firms and organizations” (p.3). Senik (2014) concludes that intrinsic 
factors, rather than extrinsic factors, are primarily responsible for the low 
level of happiness of the French people. Senik (2014) also discusses 
possible conflict between egalitarian and aristocratic values exacerbated by 
the highly elitist French school system (d’Iribarne, 1989). I will attempt to 
shed a new light on these findings in Part II. 
Oswald (1997) studied France and Italy as cases of nations with low 
levels of happiness in comparison with countries with similar purchasing 
powers such as Belgium or Denmark. The economists Proto and Oswald 
(2014) state that the French, as well as Italians, British and Americans, are 
born miserable and that an explanation for this resides in the genetic 
makeup of the populations.   
 
1.6. This dissertation 
 
The initial question of this PhD dissertation was: Why are the French not as 
happy as citizens in other apparently comparable nations? My main goal 
was to try and gain an understanding of the factors behind this 
phenomenon; however, academic work is rarely linear. Academics start 
with an initial, driving question, and collect material along the way that 
challenges their view and forces them to enlarge, change or modify the 
initial scope of their research. In my case, I did not change my initial 
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question, and inquiring into the relative unhappiness of French people 
remained a driving force behind my work. However, analyzing the data 
caused me to add two additional questions to my main query. First, in the 
attempt to situate France on the world map on the hedonic and cognitive 
components, I found some geographical patterns. So a first additional 
question became: Can we identify clusters of countries in terms of 
happiness and, if so, can we make sense of them?  Second, looking beyond 
the average values of national data, and analyzing the various distributions, 
I observed major differences in the shape of distributions and was forced to 
raise the issue of cultural influences on the surveys themselves. Hence, an 
additional question became: Can we identify cultural variation in responses 
to happiness questions, and, if so, can we make sense of them? 
 
1.6.1 Subject and title 
The title of this dissertation is ‘Geography of happiness: a comparative 
exploration of the case of France’. I use the word ‘geography’ in this title 
for several reasons. Since I largely focused on cross-national and cross-
regional comparison, the first thing I did was look at the world as a 
geographer, studying happiness in nations and regions, trying to understand 
the dynamic of geographical areas through the lens of happiness. However, 
entering happiness research through these geographical borders had in some 
cases a limited impact and, to gain more understanding, I had to go beyond 
state borders and consider the social, economic, and cultural dimensions of 
nations. In doing so, I had to look at characteristics of societies, i.e. GDP, 
inequality, level of education, culture, etc., and characteristics of 
inhabitants, i.e. personalities as levels of happiness in countries’ and 
cultures’ populations float between these two interconnected layers. 
 
1.6.2 Why France?  
France is often portrayed in the popular imagination as a land where 
happiness is easily reachable. In some Germanic languages, for instance in 
German or in Dutch, to live an idle, carefree life is referred as ‘to live like 
God in France’. When one combines this representation with social and 
economic data, such as economic development and social security, one 
would assume that its inhabitants are satisfied with the lives they lead. The 
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non-validity of this hypothesis strikes the eye of the researcher in happiness 
studies. French people actually report to be significantly less happy than 
people in many other nations comparable in terms of economic 
development as I will show in Chapter 4. This begs the question of whether 
the French are really less happy, and if so, why.  
The first reason to focus on France is the surprisingly low level of 
happiness found in this country, as I will show in Part II. Yet, France is not 
the only possible case in this respect. Other interesting cases would be those 
of Germany, Italy or Japan, as the average level of happiness in these 
countries is also below what one would expect when looking at their 
economic development. I chose France because it is my home country, I 
speak the French language and I have a personal interest in better 
understanding what happiness is in France, how the meaning of happiness 
is conveyed, what people say about it and what the determinants of it are. 
Since French is my mother tongue, I have easy access to any document in 
the languages I needed to read on the topic. I wanted to understand the gap 
between the expected quality of life in France and the actual experienced 
quality of French life. Finally, in spite of the attempts to explain this gap, 
presented in section 1.5, the literature is very scarce and requires more 
work.  
 
1.6.3 Approach 
I explored determinants of happiness in nations to find reasons why French 
people report relatively low scores on life satisfaction scales. To do this, I 
identified comparable countries in order to limit the number of variables 
met along the way and to circumscribe the uncertainty inherent in certain 
comparisons; see research limitations (subsection 1.6.4 below).  
In the frame of this dissertation, I used existing data, most of which 
is available in the World Database of Happiness (WDH). This data is 
mainly composed of levels of happiness in regions and nations, 
correlational and distributional findings. In general I looked at correlational 
findings at a macro-level, and in particular, I used both objective indicators 
such as purchasing power, economic freedom, social security, and 
subjective indicators such as the experiences of freedom or the perceptions 
of hierarchy. These indicators have almost exclusively been recorded since 
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the 1970s for most developed countries. The data used concern mainly the 
decade 2000-2010.  
Most of this dissertation is based on an exploratory approach. I 
started analyzing data in a mostly inductive way, looking for correlations 
and patterns that could answer the main question through cross-sectional 
analysis, comparing across nations and regions. Such an approach has 
several advantages. Firstly, it allows the researcher to remain close to the 
data, and not be guided by pre-existing views. A second advantage is that 
random error is also typically smaller at an aggregated level than at an 
individual level, and thus correlations are more meaningful. Next, I 
considered possible flaws in the observed patterns. As a first step, I looked 
at the literature on determinants of happiness to find factors that could 
produce a spurious correlation and then controlled for these as much as 
possible. Once I was reasonably sure that a real correlation existed, I 
attempted to derive a sense of the causal mechanisms involved. For that 
purpose, I used path analysis in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 to get a sense of 
causality. However, most of the analysis is based on zero order and first 
order correlations. 
I divided the data into different groups: 1) all nations 2) developed 
nations and 3) Latin European nations. Locating France in each of these 
groups allows particular aspects to be highlighted. I had to situate France on 
a happiness map, first from the perspective of general life satisfaction, then 
from a components of happiness perspective (Chapter 2). Then, to remove 
as much as possible the influence from factors linked to societal 
development, I looked more specifically at developed nations. These 
include about 50 nations as defined in Chapter 4.  I then had to find smaller 
groups to make comparisons within populations and obtain a more detailed 
understanding of the similarities and differences shown by the data. This 
was not an easy task a priori, as France includes heterogeneous cultures, 
something that was perhaps most clearly demonstrated when I looked at 
family types in France (Chapter 7). France, with a Latin-Mediterranean part 
in the South, a Germanic part in the East and an Anglo-Saxon part in the 
West seems difficult to classify: to which cultural group should France be 
linked? The closest countries to France that I found in terms of happiness, 
of life satisfaction and in terms of components of happiness, were Italy, 
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which is Latin-Mediterranean, Germany, which is Germanic and the United 
Kingdom, which is Anglo-Saxon. It was not easy to assign France to a 
particular cultural area. It was tempting to place it in the Latin area with 
Italy and Spain, but it can equally be argued that it should be placed in a 
group of large European nations alongside Italy, the United Kingdom and 
Germany.  
 
1.6.4 Limitations 
 
Limits of the approach 
The exploratory approach followed in this dissertation has certain 
drawbacks as well. 
 
No random sampling, hence limited generalization 
The available data on happiness in nations covers most of the world’s 
population, but do not provide a random sample of nations. Consequently 
the patterns observed cannot be generalized to all nations and significance 
tests on this level make little sense. Still almost all developed nations are 
represented, so that my findings for these countries can be assumed to be 
reliable. 
 
Limited number of nations and observations per country 
Working at a country level means, by definition, working with a limited 
number of points, which reduces the possibilities of controlling for certain 
variables or using thorough statistical methods, such as multivariate or 
multilevel analyses. I computed first-order partial correlations and 
conducted path analyses in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. The reader has to bear 
in mind that this allows only a limited view on the unique effects of the 
factors considered, which is already difficult due to the entanglement of 
societal variables at hand.  
 
Reverse causality 
The statistical associations reported in this thesis are typically interpreted as 
resulting from an effect on happiness, such as in the case of the economic 
development of nations, where the correlation between GDP and average 
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happiness is usually seen to mean that wealth boosts happiness. But the pre-
supposed causality can also work the other way around. For example, 
happier populations might, for example, create more wealth than unhappier 
populations. The plausibility of such reverse causation will differ across 
topics. In the case of climate, no reverse effect is likely to be involved. In 
other cases, however, the possibility of such effects is at least plausible.  
 Reverse causality is not unlikely in the relationship between 
freedom and happiness, which is central in this dissertation. Lyubomirsky 
et al. (2005) reviewed cross-sectional, longitudinal and experimental 
studies which show that subjective well-being and positive affects fosters 
success as well as pro-social behaviors such as social activities or group 
cooperativeness. These behaviors might lead to more consensus, less 
frictions and possibly more freedom in various forms. On the other hand, 
unhappy people could engage in more anti-social behavior, which could 
lead to restrictions of freedom for individuals, such as choosing one’s 
sexuality, engaging in various forms of commercial exchanges or 
expressing one’s opinion. I was unable to assess the extent to which such 
effects of happiness on freedom are involved. So, this difficult question 
remains open for the time being (see section 8.2).   
 
Spuriousness 
Based on the correlations I found between happiness and various factors, 
i.e. hierarchy, participatory teaching, various types of freedom, in this work 
I propose an interpretative framework to account for levels of happiness in 
France. When a statistical correlation or another link between two factors 
results from a third, hidden factor, we face the risk of spurious correlations. 
Once the effects of this third factor are removed, i.e. controlled, there may 
be no association between the two factors left. Raw correlations are 
important, but it is necessary to be aware of possible spurious relationships 
and to try to identify them. I did my best to identify possible ‘hidden’ or 
alternative effects through the literature and through educated guesses. I 
systematically looked for possible spurious correlations in national data 
using indicators such as GDP and HDI to control for these; however, it is 
always possible that I missed a third, hidden factor that would change the 
interpretation of the findings. 
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 In addition to limitations of my theoretical imagination, there are 
limitations due to the availability of data. I could only control for factors on 
which data was available for a sufficient numbers of countries. 
 
1.6.5 Outline 
The goal of this dissertation is to find answers to the main question of the 
relative French unhappiness, and then to the two additional questions, i.e. 
on the characterization of happiness clusters on one hand and on the 
characterization of cultural response effects on the other. I have divided the 
dissertation into two main parts. The first part is entitled cross national 
patterns of happiness and their measurement. In this part I aim to 
characterize both the clusters and the cultural response effects in order to 
give a broad picture of the happiness clusters before narrowing down on the 
case of France. The second part is entitled exploring the relative 
unhappiness of French people; this is the main part of the dissertation.  
Comparisons of happiness across nations reveal interesting 
disparities between nations and give intriguing results. The usual rankings 
are commonly based on life satisfaction within a nation or group, and these 
data reveal a much more complex view when a bi-dimensional view of life 
satisfaction is adopted, i.e. when happiness is viewed from both hedonic 
and cognitive perspectives. In Chapter 2, I look at the repartition of the 
hedonic and cognitive components throughout 133 nations and identify 6 
clusters: Asia, Islamic countries, Africa, ex-communist countries, Latin 
America and developed nations. I observed large differences within the 
cluster ‘developed nations’. Some countries were noticeably low on both 
axes on the chart, among them Germany, Japan, Italy and France (Brulé & 
Veenhoven 2015a). I focused on the latter case, as France is often 
associated with a high quality of life in collective narratives, and raise the 
following question: How can we explain the relatively low level of life 
satisfaction in France?   
Using the clusters identified in Chapter 2, I look at distributions in 
Chapter 3, finding that people in different countries respond differently to 
happiness questions. As a consequence the distribution of responses to 
happiness questions varies across countries. I observed what resembles a 
cultural measurement effect. It is characterized by having more ‘10’ 
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responses than ‘9’ responses: an effect I call the ten-excess phenomenon. It 
is typically present in Latin America and the Middle-East (Brulé and 
Veenhoven 2015b). This finding opens up an interesting new perspective 
for future research since it concerns the issue of cross-national cultural 
variations as well as methodological questions about measurement bias and 
the validity of international comparisons on the basis of survey data. 
In Chapter 4, I explore happiness through freedom, both in its 
objective and in its subjective form. I do so by comparing France and 
Finland, countries that have the same GDP and comparable objective 
conditions, but have a one-and-half point of difference in life satisfaction 
on a scale of 0-10. I found a large difference in subjective freedom between 
the countries. Comparing life satisfaction and subjective freedom using the 
three dimensions of freedom, i.e. social, psychological, potential, as defined 
by Bay (1962), I observed that social freedom and potential freedom were 
somewhat similar, but observed large differences in psychological freedom 
between France and Finland. I constructed a model and observed a causal 
relationship between psychological freedom, perceived freedom and 
happiness (Brulé and Veenhoven 2014a).  
In Chapter 5, I demonstrate and discuss, looking at schools, that 
participatory teaching has a large influence on adults’ happiness, but not on 
teenagers’. Using Bay’s taxonomy, as in Chapter 4, I observed that 
psychological freedom is the key to explain this phenomenon. Participatory 
teaching develops self-development during one’s schooling years. Once 
adult, this psychological freedom is revealed as useful as a decision-making 
capacity in terms of happiness (Brulé and Veenhoven 2014b).  
In Chapter 6, I present an observation of the influence of power 
distance, which I call hierarchy, on the happiness of people. Looking at 
developed nations, we see a very strong direct effect of hierarchy on 
happiness. This is particularly true when comparing the Southern countries 
of Europe and the Northern countries of Europe. It is not embedded in the 
values of the countries, as all the countries seem to value hierarchy 
somewhat similarly. It is a difference rather in practice; the difference 
between ‘as it is’ and ‘as it should be’ seems to be larger in the Southern 
European nations. I explain this using a macro-sociological approach (Brulé 
and Veenhoven 2012). 
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In Chapter 7, I look at the links between freedom and happiness in 
the context of the family unit. Comparing the dominant family type and 
average happiness across the regions of Europe, I observed a link between 
intragenerational freedom and happiness, and no link between 
intergenerational freedom and happiness; the more egalitarian the dominant 
family type is, the unhappier the inhabitants of a region are (Brulé and 
Veenhoven 2014c). I explore this apparent contradiction in the conclusion. 
Finally, in Chapter 8, I summarize the main findings and talk about 
future challenges for happiness research, including my own research.   
Chapters 2 to 7 are based on papers that are either published 
(Chapters 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7) or in the process of being published (Chapter 3). 
As compared to the published versions I have kept the paragraphs on 
definitions, data and measurements in the chapters to a minimum, 
concentrating this information in the introductory chapter, in order to avoid 
redundancy.    
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PART I: 
 
CROSS-NATIONAL PATTERN OF HAPPINESS 
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Chapter 2: Geography of happiness7 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Much of the research described in the previous chapter is focused on 
happiness in the sense of overall life-satisfaction. This overall appraisal of 
life is seen to draw on two sources of information that are called 
‘components’ (Veenhoven 2009): 1) how well one feels most of the time 
and 2) to what extend one’s wants are being met (Figure 2.1). These 
components of happiness can be measured separately and therefore it is also 
possible to assess these in nations. Though possible in principle, such 
measures were not available until recently. Yet since the start of the Gallup 
World Poll in 2005 we got data on both components of happiness for most 
nations of the world. This makes it possible to explore variations on 
components of happiness across nations. 
 
Figure 2.1: Overall happiness, i.e. life-satisfaction and its ‘components’ 
 
 
 
 
Hedonic level of affect.  
Like other animals, humans can feel good or bad, but unlike other animals, 
we can reflect on that experience, assess how well we feel most of the time 
                                                 
7
 This chapter is published as Brulé G. and Veenhoven R. (2015) Geography of happiness: 
components of happiness in 133 Nations. International Journal of Happiness and 
Development. Vol.2, n°2. 
 
Overall happiness
Hedonic level of 
affect
Contentment
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and communicate this to others. This is the feeling-based part of happiness. 
Veenhoven assumes that affective experience draws on gratification of 
innate needs and infers on this basis that the determinants of hedonic 
happiness are universal (Veenhoven, 2010). 
  
Contentment 
Unlike other animals, humans can also appraise their life cognitively and 
compare their life as it is with how they want it to be. Wants are typically 
guided by common standards of the good life and in that sense contentment 
is likely to be more culturally variable than affect level. This cognitive 
appraisal of life assumes intellectual capacity and for this reason this 
concept hardly  applies to people who lack this capacity, such as young 
children, for whom it is harder to oversee their life as a whole and thus to 
have  clear standards in mind. 
 
Literature on components of happiness in nations 
In that context a first question is which of these two components weights 
most in the overall evaluation of life and whether the weights differ across 
cultures. That question has been considered by Rojas and Veenhoven 
(2012). In the same vein, Clark and Senik (2011) compared the link 
between life satisfaction and cognitive, hedonic and eudemonic components 
in 21 European countries and found that these components do not correlate 
well for all nations.  
  Another question is to what extent these sub-appraisals of life go 
together and whether correlations differ across cultures. As yet few studies 
have compared ‘components’ of happiness across nations8. Can people in a 
country be contented cognitively, while feeling miserable affectively? 
Some critics of modernity (Scitovsky (1976), Lane (2000)) see the high 
rates of depression in ‘happy’ nations as a proof. Likewise, could it be that 
people in a country are discontented with what they have, but still feel fine 
affectively? In that line, a common narrative is that people in poor nations 
are ‘poor but happy’, a Western stereotype well depicted by Lévi-Strauss 
                                                 
8
 This is reflected in the above-mentioned collection ‘Happiness in Nations’ of the World 
Database of Happiness. Among the findings on average happiness in nations, only 8 % are 
based on measures of affect level and 12% on measures of contentment 
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(1955). These guesses link up with a wider question of the effect of societal 
development on happiness. Life-satisfaction is typically higher in 
developed nations, but is that because modern people feel better or because 
of a smaller gap between what they want and what they have? As we will 
see in more detail below that latter question is critical in the moral 
evaluation of societal development.  
 
Measures of hedonic level of affect 
There are several ways to ask people to assess how well they feel generally.  
One way is to invite to a general estimate, for instance with the question: 
‘How often have you felt happy during the past 6 weeks?’ Questions of this 
kind are coded A-TH (Affect: Time Happy), in the collection of happiness 
measures.  
 A second method used to assess happiness is multi-moment 
assessment and this involves a series of repeated questions such as: ‘How 
happy do you feel right now?’ Measures of this kind are coded A-ARE, 
(Affect: Average Repeated Estimates), in the collection ‘Measures of 
Happiness’. 
 A third approach to assessing hedonic level is to ask first about 
various specific affects experienced in the recent past, both positive affects 
such as ‘joy’ and negative affects such as ‘anger’. Next an ‘affect balance 
score’ is computed by subtracting reported negative affects from reported 
positive affects. Measures of this kind are coded A-AB (Affect: Affect 
Balance) in the collection Measures of Happiness. A common example is 
the PANAS scale (Watson et al., 1988). A variant of this latter method was 
used in this study. 
   
Measures of contentment 
Contentment can be measured using a global question, such as: ‘How 
successful are you in getting what you want from life?’ (code C-RW, 
Contentment: Realize Wants). 
 A more sophisticated method to assess happiness involves three 
steps:  First respondents are asked to list the things they want from life. 
Next they rate how successful they are in reaching each of these things. 
Finally the investigator computes the respondents’ average success in 
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meeting their wants, eventually weighed by importance. Measures of this 
kind are coded C-ASG (Contentment: Average Success in Goals) in the 
collection ‘Measures of Happiness. 
  A variant of the above approach which I have briefly described in 
the previous chapter as self-defined scale, does not ask respondents for 
personal ‘wants’, but rather refers to notions of the good life. The first step 
is to ask people what they think of as the ‘best possible life’ and next what 
constitutes the ‘worst possible life’. After priming the respondents with 
these open questions, they are presented with a ladder and asked to imagine 
that the top of the ladder represents the best possible life that they just had 
described and that the bottom of the ladder represents their worst concept of 
the worst possible life. As a last step respondents are asked to rate their 
present life on the ladder, in some variants of this approach this is done 
after respondents have been asked to rate their life 5 years ago and how 
they envisage their life 5 years from now. This method is known as 
Cantril’s (1965) ‘ladder of life scale’ and is coded C-BW (Contentment: 
Best Worst) in the collection ‘Measures of Happiness’. In this study I used 
a simplified version of the method that involved only the last step.  
 
2.2. Data 
 
The Gallup Organization has been involved in cross-national surveys on 
happiness since the 1970s (Gallup, 1976). In 2005 Gallup started its ‘World 
Poll’, which involves yearly surveys in almost of all the countries of the 
world. Data are now available for 155 nations for the years 2006 to 2009 
(Gallup, 2009). In each country, about 1,000 people were interviewed. In 
22 countries of the 155
9
, data on at least one of the components is not 
available, which is why I draw on 133 countries.  
In some countries, surveys were held in all the study years (2006, 
2007, 2008, 2009) and in some countries data was collected only once in 
this period. When data on more than one year were available for a country, 
                                                 
9
 Suriname, Western Sahara, Guinea Bissau, Gabon, Lesotho, Swaziland, Somalia, Eritrea, 
Oman, Bhutan, North Korea, Papua new guinea, New Caledonia, Vanuatu, Fiji, Salomon 
Islands, Kiribati, Greenland, Hong Kong, Yemen, Guinea, South Georgia and the South 
Sandwich Islands. 
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I took the average
10
. One might wonder about the stability over time of the 
results. The data on contentment and hedonic level of affect does not allow 
one to assess stability over time, but we know that overall happiness is 
stable over time within countries
11
; thus, it is very likely that its 
subcomponents, contentment and hedonic level of affect also are stable 
over time. 
  In 2006 the questionnaire of The Gallup World Poll contained 
questions on all three happiness variants: a question on overall life-
satisfaction, a question on contentment and a series of questions on affect.  
The results of the Gallup World Poll are not freely available, but some of 
them can be accessed temporarily on the Gallup World View website 
https://worldview.gallup.com/. Among these free data are the average 
responses in countries to the questions about affect and contentment. I kept 
track of these reports and entered the findings in our data file ‘States of 
Nations’ (Veenhoven, 2014f). 
 
Questions on hedonic level of affect  
The Gallup World Poll contains 14 questions about how the respondent felt 
yesterday. The first eight are introduced with the following lead question:  
‘Did you experience the following feelings during a lot of the day 
yesterday? How about:  (a) enjoyment, (b) physical pain, (c) worry, (d) 
sadness, (e) stress, (f) anger, (g) depression,(h) love.’ Respondents 
were also asked: ‘Now please think about yesterday, from the morning until 
the end of the day. Think of where you were, what you were doing and how 
you felt: (i) Did you feel well rested yesterday? (j) Did you smile or laugh a 
lot yesterday? (k) Did you learn or do something interesting yesterday? (l) 
Would you like to have more days just like yesterday?(m) Were you proud 
of something you did yesterday? (n) Were you treated with respect all day 
yesterday?’ 
                                                 
10
 The years and the size of the samples can be accessed at: 
http://www.worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/hap_nat/desc_qt.php?qt=92 
11
 Trend report for Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Japan, 
Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Spain, UK, USA are available at: 
http://www.worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/hap_nat/findingreports/TrendReport_Averag
eHappiness.pdf 
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  Respondents can answer either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ to each of these 
questions. On its World View website Gallup reports the percentage ‘yes’ 
responses to each of these questions in the participating countries. It is on 
this basis that I computed the average percentage of positive affects 
reported in each of the countries: (a+h+i+j+k+l+m+n)/8. Likewise, I 
computed the average percentage of negative affects reported: 
(b+c+d+e+f+g)/6. As a last step, I subtracted the latter percentage from the 
former. The resulting affect balance score denotes the degree to which 
positive affects outweigh negative affects.  
It appears that the sum is positive in all countries, which means the 
percentage of positive affects reported tends to be greater than the 
percentage of negative affects. The percentages range from 11 (Ethiopia) to 
66 (Iceland). This variable is entered in the data file ‘States of Nations’12. 
 The method above is not suited for measuring the hedonic level of 
affect of individuals, since yesterday's affect does not always correspond 
with the typical affect of the individual. Yet this method can be used to 
measure hedonic level in aggregates, such as nations, since individual 
variations balance out in big samples.  
 
Questions on contentment 
The single question on contentment in the Gallup World Poll reads as 
follows:  ‘Here is a picture of a ladder, suppose that the top represents the 
best possible life and the bottom the worst possible life. Where on this 
ladder would you place your current life?’ (0 worst possible, 10 best 
possible). Average responses differ widely across nations, the highest 
average is observed in Denmark (8.0) and the lowest in Iraq (3.2). This data 
is also stored in the data file ‘States of Nations’13.  
 
2.3. Results 
 
I plotted average affect against average contentment in nations and 
inspected the extent to which these components of happiness converged or 
diverged and if I could find any pattern in this mapping. 
                                                 
12
 Variable name: HappinessYesterdayABS_2006.08. 
13 Variable name: HappinessBW11_2006.09 
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Correlation between average affect and contentment in nations 
Not surprisingly, scores on the two components of happiness tend to go 
together, in countries where affect is high, contentment also tends to be 
high; r = +.48. Yet the correlation is far from being perfect. This is in line 
with the findings of Rojas and Veenhoven (2013). While these authors 
looked for the contribution to life satisfaction of each of the components, I 
looked at the way these two components of happiness go together. I looked 
for similarities in co-variance and recognized clusters of countries in 
specific geographical areas and sharing a common culture. These clusters 
are circled in Figure 2.2. 
 
Figure 2.2: Configurations of average affect balance by average 
contentment in 133 countries in the world 2006-2009 
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Geographical areas 
 
Six geographical areas stand out in Figure 2.2: one, Western nations, 
composed of the wealthiest countries; two, former communist countries; 
three, Latin America; four, Africa; five, Asia and six, Islamic countries. 
Table 2.1 presents variance within the different clusters as well as 
intercluster variance. Intercluster variance is superior to intracluster 
variance and indicates that this set of clusters is relevant.  
 
Table 2.1: Comparison of variance between and within clusters  
Intracluster variance +.16 
Black Africa +.20 
Asia +.22 
Latin America +.20 
Western nations +.12 
Islamic +.13 
Ex-communist  +.11 
Intercluster variance +.33 
 
These clusters cover most of the countries quite well, however, a few 
countries fall out of their geographical zone. Noticeable outliers are 
Germany, Spain, Portugal, Chile, Bolivia, Peru and Bulgaria.  
 
Correlation within cultural clusters 
We have seen that the general correlation is +.48, but there are large 
difference in homogeneity of the above-mentioned zones. The correlation 
coefficients of the different zones are presented in Table 2.2 below.  
 
Table 2.2: Correlation between average hedonic level of affect and 
contentment in nations by cultural zone 
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Cultural zone N R 
Black Africa 29 +.43 
Asia 25 +.23 
Latin America 22 +.74 
Western 20 +.70 
Islamic 15 +.45 
Ex-communist  20 +.38 
 
Inter-zone correlations between the two components of happiness range 
from +.23 (Asia) to +.81 (Latin America). The correlation for Asia (+.23) is 
lower than the global correlation (+.48), which is not surprising: this area 
presents the highest heterogeneity among the different zones. The 
correlations for former communist countries and Africa are more in line 
with the global correlation (+.38 and +.43). Relatively high correlations 
appear in the Western countries, Islamic countries and Latin America 
(respectively +.70, +.78 and +.81). 
 
 Concordance in combinations of affect and contentment in nations 
In order to explore patterns of convergence and divergence, I divided the 
scores on both components of happiness into the tiers ‘low’, ‘medium’ and 
‘high’. This resulted in nine possible combinations, three of which were 
concordant, e.g. low affect – low contentment, and six of which were 
discordant, e.g. low affect – medium contentment.  
 
Concordant combinations 
Areas where affect and contentment go hand in hand are presented in 
Figure 2.3. The concordant combination ‘low-low’ was typical of Islamic 
countries. The concordant combination ‘medium-medium’ gathered most of 
the Asian countries, whereas the ‘high-high’ combination was typical of 
rich countries, mostly western nations.  
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Figure 2.3: Concordant combinations 
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Discordant combinations 
Area’s where affect and contentment diverge are presented in Figure 2.4. 
The combination of low affect and medium contentment appeared to be 
typical for the former communist nations. The combination of medium 
affect and low contentment appeared to be characteristic of African 
countries. The combination of high affect and medium contentment was 
typical for Latin America. The combination of high affect and low 
contentment was seen in a few African countries, i.e. Kenya, Mali and 
Niger. There were no countries with low affect and high contentment. 
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Figure 2.4: Discordant combinations 
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2.4. Discussion 
 
What does this empirical exploration tell us about happiness? Below I will 
first interpret the patterns in the light of existing civilizations matrices. Next 
I will look at these societies from the perspective of needs and wants. 
 
2.4.1. Why geography makes sense? 
 Our approach is empirically-driven and most geographical clusters were 
trivial. The question is why does geography matter so much? Why would 
geographical clustering make any sense at all? By definition, geographical 
areas present some continuity and some resemblance, at least more so than 
with any random remote country, for instance with link to the climate. 
Because all borders have been to various degrees porous at some point in 
history, they also present some continuity; through these pores, different 
materials (economic, genetic and cultural) have been exchanged. This 
means that neighbouring societies are likely to share some resemblance in 
societal development and cultural environment, more so than with any other 
country. This is also true for countries with a common culture and a 
comparable level of development but no geographic proximity (e.g. United 
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Kingdom and Australia). In general, countries from a common geographical 
area also present as well some heterogeneity, but as seen in the previous 
section, not as much as with other areas in average. In particular, societal 
development and cultures within geographical areas are much closer than 
they are between geographical areas. Thus, gratification of wants and needs 
and the way inhabitants answer to those questions are likely to converge to 
some extent. Below I discuss first, the cultural homogeneity looking at 
existing classifications and second, I look at societal development using 
Veenhoven’s theory of gratification of needs and wants.  
  
2.4.2. Link with cultural differences 
I identified 6 geographical clusters. Is there a link with clusters as identified 
in comparative studies of culture? Below I consider three of these.  
 
Inglehart’s value zones 
Inglehart(2000) defines 8 cultures through the study of clusters of values: 
Africa, South Asia, Confucian, English speaking, Protestant Europe, 
Catholic Europe, Latin America and Ex-Communist. Probably because of 
lack of data, an obvious miss is Islamic culture; this would make nine 
cultures.  
 At first, we can see that the clusters I defined are quite in line with 
Inglehart’s classification. Africa, Latin America and ex-communist are the 
same clusters as the ones that stand out on Figure 2.2. Then, there are slight 
differences between classifications.  
  The cluster ‘Western nations’ I defined correspond to Inglehart’s 
‘Catholic Europe’, ‘Protestant Europe’ and ‘Anglo-Saxon countries’ 
clusters combined. I reckon they are large differences inside the cluster as I 
defined it and there would be room to define sub-clusters, although they 
would be different from Inglehart’s classification. Whereas I would define 
it as the South part of Europe (geographically), Inglehart mainly introduces 
religion. A good example of difference is Austria; although this is a 
Catholic country, it clearly does not fit in the Latin Europe sub-group as the 
hedonic component is higher than this group and is, in my classification 
clearly in the Protestant group, which also includes Germanic countries. 
Next, whereas Inglehart makes a distinction between Protestant Europe and 
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English speaking, I reckon that the three sub-groups, ‘Protestant Europe’, 
‘Anglo-Saxon countries’ and ‘Germanic countries’ form a homogeneous 
group, with high scores on both hedonic and cognitive components.  
Finally, I define a wide cluster ‘Asia’ whereas Inglehart’s separates 
‘Confucian countries’ from ‘South Asia’. When looking at the map of 
happiness, it is impossible to dissociate Confucian countries from south 
Asian ones as the overlap is too important to dissociate them. This is partly 
due to the high heterogeneity of the two groups and particularly the South 
Asian one, who gathers countries as different as Vietnam, Armenia, 
Turkey, India or Israel. Furthermore, it seems wise to split the category 
South Asia in two parts, one to be added to the Asian group and one to the 
Islamic group.  
 
Nadoulek’s religious civilizations 
Nadoulek defines 7 civilizations largely based on religion: Catholic, 
Protestant, Hindhu, African, Islamic, Asian and Orthodox. Inglehart’s and 
Nadoulek’s matrices present some similarities in the structure and some 
noticeable differences. Nadoulek places together Latin America with Latin 
Europe under ‘Catholic’ whereas Inglehart has them separately. Both 
authors divide Asia in two parts, but the Hindhu part of Nadoulek is 
restricted to two nations (India, Sri Lanka) which are included in the South 
Asian part of Inglehart together with many countries.  
  The clusters I identified present some strong similarities with 
Nadoulek’s classification. The groups African and Islamic are identical. 
Nadoulek’s Orthodox group is very close from the ex-communist group as I 
defined it except a few differences; for instance Greece is in the Western 
nation group and not in the ex-communist group in my classification, as its 
happiness configuration is closer to Western nations than to the ex-
communist one.  
  A major difference between Nadoulek’s classification and the one I 
defined is the Latin civilization; whereas Nadoulek joins the group of Latin 
America and Latin Europe under Catholic culture, their happiness is clearly 
different. In terms of happiness, Latin America and Latin Europe, which is 
part of the cluster ‘Western nations’ are completely separated, the former 
combining high affect level and medium contentment, the other one 
 59 
 
presenting the reverse pattern. Finally, it integrates as well the Hindu 
culture as a category on its own; with only two countries (India, Sri Lanka), 
it is complicated to see if this makes a group on its own. However, it does 
fit very well in the Asian group. I do not deny it to be a cultural group on its 
own, but on the basis of the two components of happiness, it is not 
justifiable to isolate it.  
 
Huntington’s civilizations 
Huntington defines 8 types of civilizations: Western, Orthodox, Islamic, 
Latin American, Sinic, Hindhu, Buddhist and Japanese (and may be 
African). 
 The classification presents some similarities with the one I defined; 
Islamic and Latin American are strictly identical, Orthodox, as for 
Nadoulek, is almost identical to the ex-communist group in my 
classification. 
Next, there are some differences. That the African civilization, the 
oldest civilization, representing 650 million people might not be a 
civilization according to the author can interrogate us on the validity of his 
set of civilizations. I do see a clear Black African group consisting of low 
contentment and medium to high hedonic level of affect. Furthermore, 
Huntington defines 4 Asian civilizations: Sinic, Hindhu, Buddhist and 
Japanese. As for Inglehart, I am not able to disentangle different groups 
within the Asian clusters for different reasons. The overlap between the 
Sinic and the Buddhist is too wide for me to separate them. As for the 
Japanese and the Hindhu ones, they consist of respectively one and two 
countries and those sub-clusters perfectly fit with the wider Asian cluster. 
Therefore, leave them together does not seem to be a bad idea. 
 
All in all, the clusters I defined show a common ground with each of the 
three classifications of cultures discussed above. This suggests a simple, 
although far-reaching implication, that each civilization has a distinct 
pattern of happiness.   
 
2.4.3. Interpretation though the lens of needs and wants 
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According to Veenhoven (2009) hedonic level of affect draws on the 
gratification of needs, while contentment is a matter of perceived 
realization of wants. 
  In his theory ‘needs’ are vital requirements for survival, such as 
eating, bonding and exercise. Nature seems to have safeguarded the 
gratification of these needs with affective signals such as hunger, love and 
zest. These separate signals generalize in the hedonic tone of mood and 
consequently good mood seems to denote that most needs are sufficiently 
met (Veenhoven, 2009). As such, good mood tells us that we are doing 
well.  
In this theory ‘needs’ should not be equated with ‘wants’. Needs are 
inborn and universal, while ‘wants’ are acquired and can vary across 
cultures. One may want things one does not need, or needs things one does 
not want. Such divergence occurs at the individual level, e.g. a priest who 
wants to forsake his need for sex, and at the societal level. A common 
criticism of western society is that it creates wants that do not fit needs. In 
that line Scitovsky argues that the products we buy do not satisfy 
(Scitovsky, 1976). Likewise Lane argues that we want wealth, while we 
need companionship (Lane, 2000).  
 
Explanation of convergence 
We have seen above that average affect and contentment go closely 
together in half of the nations (Figure 2.3) Seen in the context of this theory 
this means that we typically want what we need. If need gratification falls 
short in a country, people feel bad and are also discontented and if needs 
are well met in the country, scores on both components of happiness are 
high.  
 
Explanations of divergences 
Yet we have also seen several discordant combinations (Figure 2.4). If 
needs gratification and wants gratification tend to go together, how can we 
explain the divergent cases? 
  Let us first consider the case of the former communist nations, 
where the level of affect is low, and contentment is medium. The low level 
of affect indicates deficient need gratification. This can for instance be an 
 61 
 
echo of the communist past, which seems to have worked out negatively on 
intimate networks and to have reduced the capacity of individual to take 
control of their own lives. This may have thwarted gratification of the needs 
for companionship, self-respect or self-actualization. Yet much has changed 
for the better in these countries and for that reason one can imagine that 
people do not rate their life as ‘worst possible’, but rather tick the middle of 
the contentment scale.  
 In the same vein, how can we explain the situation of the countries 
with high contentment and medium affect, such as France, Israel, Italy and 
Germany?  It is well possible that these societies with a high level of 
development fail to meet human needs such as self-esteem or self-
realization. Possible explanation for this would be the teaching practices or 
the high power distance that is present in most of these countries which is 
likely to thwart the need for ‘self-respect’. This explanation fits my findings 
on the negative effect of vertical teaching practices (Chapter 5) and high 
power distance ((Chapter 6). 
 How about Africa, where affect is at the medium level, but 
contentment low? The medium level of affect indicates that need 
gratification might not too bad in these countries, possibly because of 
seasoned survival strategies embedded in these cultures. Why then are 
people not equally contented? Probably because they are aware that life 
could be better and in particular that their material standard of living could 
be higher. The low contentment of Africans could then bea matter of 
‘relative deprivation’. Possibly contentment would have been scored at the 
medium level if Africans were unaware of living conditions elsewhere.  
Following this line, the pattern of high affect and medium 
contentment in Latin America would mean that human needs are fairly well 
met in Latin American societies, though life falls short on notions of how it 
could be. It is not easy to grasp why Latin American societies do so well 
with respect to need-gratification. It has been suggested that the need for 
social contact is well met in Latin culture, but it is difficult to prove that 
this really makes a difference. It is easier to understand why contentment is 
only at the medium level in Latin American countries, the high income 
inequality found in these countries is likely to foster a sense of relative 
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deprivation in most individuals and across borders the salient example of 
the United States of America is likely to do the same. 
 
Explanation for absence of low affect-high contentment combination 
As we have seen, the combination of high contentment-low affect balance 
was not found. In the context of this theory that can be interpreted as 
preponderance of needs over wants. When minimum gratification of needs 
is at risk, we might feel so bad affectively that we cannot comfort ourselves 
with cognitive accommodation. 
 
Application to differences in components across societal development 
Earlier research has shown that overall life-satisfaction tends to be higher in 
developed nations than in developing ones. This difference appears in 
strong correlations with various indicators of societal development, such as 
wealth e.g. Schyns (1998), Layard (2005), Bjornskov (2007), Stanca 
(2010), democracy e.g. Frey & Stutzer (2002), institutional quality e.g. Ott 
(2010) and value pattern (e.g. Inglehart (2000). In this data set the 
correlation between overall life-satisfaction and income per capita is +.61. 
  Let’s now consider the correlation with each of the components of 
happiness: the correlation between income per capita and average affect 
level is much lower: r = +.20. Reversely the correlation with contentment is 
higher: r =+.79, as highlighted by Rojas and Veenhoven (2013). How to 
make sense of these findings? 
At first sight this could mean that the effect of societal development 
on happiness is a matter of comparison in the first place and that modern 
society does not do much better in meeting human needs. This 
interpretation would fit the earlier mentioned qualms about the livability of 
modern society and the related claim that the higher ‘happiness’ in modern 
nations is mere superficial contentment that masks an epidemic of 
depression. Yet that explanation does not fit the fact that average affect is 
still higher in the developed nations than in developing ones. This 
explanation does not fit either with the observation that affect and 
contentment are highly correlated in developed nations, since this 
explanation would rather predict a non-correlation or even a negative one. 
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Rather than denouncing the happiness in developed nations, one 
could read these data as showing that need-gratification is not so bad in 
developing nations, though still not so good as it is in developed nations. In 
this context the discordant combination of affect and contentment in 
African countries makes sense. People do not feel too bad, so their basic 
needs are reasonably met. Still they know that life could be better and for 
that reason they do not report contented. Africans score indeed low on 
contentment and the correlation between affect and contentment is 
relatively low in nations of low development. 
 
2.4.4. What strategy for the delineation of clusters? 
The two criteria that are important to delineate proper clusters are: one, 
maximization of intercluster variance and two, minimization of intracluster 
variance. Most of the time, these two criteria are contradictory, e.g. when 
increasing the number of cluster, the intracluster variance increases whereas 
the intercluster variance decreases. As for now I delineated large clusters, 
maximizing intercluster variance. The large clusters could be broken down 
into sub-clusters and that would be a nice work to do in the future. Already, 
based on my observation, I see potential sub clusters in the western nations 
one; for instance, we can see ‘Latin Europe’, ‘English speaking’ and 
‘Protestant Europe’. The first one differs from the rest with a middle 
hedonic level of affect whereas the rest is characterized by a high level. Yet 
one have to be consistent in terms of aggregation and in this chapter, my 
interest was into defining the largest clusters and to maximize intercluster 
variance. Future work could consist in dividing these large clusters into 
sub-clusters.  
 
2.5. Conclusions 
Life can be appraised on the basis of two components: how well one feels 
and to what extent one perceives oneself to get what one wants from life. 
Ratings on these ‘components of happiness’ seem to differ quite a lot across 
nations. As one might expect, affect and contentment tend to go hand in 
hand in most cases; yet there is also a cluster of nations in which people 
report fairly contented but feel bad, i.e. former communist countries, and 
several clusters of nations where people report to feel fairly good but 
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discontented, i.e. Latin America. These differences across geographical 
clusters are likely to correspond to some extent to variations in societal 
characteristics as well as in cultural differences.  
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Chapter 3: Cultural variation and 
measurement bias in survey responses: 
presentation of the 10-excess14 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
3.1.1 Research biases in happiness studies 
 
Survey questions 
Survey research involves interrogation, typically using ‘closed’ questions. 
Respondents are presented with a standard question and answer by 
choosing one of a few response options, such as ‘very happy’, ‘pretty 
happy’ or ‘not too happy’. Questions are presented in personal interviews, 
in questionnaires or via internet. This method of collecting information is 
vulnerable to various biases. Below I mention some of these and discuss 
how these may affect the measurement of happiness.  
 
Validity doubts 
Responses to survey questions may fail to measure what they are supposed 
to measure. In this context, Bourdieu (1994) argues that closed questions 
might shed light on topics that people would not otherwise consider. 
Likewise, Morin (1994) argues closed questions ‘trap’ respondents in pre-
established schemes. An objection particular to survey questions on 
happiness is that such questions tap how happy respondents feel they 
should be given their situation, rather than how happy they actually are. 
 These qualms have given rise to many validity tests, see the 31 
publications listed in section Ca01 of the Bibliography of Happiness. The 
conclusion is that the validity of such responses is quite good, provided that 
questions clearly address subjective appreciation with one’s life as a whole. 
                                                 
14
 This chapter is accepted with minor modifications in Social Indicators Research and is 
to date (August 2015) in the reviewing process.  
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Still there are persistent qualms about the reliability of answers to questions 
about happiness. 
 
Reliability biases 
Even if responses to questions about happiness reflect the respondents’ life 
satisfaction, they may do this inaccurately. Responses can be distorted in 
several ways, some of which are listed below.    
 
Desirability bias: It has been suggested that desirability bias produces 
unrealistically high scores on happiness; for instance self-ratings of 
happiness tends to be slightly higher in personal interviews than on 
anonymous questionnaires (Phillips & Clancy 1972).  
 
Interviewer bias: This occurs when responses are influenced by 
characteristics of the interviewer; for instance, if the interviewer is in a 
wheelchair, the benefit of good health is salient. Respondents in good 
health will then rate their happiness somewhat higher and the correlation of 
happiness-ratings with health variables is more pronounced (Smit et al. 
1995).  
 
Extreme Response Bias (ERB): Some respondents tend to tick the highest or 
the lowest option. Greenleaf (1992) found that this tendency is related to 
the age, education level, and household income of respondents, but not to 
their gender. Vulnerability varies across topics, in a study on positive and 
negative effects; Diener et al. (1991) report that mood intensity is quite 
vulnerable to extreme response bias. Maggino (2003) found that longer 
scales less vulnerable to extreme response biases than shorter scales.  
 
Contextual bias: The presentation of the study, the conversational context 
(Smith et al, 2006) and the day of the week are among other factors that 
influence the response of interviewees. Reponses to questions about 
satisfaction with one’s life as a whole tend to be slightly more positive 
when asked on a Monday than on a Friday, Saturday or Sunday (Akay & 
Martinsson, 2009). 
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Questionnaire effect: The order of questions has been proved to influence 
both the distribution of responses and the association with other 
variables(Glenn & Taylor 1990)., e.g. the observed correlation between 
happiness and income tends to be higher if the question on happiness 
follows after questions about income.  
 
Cultural measurement bias: The above mentioned biases can be random or 
systematic. Random bias is no great problem in cross-national happiness 
research, since random distortions typically balance out in big samples. 
Systematic bias is trickier, in particular when cultural factors are involved. 
This is called ‘cultural measurement bias’.  
  Veenhoven (2012) estimates the degree to which cross-national 
differences in average happiness are distorted by cultural measurement 
bias, but to a small extent. Although cultural measurement might not be 
dramatic, it is still worth knowing what particular biases are involved and 
whether these distortions can be corrected. 
 In this context the extreme response bias (Diener et al. 1991) 
deserves consideration, as this kind of bias appears to differ across cultures. 
Culpepper & Zimmerman (2006) have shown in a study done in an 
American university, that Hispanic students are more prone to extreme 
responses; Hispanic students were less likely to go for middle responses 
and would go more for extremes than their Anglo-Saxon counterparts. 
Likewise, Chinese students were less inclined to extreme responses than 
Caucasian students (Song et al. 2011). In a bi-ethnic comparison in Israel, 
Arab respondents have been shown to go more easily for extreme responses 
than their Jewish counterparts (Baron-Epel et al. 2010). In this respect, one 
can question the attempt of Johnson et al. (2005) to link response styles 
with Hofstede’s measures, as those are themselves heavily depending also 
on response styles.   
 
3.1.2 The ’10-excess’ phenomenon in responses to questions on 
happiness in different nations 
A particular type of extreme response bias (ERB) appears in responses to 
survey questions about happiness using a numerical response scale ranging 
from 0 to 10:  in several countries the percentage of responses in the highest 
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category (10) is surprisingly high and does not fit the unimodal distribution 
we typically see. In these cases the option ‘10’ is more often ticked than the 
option ‘9’. 
   An example of such a frequency distribution is presented on Figure 
3.1. This is the case of Austria where the percentage of 10 responses is 
almost twice as high as the percentage of 9 responses, contrary to Australia, 
which shows a more classic unimodal curve. I call this the ‘10-excess’ 
phenomenon.  
As we will see in more detail in section 4, this pattern appears in 
many countries all over the world and is particularly frequent in Latin 
America and the Middle East. 
 
Figure 3.1: Two distributions of responses to a single question about life 
satisfaction 
Classic, Australia 2005 and 10-excess, Austria 1999 
 
 
 
 
3.1.3 Research question 
Our goal with this chapter is to give a first exploration to the 10-excess 
phenomenon: how often does it appear and where?  What are the possible 
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reasons behind this response pattern? Is this a reflection of reality or a 
matter of measurement bias? This is worth knowing as the 0-10 numerical 
response scale has become standard in happiness studies. Understand this 
type of response pattern will help us researchers in happiness studies gain 
understanding of the tools we are using.  
 
3.1.4 Plan of this chapter 
I will first describe how I define ‘excess’ in the most positive response 
possible (Section 2). Next I assess the prevalence of the 10-excess 
phenomenon, how often it occurs and in which nations in particular 
(Section 3). On that basis I suggest several possible explanations for this 
phenomenon and check these one by one (section 4).  Most of the 
explanations I considered failed an empirical test. I conclude that some 
cultural bias is involved (section 5).   
 
3.2 Subject matter 
   
3.2.1 Data on happiness in nations 
I used this collection of data responses and considered the findings obtained 
for questions that used a numerical response scale (type n), with at least 10 
options, that is, either 1 to 10 scales, as in Figure 3.1, or 0 to 10 scales. This 
type of response scale has been used for that use the keyword ‘happiness’ 
or ‘life-satisfaction’ and also for ratings of one’s life between ‘best 
possible’ and ‘worst possible’, a rating which is better known as the Cantril 
ladder (Cantril 1965).  
To date these kinds of questions have been used in more than 5000 
survey studies in the general public of nations and for 1367 of the surveys 
the full distribution of responses is reported, rather than only the mean and 
standard deviation. In section 3 I inspect the 10-excess responses in the 
1367 distributions. 
 
3.2.2 Identification of 10-excess in responses to survey question on 
happiness  
I speak of ’10-excess’ when the number of 10 responses is higher than that 
of the number of 9 responses. The degree of excess is expressed in a Ten 
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Over Nine ratio, that I call the TON. I speak of 10-excess when TON is 
greater than 1. 
 
3.3 Prevalence of 10-excess 
 
In responses to questions on life-satisfaction 
Out of the 1367 distributions, 534 are on a numerical scale ranging from 0 
to 10 and 833 on a scale ranging from 1 to 10. Since this small variation in 
scale length might make a difference, I considered them separately. For 
reasons of readability, I will present only the first 15 countries by 
alphabetical order in the tables to come, the complete results are available 
online
15
. 
  As a first step I inspected the distribution of responses, and I present 
an illustrative overview of the most recent scores on the 1-10 scale in 15 
nations in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1: Distribution of responses to a question on life-satisfaction in the 
years 2006-2009 on a 1-10 numerical scale 
First 15 cases out of 90 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
TON 
ratio 
Albania 4,6 6 15,4 15,9 16,7 11,7 11,3 10,2 5,3 2,7 0,51 
Algeria 12,6 5,6 8,4 5,9 12,9 10,5 13,6 11,5 6,3 11,9 1,89 
Andorra 0,5 0,4 1,3 2,5 12,5 13,3 23,1 29,7 9,9 6,7 0,68 
Argentina 1,2 0,7 2 1,4 7,3 5,3 18,8 26,6 13,4 22,5 1,68 
Armenia 14,3 10,5 16,5 12,8 17 9,3 8,2 5,7 2,9 2,5 0,86 
Australia 1,2 1,3 2,1 2,8 8 8,5 21,7 32,1 13,3 8,1 0,61 
Austria 0,9 0,7 1,5 2,4 5,7 6 13,4 23,7 17,8 27,2 1,53 
Bangladesh 3,3 1,1 7,5 10,5 35 9,3 8,9 10,6 2,9 9,5 3,28 
Belarus 6,8 8,3 14,2 13,5 21,5 8,9 10,1 8,1 3,3 1,9 0,58 
Belgium 3 0,7 1,7 2,6 6,3 7 15,9 29,4 15,7 16,8 1,07 
Bosnia 7,3 3,3 5,1 8,6 24,3 13,3 13,2 11,6 5,3 7,8 1,47 
Brazil 1,9 0,9 1,4 2,2 10,9 8,6 12,4 23,8 13,4 24,3 1,81 
                                                 
15
 Complete dataset : http://gaelbrule.com/data/10 excess/  
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Bulgaria 5,8 6,6 11,3 11,6 18,7 11 14,9 8 4,8 2,8 0,58 
Burkina 3,6 4,6 6,7 12,1 26 15,2 11,1 8,2 3,1 7 2,26 
Canada 0,8 1,2 1,4 2,6 6 7,3 14,1 28,6 19,4 18,6 0,96 
 
Data:  Happiness in Nations (Veenhoven 2013c), table 122F 
 
I then assessed the frequency of the 10-excess in all 1367 surveys that have 
involved a question on life satisfaction. The frequency on a 1 to 10 scale is 
reported in Table 3.2a and the frequency on the 0 to 10 scale in Table 3.2b. 
I also assessed the frequency of the pattern in questions about contentment, 
see Table 3.2c.    
  
Scale 1-10: On the 833 distributions on scale 1-10 observed in 97 nations, 
462 had a TON  greater than 1, which is 55%. Among these 97 nations, 23 
systematically had a TON higher than 1. These were: Argentina, Bosnia 
Herzegovina, Brazil, Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, India, Indonesia, 
Jordan, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Montenegro, Morocco, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Puerto Rico, Taiwan, Tanzania, Trinidad and Tobago, 
Uganda, Uruguay, Zimbabwe. 
  
Scale 0-10: On the 534 distributions on scale 0-10 observed in 88 nations, 
199 had a TON greater than 1, which represents a percentage of 37%. 
Among these 88 nations, 23 always had a TON higher than one: Belize, 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Honduras, Hong Kong, Jamaica, Macao, Nicaragua, 
Palestine, Peru, South Africa, Surinam, Trinidad and Tobago, Turkey, 
Uganda, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam.   
 
In responses to question on ‘best-worst possible life (Cantril ladder) 
On the 48 distributions on the Cantril ladder scale, 18 had a TON higher 
than 1, which is 38%. The following countries presented a TON ratio of 
more than 1: Argentina, Brazil, China, Guatemala, Honduras, Italy, Japan, 
Jordan, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Slovakia, South Africa, Uganda, 
Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Viet Nam, Russia, and Pakistan.  
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Table 3.2a: 10-excess frequency in responses to a question on life 
satisfaction on a 1-10 numerical scale. First 15 cases out of 97 
Data:  Happiness in Nations (Veenhoven 2013c), table 122F 
 
 
  
  Surveys with TON>1 Total number of surveys Ratio 
Albania 0 6 0,00 
Algeria 4 6 0,67 
Andorra 0 4 0,00 
Argentina 11 11 1,00 
Armenia 4 8 0,50 
Australia 1 9 0,11 
Austria 3 4 0,75 
Azerbaijan 2 9 0,22 
Bangladesh 11 14 0,79 
Belarus 3 10 0,30 
Belgium 2 6 0,33 
Bosnia Herzegovina 4 4 1,00 
Brazil 10 10 1,00 
Bulgaria 4 16 0,25 
Burkina Faso 6 9 0,67 
 
All 97 cases 462 
 
0.54 
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Table 3.2b: 10-excess frequency in responses to a question on life 
satisfaction on a 0-10 numerical scale 
First 15 cases out of 88 
 
Number of surveys with TON>1 Total number of surveys Ratio 
Angola 0 1 0,00 
Argentina 1 5 0,20 
Australia 4 6 0,67 
Austria 3 6 0,50 
Bangladesh 0 2 0,00 
Belgium 1 14 0,07 
Belize 1 1 1,00 
Bhutan 7 22 0,32 
Bolivia 2 5 0,40 
Brazil 7 7 1,00 
Bulgaria 6 8 0,75 
Canada 3 6 0,50 
Chile  4 4 1,00 
China 1 3 0,33 
Colombia 3 3 1,00 
    All 88 cases 199 534 0.37 
Data:  Happiness in Nations (Veenhoven 2013c), table 122G 
 
 
Table 3.2c: Distribution of responses to a question on ‘Best-Worst possible 
life’ (Cantril ladder) in the years 2006-2009 on a 11-step numerical scale 
  0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 TON   
Angola 2,5 10,0 8,7 16,8 20,2 20,3 10,1 5,5 3,3 0,8 0,6 0,75 
Argentina 4,5 1,6 2,2 5,4 7,2 19,5 13,8 16,3 17,0 4,9 7,0 1,43 
Bangladesh 0,0 2,1 16,8 8,8 21,3 28,1 9,6 4,8 5,7 1,8 0,6 0,33 
Bolivia 1,2 2,9 4,2 6,7 11,9 29,5 12,7 12,9 9,4 4,1 3,9 0,95 
Brazil 1,8 2,1 2,8 6,1 7,8 21,0 14,7 13,1 14,5 3,8 11,3 2,97 
United 
Kingdom 
0,8 0,5 2,3 4,2 6,7 21,4 10,9 21,5 19,9 6,6 4,6 
0,70 
Bulgaria 5,7 7,8 12,3 19,3 16,6 21,2 7,1 4,3 3,3 0,6 0,2 0,33 
Canada 0,4 0,3 0,6 1,1 3,9 15,5 10,5 22,9 29,0 7,9 6,9 0,87 
China 3,1 2,6 2,9 6,8 9,2 32,9 19,4 10,1 9,5 1,7 1,8 1,06 
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Czech 
Republic 
1,0 0,0 1,0 4,4 9,3 27,5 16,0 22,9 13,2 2,6 2,0 
0,77 
Egypt 0,1 0,2 1,2 4,1 7,7 18,7 22,4 18,3 15,5 7,9 3,2 0,41 
France 0,0 0,4 1,6 1,2 4,9 20,9 14,2 28,2 22,9 3,9 1,6 0,41 
Germany 0,8 0,7 1,8 3,9 5,8 22,7 15,1 21,6 18,5 4,9 3,6 0,73 
Ghana 1,0 2,6 7,4 16,4 19,5 26,2 14,1 7,5 2,1 0,6 0,3 0,50 
Guatemala 1,0 0,4 0,2 1,2 3,6 11,6 10,2 17,4 29,0 11,4 13,6 1,19 
 
Data:  Happiness in Nations (Veenhoven 2013c), table 31D 
 
I summarize these results by comparing the phenomenon in 6 geographical 
areas:  Africa, Latin America, North America, Asia, Europe and Middle 
East. The 10-excess pattern appears in all parts of the world, but it is 
particularly present in Latin America and the Middle East as Table 3.3 
shows.  
 
Table 3.3: TON distribution in parts of the world
16
 
 TON >1/total 10-excess frequency(%) 
Africa 8/11 73 
Latin America 10/10 100 
USA/Canada 0/2 0 
Asia 7/17 42 
Europe 17/40 42 
Middle East 10/10 100 
Total 52/90 58% 
 
Robustness check 
As a robustness check, I considered the most recent distribution in each 
country separately, limiting to surveys held after the year 2006. The rates of 
10-excess responses were similar (tables not shown). 
A second robustness check is to look at the prevalence of the phenomenon 
at higher levels of TON, for instance TON inferior or equal to 2.  
                                                 
16
 Life Satisfaction in 90 nations, scale 1-10, Happiness in Nations (Veenhoven 2013c), 
table 122F 
 75 
 
 Out of the 535 surveys presented on a 1-10 scale, the number of 
TON superior to 2 drops to 35, which represents 6.5 % of the surveys. Out 
of the 833 surveys on a 0-10 scale, 153 have a TON superior to 2, which 
represent over 18% of the surveys. Finally, out of the 48 distributions on 
the Cantril ladder, 5 countries (10%) have a TON superior to 2 (Brazil, 
Italy, Pakistan, Peru and Turkey). 
 
3.4 Explanations  
  
 Is there any system in this 10-excess pattern of responses to survey 
questions about happiness? I first considered whether this pattern is 
particular for cognitive evaluations of life. This appears to be the case it 
may reflect reality and next whether we deal with measurement bias.  
 
3.4.1 Reflection of social inequality? 
 A possible explanation for this 10-excess phenomenon is that societal 
factors are responsible. In this hypothesis, the society with a high number 
of 10 responses would be characterized by a particularly privileged class, 
whose members would easily tick the top of the scale.  
  The Latin American countries, largely represented among the countries 
with a 10-excess, are also among the ones with the highest income 
difference. South Africa and Hong Kong, also present in the 10-excess list, 
are also among the most unequal countries in the world. However, this 
explanation faces many exceptions: much more equal societies frequently 
show a 10-excess, e.g. Luxemburg, Czech Republic, Austria, Mali. This is 
confirmed by the relatively low correlation between the TON ratio and 
income inequality measured with the Gini coefficient: r=+.28. Income 
distribution seems to have an impact on but its contribution seems rather 
small. Still more aspects of inequality may be involved. 
 
3.4.2 Measurement bias? 
 If this pattern does not reflect reality, there must be measurement bias. The 
question is then: What kind of bias? Below I check some possibilities. 
  
 A matter of grading culture? 
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 Ratings on the numerical scale of happiness could be influenced by the way 
school performance is graded in the country. For instance, a study
17
 
comparing the American, British and Dutch systems show that the first 
ones give the most top grades whereas it is nearly impossible to get a top 
grade in the Netherlands. The highest grade frequency is consistent in order 
with the TON, at least for these three examples, the America having the 
highest frequency of 10-excess and the Netherlands the least. We miss 
systematic data on grading culture that would be of much interest here. 
 
Part of a wider extreme response style? 
 The 10-excess pattern observed in responses to questions about happiness 
can be part of a wider tendency to tick extreme response options. If so, that 
must manifest in ratings of other things than happiness, such as in responses 
to questions about perceived freedom. I checked using the item in the 
World Values Survey
18
. Among the 57 nations for which data is available, 
41 present a 10 excess in feeling of freedom, which represent a percentage 
of 71 % of TON. Thus, TON rate is higher than for life satisfaction or 
happiness questions.  The correlation between TON for life satisfaction and 
feeling of freedom is strong: +.58, which confirms the close links between 
life satisfaction and perceived freedom that I will detail in the next chapter. 
Hence, the 10 excess is likely to be anchored in a wider response style. 
 
 A matter of survey technique?   
 The phenomenon we observe might be caused by subtle differences in 
survey techniques, such as in the sampling of respondents, the place of 
happiness in the questionnaire and the behavior of the interviewer. If so, we 
can expect that TON differs across surveys in the same country. I checked 
using the countries where different survey programs had measured 
happiness on 1-10 or 0-10 numerical scales. To do so, I took the example of 
                                                 
17
 http://www.studyinholland.nl/documentation/grading-systems-in-the-netherlands-the-
united-states-and-the-united-kingdom.pdf 
18
 Item 46: Some people feel they have completely free choice and control over their lives, 
while other people feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. 
Please use this scale where 1 means ‘no choice at all’ and 10 means ‘a great deal of choice’ 
to indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your 
life turns out (code one number): 
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Brazil, a country that often presents the 10-excess. I compared different 
surveys. Results are shown in Table 3.4a. 
 
Table 3.4a Comparison of surveys in Brazil in various years 
 
 
 Variations can be seen between regions, years, scales but the 10-excess 
phenomenon is systematically present. I compared also the variance in 
TON within survey programs with variance in TON across survey 
programs. I compared the LAPOP, What World Thinks and PEW surveys 
asking the same question on contentment on a 0-10 scale in the years 2000. 
Results are presented in Table 4b below. The LAPOP presents the same 
survey in the years 2008 and 2010 and their difference are very small, with 
a variance of 0.05. The variance among the three types of surveys is much 
more important (0.5), which seems due to the fact that the TON is much 
higher in the What World Thinks survey (2.37) whereas LAPOP (1.32) and 
PEW(1.38) are very close.  
 
Table 3.4b comparison of variance between surveys in Brazil 
 Variance 
Variance within LAPOP surveys 0.05 
Variance among surveys  0.5 
 
The surveys show different results but the phenomenon is still 
systematically present. 
Year N Survey 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 TON
2002 1 000
WhatWorldThinks 
2002 1,80 2,10 2,80 6,10 7,80 21,00 14,70 13,10 14,50 3,80 11,30 2,97
2008 1 353 LAPOP 2008 0,89 0,37 1,03 3,10 4,43 15,59 15,15 17,81 19,07 10,35 12,20 1,18
2010 2 010 LAPOP 2010 0,90 0,52 0,76 1,90 3,85 14,27 14,03 18,60 23,17 8,90 13,08 1,47
2007 1 000 PEW survey 2007 1,20 1,60 1,00 2,60 4,60 14,70 11,60 18,00 21,30 9,70 13,40 1,38
1975 382 Kettering Survey 1,00 2,00 2,00 5,00 8,00 21,00 19,00 14,00 14,00 5,00 9,00 1,80
1975 382 Kettering Survey 1,00 1,00 2,00 3,00 5,00 13,00 11,00 17,00 18,00 12,00 16,00 1,33
2006 1 495 WorldValuesSurvey 5 1,90 0,90 1,40 2,20 10,90 8,60 12,40 23,80 13,40 24,30 1,81
1998 414 WorldValuesSurv 1-5 2,60 0,70 2,50 4,10 11,70 10,00 13,40 21,70 9,30 23,80 2,56
1998 1 471 WorldValuesSurv 1-5 3,50 2,20 3,10 3,60 14,60 7,60 11,30 16,30 9,00 28,20 3,13
1998 268 WorldValuesSurv 1-5 7,10 3,70 3,70 1,90 11,50 10,00 10,00 11,20 6,70 33,80 5,04
1998 523 WorldValuesSurv 1-5 2,50 1,80 2,80 4,00 13,90 6,90 11,90 14,80 8,90 32,00 3,60
1998 230 WorldValuesSurv 1-5 0,00 0,00 0,80 3,40 11,10 13,20 15,10 23,60 7,50 25,20 3,36
1998 190 WorldValuesSurv 1-5 1,80 0,90 0,00 1,40 10,30 8,60 17,60 22,40 14,30 22,70 1,59
1998 428 WorldValuesSurv 1-5 2,70 1,70 1,60 2,60 13,30 8,40 9,80 23,20 13,00 23,20 1,78
1990 1 502 WorldValuesSurvey 2 2,98 1,29 2,33 3,72 14,31 7,39 13,11 17,11 8,81 28,24 3,21
1996 1 149 WorldValuesSurvey 3 4,87 2,96 3,66 3,74 13,14 8,79 9,66 14,88 8,62 29,33 3,40
2007 1 035 GallupWorldPoll2007 0,60 0,70 1,10 1,70 2,90 9,40 10,60 16,50 24,70 9,50 22,50 2,37
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Particular to 1-10 scale? 
I first hypothesized that the 10-excess phenomenon is typical for short 
response scales and therefore occurs more often on 1-10 scales than on the 
0-10. People might be less prone to go to 10 once they have imagined what 
zero means versus 1 which is less extreme. This was found to be the case: 
the 10-excess was rather less present on a 0 to 10 scale (37%) than on a 
scale from 1 to 10 (55%) as shown in Figure 3.2 below. However, if a 
difference can be observed, it still represents a high percentage of the 
distributions in both cases. 
 
Figure 3.2: Distribution of the highest values for the latest data on a 0-10 
scale(65 nations) and on a 1-10 scale (90 nations) 
 
  
  
Particular to extreme labeling of scale end? 
The 10-excess phenomenon could be more common if the positive end of 
the rating scale is labeled modestly, using terms such as ‘satisfied’ or 
‘happy’, rather than with stronger terms such as ‘completely satisfied’ or 
‘extremely happy’. To check this explanation I selected pairs of questions 
used in the same country in the same period, that differed only in the 
0 
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0-10 scale 
1-10 scale 
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labeling of the extremes of the numerical response scale. The only match in 
terms of length of scale, period and measure type are the questions
19
 
O_SLW_c_sq_n_10_a (World Values Survey, wave 1-5, 1990-2005) and 
O_SLU_c_sq_n_10_b (European Quality of Life Survey 2003). Both 
address life satisfaction on a 1 to 10 scale in European nations between 
1990 and 2005. However, whereas the first one ranges from ‘dissatisfied’ to 
‘satisfied’, the second one ranges from ‘very dissatisfied’ to ‘very 
satisfied’.  As shown in Table 3.5, the prevalence of the 10-excess is 
exactly the same in both cases (36%), so there is no difference in the only 
comparison case we have. 
 
  Table 3.5: Comparison of two types of surveys 
 Labeling Number 
of 
surveys 
for 
Europea
n 
countries 
Number 
of surveys 
presentin
g a 10 
excess 
Ratio of 
surveys 
presentin
g the 10 
excess 
O_SLW_c_sq_n_10_
a  
(World Values 
Survey, wave 1-5, 
1990-2005)  
‘dissatisfied
’ to 
‘satisfied’ 
 
149 
 
54 
 
36% 
O_SLU_c_sq_n_10_b 
(EQLS 2003) 
‘very 
dissatisfied’ 
to ‘very 
satisfied’ 
 
28 
 
10 
 
36% 
 
 
 Particular to numerical response scales?  
 Still another possibility is that the 10-excess pattern occurs typically on 
numerical scales, because the number 10 is open to more interpretations 
                                                 
19
 Codes used in the collection ‘Measures of Happiness’ of the World Database of 
Happiness (Veenhoven 2013f) 
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than a word like ‘satisfied’. Ideally this requires a comparison with 
responses scales with an equal number of verbal response options.  Such 
cases are not available however; the longest verbal response scales provide 
only seven options.  
  Therefore I compared means obtained using numerical scales to the 
mean scores on verbal response scales, which were later transformed to a 
secondary 0-10 numerical scale. To that end, I selected  average values: for 
numerical scales, I used the average mean score given for a 11-step numeral 
Life Satisfaction scale (Table 122F) and for verbal scales, the average 
values given for 4-step scales (Table 111 C), this data for both was 
available in the collection ‘Happiness in Nations’ of the World Database of 
Happiness
20
. I then assessed whether the means on the numerical response 
scales tended to be higher than the means obtained using verbal response 
scales. I repeated this analysis for the countries where 10-excess responses 
were observed.  
  The differences between average scores on the numerical scale, 1 to 
10, and a verbal scale , very unsatisfied to very satisfied, that was projected 
on a numerical scale to see if some differences could be observed are 
presented in Table 3.6. There are differences between the responses to the 
two types of scale, but no systematic differences; in my 10-excess list, 
some countries like Argentina or Brazil offered quite a large difference 
between the verbal and the numerical scale, which might tell us that this 
excess came from a scale effect; however, when looking at Venezuela, 
Colombia and Costa Rica, the results on the two scales were the same and 
in some cases, the result on the verbal scale was even higher than the one 
on the numerical scale. 
    I computed the difference between average scores obtained using a 
numerical scale and verbal scale; a 4-step numerical scale was more 
vulnerable to excess responding than a 10 or 11 step scale. When 
subtracting scores on a verbal scale from average score on the numerical 
scale, the difference was +0.32 in the case of the countries that did not 
                                                 
20
 Transformation from verbal to numeral scores were obtained using experts ratings; for 
instance very satisfied corresponds to a 9.3 on a 0-10 scale, satisfied to a 6.5, quite 
unsatisfied to a 3.7, and very unsatisfied to a 1.3 (Veenhoven, 1993: section 7/3.3.2). It is 
then possible to obtain a value on a 0 to 10 scale from a distribution of verbal answers. 
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present a 10-excess, and +0.16 in the case of the countries presenting a 10-
excess. Therefore, the difference was even smaller in the countries 
presenting a TON effect.  So numerical responding does not seem to 
explain the bias in responses to happiness questions, quite the contrary. 
 
Table 3.6: Mean scores on pairs of questions on life satisfaction in the 
same country and period 
0-10 numerical scales compared to transformed scores on a 4 step verbal 
response scales 
 
Data:  Happiness in Nations (Veenhoven 2013c), tables 121C and 122F. 
 
Country 
 
 
 
 
Average score on  
0-10  numerical 
scale 
 
 
Average score on 
equivalent question 
rated on a verbal 
response scale and 
transformed to range 0-
10 
Difference 
 
 
 
Argentina  7,3 6,39 +0,91 
Armenia  5 4,78 +0,22 
Austria 7,6 6,7 +0,90 
Belarus 5,2 5,5 -0,30 
Belgium  7,3 6,85 0,45 
Belize 6,6 6,64 -0,04 
Bolivia 6,3 6,12 0,18 
Brazil  7,5 6,6 0,90 
Bulgaria  4,4 4,17 0,23 
Canada  7,8 7,91 -0,11 
Chile 6,7 6,49 0,21 
China 6,3 6,11 0,19 
Colombia 7,7 7,39 0,31 
Costa Rica 8,5 7,74 0,76 
Croatia 6 5,94 0,06 
 
   Average 6.65 6.4 0.25 
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 Social desirability bias? 
Happiness is highly valued in most societies and claiming to be very happy 
could be a way to obtain prestige and social acceptance. Therefore I 
checked social desirability. In a study among college students in 41 nations, 
Diener (2000) assessed the degree of life-satisfaction they deemed ideal. 
Ideal scores range from 19.80 (China) to 31.14 (Australia)
21
. Ideal 
happiness tends to be higher in 10-excess nations; e.g. in Puerto Rico 
(30.70), Colombia (31.12), Brazil (29.07), Peru (28.98) and Argentina 
(27.72). Yet the two countries with the highest ideal happiness, Australia 
(31.14) and Spain (31.02), are not among the countries that frequently 
present a 10-excess. The correlation between the ideal life satisfaction and 
the TON ratio is +.27, thus the valuing of happiness does seem to be 
involved, but since the correlation is modest this is not the whole story. 
 
Typical for Latin American and Middle Eastern countries? 
The 10-excess pattern is observed in countries with different cultures; 
however, we do see a particularly high occurrence of this pattern in Latin 
America and Middle East. As noted in section 3.1.1, Culpepper & 
Zimmerman (2006) have shown that Hispanic students are more prone to 
extreme responding on different topics. Baron-Epel showed that Arabic 
students were prone to choose extreme answers, a phenomenon also 
highlighted in the case of Jordan by D’Iribarne(2012) (Jordan is also one of 
the most dramatic examples of 10-excess: the last data giving 8.9% of 9-
respondents for 30.4% of 10-respondents, which gives a TON of 3.42, the 
second highest after Puerto Rico (3.52)). These results seem to be in line 
with those previous works; therefore the 10-excess might therefore be 
largely drawn from cultural measurement bias. Whereas the exact 
mechanisms underlying this phenomenon are largely unknown yet, 
Culpepper & Zimmerman showed some independent positive influences of 
masculinity and power distance on the occurrence of 10-excess and an 
independent negative contribution of individualism on the 10-excess.  
 
Check of the bias explanation 
                                                 
21
 Ratings were made on the 5 item Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS), possible scores 
on which range from 7 to 35 
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The above analyses suggest that the 10-excess phenomenon is at least partly 
due to measurement bias. If so, scores of average happiness in nations are 
often inflated and will as such lower the correlation with nation 
characteristics, such as the income per head. This allows us to check 
whether measurement bias is really involved and to get a view on the size 
of this bias. 
  In that vein I explored the effect of three corrections for 10-excess 
in the distribution of happiness in nations. First I simply changed the 
frequencies of 9 and 10 for the countries presenting a 10-excess. Second, I 
reduced the 10 scale by combining the responses in the following way: 1-2, 
3-4, 5-6, 7-8 and 9-10. Third I applied a more complicated method in which 
I computed the ten over nine(TON) ratio for the 371 distributions on a 1-10 
scale that do not present a 10 excess; the average TON was 0.64. I made the 
assumption that this ratio is a better reflection of reality and I applied it to 
countries presenting the 10-excess to remove the bias; I then computed a 
new percentage of 10 respondents by multiplying the number of 9 
respondents by 0.64, thus obtaining a corrected 10 percentage, which was 
lower than in the original data. The sum was then lower than 100%; so I 
computed a new average with the corrected percentage of ten respondents 
to reach 100% by multiplying the average by (100/(100-((original 10)-
(corrected 10)) so the 10-excess was distributed over all the bars, 
respectively of their proportional weight.   
The question is then whether these corrected means of happiness in 
nations correlate better with societal quality than the uncorrected original 
means. I examined that 97 nations around the year 2000, using the nation 
characteristics: buying power per capita, the human development index, 
government effectiveness and economic freedom. Data were drawn from 
Veenhoven’s (2013e) ‘States of Nations’. The results are presented in Table 
3.7. These variables explained 69% of the variance in uncorrected average 
happiness in nations. When corrected averages happiness was used, the 
explained variance rose to 71% in the case of the 9-10 Swap, 70% in the 
case of the merge and up to 74% for the TON 0.64 method. So in all cases, 
there was a gain in explained variance. This confirms that considerable 
measurement bias is involved in the ’10-excess’ phenomenon.  
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  The bias is possibly greater than these. Correcting this extreme 
response bias could possibly be done in many other ways, e.g. by squeezing 
the observed distribution on this 0-10 numerical scale into a reference 
distribution obtained using a survey question on the same topic in the same 
year with a different response scale (De Jonge et al. 2013). The purpose of 
this chapter is not to select the best correction; as for now, it is sufficient to 
demonstrate the plausibility of bias. 
 
Table 3.7: Explained variance in average happiness in 97 nations around 
2005 (with and without correction for 10-excess bias) 
Average happiness in nation Explained variance 
No correction 69% 
Merge 10 step scale into 5 step 
scale 
70% 
Swap 9 10 scores 71% 
Transform to TON 0.64 74% 
All the correlations are significant at the 0.01 level 
Data: States of nations (Veenhoven 2013e) variables RGDP_2005, HDI_2009, 
GovEffectiveness_2006, FreeEconIndex1_2005 
 
3.4.3 10-excess typical for cognitive evaluation of life? 
 So far I considered the 10-excess pattern in responses to questions on life 
satisfaction and on the Cantril ladder that invites for a rating between the 
best and worst possible life. Both these questions invite a cognitive 
evaluation of life. Does the same pattern appear in responses to more 
affective toned questions? Let’s see with questions that use ‘happiness’ as 
the keyword
22
. The reason is that responses to that question are mostly 
recorded on shorter scales with verbal response options, such as ‘very 
happy’; data on numerical ratings of ‘happiness’ and ‘mood’ are scarce.  
Still the European Social Survey includes a question with ‘happiness23’as 
the key word, responses on which are recorded on the same a 0-10 
numerical scale as the question on life-satisfaction
24
 used in that survey. 
                                                 
22
 See 1.2.1 ‘Key terms used in this dissertation’ 
23
 Taking all things together, how happy would you say you are? 
24
 All things considered, how satisfied are you with your life as a whole nowadays? 
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This enables us to check whether the same response pattern appears the 
more affectively toned question. I find a noticeable difference, 25% of 10-
excess in responses to the question on ‘satisfaction’ and only 10% in 
responses to the question on ‘happiness’. So, affective measures seem to be 
less vulnerable to the extreme responding than more cognitive measures, at 
least in Europe.  
 This difference can be understood in the context of the theory that 
we draw on two sources of information when evaluating our life; how well 
we feel affectively most of the time and to what extent we perceive that life 
meet standards of the food life (Veenhoven 2009). The question on 
‘happiness’ reflects the former affective appraisal more than the question 
on ‘life-satisfaction’ and this gives rise to slight variations in correlation 
with other variables, such as with income (McKennell 1978). 
In that context it seems that we are better in grading how well we 
feel, than in judging how successful we are in meeting standards. One 
reason could be that there a many standards for judging life and 
performance on these is not always clear. It is easier to rate how you feel 
than rate the distance to the best possible life. The more fuzzy an object is, 
the more vulnerable its evaluation is for side influences, such as the above 
discussed sources of bias. 
 
3.4.4 Combinations of different explanations 
Of course, the 10-excess is not due to one factor, rather to a combination of 
factors. I have highlighted a non-exhaustive list of contributing factors. 
Knowing their exact contributions is desirable but it would mean having all 
the surveys mentioned above for all the years in all countries labeled and 
sampled similarly; unfortunately it is not the case so, as for now, the 
remedy of multivariate analysis would be as bad as the pain.   
 
3.4.5 Summary 
The 10-excess phenomenon, as many response biases, is not due to one 
single reason; rather it is linked to several factors (social, cultural, survey 
techniques…). Nonetheless, I have shown that some factors are much more 
influential than others and a hierarchy of those reasons can be drawn, in the 
frame of knowledge we dispose of. The phenomenon seems to be only a 
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poor reflection of reality and seems largely anchored in cultural 
measurement bias. In this context, the survey techniques, the scaling, the 
labeling, in brief, all the survey factors seem to play a minor role. 
Keywords are influential to some extent: in Europe for instance, happiness 
is less vulnerable to this phenomenon than life satisfaction. A few hints 
seem to tell us the grading culture might have an influence, but the grading 
culture might in turn be a part of a wider response pattern. The large 
correlation between 10-excess on happiness and life satisfaction and 
perceived freedom shows that a wider cultural frame involved. Still, the 
phenomenon is observable overall, and differently in different geographical 
areas. All these assumptions seem to indicate that the main factor is largely 
cultural, with systematic presence in Latin America and in the Middle East; 
this is in line with other studies (Culpepper and Zimmerman (2006), Baron-
Epel et al (2010), D’Iribarne (2012)) that mentioned Extreme Response 
Bias among Latin Americans and Arab respondents. The exact underlying 
mechanisms are yet unknown even if some links with values have been 
drawn.  
 
3.5 Future work  
 
 This study faced several limitations and therefore there are options for 
future improvement. If I think I have highlighted the main reasons behind 
the 10-excess, the quantitative contributions to the phenomenon should be 
determined in future studies. However, qualitatively, we know the major 
influence is the larger cultural influence, key words, scale and social 
desirability seem to have a moderate influence, and that labeling and survey 
technique have only a small influence. Moreover, the comparison of 
grading cultures was limited to only three countries; if it seems to be 
implicated, we do not know to what extent and the causality even if it is 
likely to be a part of the larger cultural response pattern; hence, more 
systematic data in this field would be insightful for researches dealing with 
response patterns. The keyword seems to play a role in Europe, but it would 
be very interesting to have comparable surveys for all countries, and 
particularly Latin America and the Middle East. Finally, the impact of 
social desirability has been understudied and if the sparse data we have 
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seems to indicate that this might play a role, its actual contribution is yet 
opaque.   
 
3.6 Conclusions 
 
Survey questions on happiness that use 0-10 numerical response scales 
often elicit more ratings on option 10 than on option 9. This ‘10-excess’ 
pattern is most common in Latin America and the Middle East. At least part 
of the phenomenon seems to be due to cultural measurement bias and 
questions that invite to a cognitive evaluation are particularly vulnerable. 
Further research is required into the nature of this bias and its correction.  
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PART II: 
EXPLORING THE RELATIVE UNHAPPINESS IN 
FRANCE 
 
 90 
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Chapter 4: Freedom(s) and happiness
25
  
 
In the following chapter, I raise the question: how can the relatively low 
level of happiness in France be related to freedom, both in its objective and 
subjective meaning?  
 
4.1. Introduction 
 
Comparative research on happiness shows, typically, that people live 
happiest in the richest nations of this world. This pattern was already visible 
in the first cross national comparison in 1960 by Cantril (1965) and has 
been replicated over and again, e.g. Arthaud-Day & Near (2005), Fisher 
(2008) or Clark (2011) on ever larger numbers of nations. A plot of 
happiness versus buying power in 138 countries in 2005 is presented in 
Figure 4.1.  
 
Figure 4.1: Life satisfaction rated by economic prosperity in 138 countries 
around 2005 
                                                 
25
 This chapter is published as Brulé G. and Veenhoven R.(2014) Freedom and happiness 
in nations. Why the Finns are happier than the French. Psychology of Well-Being: Theory 
Research and Practice 2014, 4:17 
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Average happiness differs across rich nations 
Happiness increases significantly with GDP in the first part of the graph, 
where the poor nations are situated, and reach a plateau around 20,000 
dollars per capita. In these nations, sufficient individuals have a purchasing 
power high enough for economic affluence to have little influence on 
happiness; this represents 49 nations
26
. Among the rich nations, we see 
large differences in happiness among countries with the same purchasing 
power, e.g. more than two points between Hong Kong and Denmark, one 
point and a half between France and Finland.  
 
Comparison between Finland and France 
Let us consider this latter case in more detail. Finland and France are both 
affluent societies, with purchasing powers per capita that are very 
comparable ($32,153 for Finland versus $30,386 for France in 2005), yet 
with remarkable life satisfaction differences, as shown in Table 4.1. The 
difference in happiness is consistent: the French are not only less satisfied 
                                                 
26
 Rich nations are shown in Figure 3.1. 49 nations are included in this group: Argentina, 
Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bahrain, Barbados, Belgium, Brunei, Canada, Croatia, 
Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Guinea, 
Hong-Kong, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Kuwait, Luxemburg, Malta, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Oman, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States 
Rich nations 
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with their lives as a whole, they also feel less well affectively and see a 
greater difference between how their lives are and how they want it to be 
compared to the Finns. In short, this case represents one of the cases where 
two countries from the same civilization (western culture), with similar 
purchasing powers, present the highest difference in happiness. 
 
Table 4.1: Average happiness in France and Finland for the period 2000-
2009 
Nation 
Life satisfaction 
(Overall 
happiness) 
Mood 
(affective 
component) 
Contentment 
(cognitive 
component) 
Finland 7.9 54 7.6 
France 6.6 42 7.0 
Average rich 
countries 
7.0 45 6.7 
Difference 
- in points on scale 1.3 12 0.6 
-in % actual scale 
range in the world 
26% 25% 12% 
-in % actual range 
among the rich 
nations 
40% 30% 21% 
 
This example illustrates that there can be large differences in happiness and 
its components at comparable economic development. So happiness 
depends on more than just wealth. What other factors can be involved? I 
considered other factors, widely regarded as the most important societal 
predictors for happiness, to be: quality of government, rule of law, social 
security, and inequality in income and between sexes (Ott 2010). Finland 
has a substantial advantage on government effectiveness and rule of law, a 
slight advantage in terms of sex inequality, both countries were comparable 
in terms of income inequality, while France was ahead in terms of social 
security. I saw differences in these factors, mostly in favor of Finland, but 
no difference seemed significant enough to explain this ‘happiness gap’. 
Results are summarized in Table 4.2 below.  
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Table 4.2: Institutional differences between France and Finland  
Factor Reference in data file 
'States of Nations' 
Finland France Percentage 
of the total 
range of 
rich 
countries
27
 
Government 
effectiveness
28
 
GovEffectiveness_2006 2.2 1.5 30% 
Rule of law
29
 RuleLaw_2006 2.0 1.4 22% 
Social 
security 
30
 
WelfareExpense1_2006 26 29 13% 
Income 
Inequality
31
 
Incomeequality_2000_200
8 
33 30 12% 
IncomeInequality1_2006 27 33 24% 
Gender 
Inequality 
32
 
GenderEquality_2_2005 0.89 0.72 25% 
GenderEquality_4_2007 0.95 0.95 0% 
 
Focus on freedom 
                                                 
27
 This percentage represents the ratio (difference between France and Finland)/highest 
difference amongst rich nations 
28
 Veenhoven R. (2011b) States of Nations,Governance, Erasmus University of Rottodam, 
accessed on 1/11/2011 Available at: 
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm.  
29
 Veenhoven R. (2011b) States of Nations,Law and order, Legal system, Erasmus 
University of Rottodam, accessed on 1/11/2011 Available at: 
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm. 
30
 Veenhoven R. (2011b) States of Nations, Health, health expenditures, Erasmus 
University of Rottodam, accessed on 1/11/2011 Available at: 
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm. 
31
 Veenhoven R. (2011b) States of Nations, inequality, income inequality, Erasmus 
University of Rottodam, accessed on 1/11/2011 Available at: 
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm. 
32
 Veenhoven R. (2011b) States of Nations, inequality, gender inequality, Erasmus 
University of Rottodam, accessed on 1/11/2011 Available at: 
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm. 
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What are the other factors that might be involved here? According to 
Verme (2009), a sense of freedom is the strongest predictor for happiness 
across nations. There are indeed sizable differences in perceived freedom 
among rich nations and the French feel less free than the Finns do (6.2 
versus 7.5 on a ten-scale) ; however, one needs to be careful as this 
correlation might be inflated by a common response tendency , i.e. a 
tendency to answer less positively to any question. If no such distortion of 
responses is at hand, it is still possible that this difference in perceived 
freedom does not correspond with a difference in actual freedom. The 
French could be more perceptible for limitations to freedom than the Fins 
are, while they are in fact equally free is also possible that the difference is 
largely driven by happiness, unhappiness making people more prone to see 
their limitations than their opportunities. Thus, in this chapter, I decided to 
investigate the freedom factor in greater depth and investigate if I can find 
any hints of the lower reported life satisfaction in perceived freedom and/or 
actual freedom.  
 
Plan of this chapter 
Following Bay I distinguish several kinds of actual freedom and note the 
difference with perceived freedom. Next I analyze the relationship between 
these freedom variants and average happiness in 49 rich nations. I will then 
show that actual freedom, affects happiness, both directly and indirectly 
through perceived freedom. The difference between Finland and France fits 
that wider pattern 
 
4.2. Concepts and measures 
 
The terms ‘happiness’ and ‘freedom’ are often used in political rhetoric, but 
are in that context seldom properly defined. Greater precision is required 
for this empirical analysis, both with respect to the concepts and for their 
measurement. The definition and the measurement of happiness have been 
defined in the previous chapters. What is ‘freedom’ precisely? How can 
that be measured in nations? Is there a difference between ‘actual’ freedom 
and ‘perceived’ freedom in nations? 
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4.2.1. Concepts  
In the broadest sense, freedom can be defined as the possibility for an 
individual to make choices, typically major life choices. The 'possibility' to 
choose requires first of all that there is an 'opportunity' to choose, which is 
an attribute of the environment in which an individual lives. Then, making 
a choice requires that an individual has the ‘capacity’ to choose, which is an 
individual attribute (Veenhoven 2008).  
Following Bay (1970) I further distinguish two aspects of the 
capacity to choose, which results in three kinds of freedom: social freedom, 
psychological freedom and potential freedom. Social freedom is about 
opportunity to choose and denotes absence of restriction by other people. 
Psychological freedom is about the capacity to choose and denotes absence 
of inner restrictions. Potential freedom is about information on possible 
choice options and awareness of external opportunities. 
 This difference in three kinds of freedom can be illustrated by the 
case of a prisoner in a cell with an unlocked door and a route to freedom. 
The prisoner can decide not to use that opportunity to escape because he or 
she foresees punishment. This is a case of social unfreedom. The prisoner 
can also decide to forego the escape opportunity because he or she does not 
dare to escape, preferring the security of the prison above the challenges of 
real life. This is a case of psychological unfreedom. Lastly the prisoner can 
miss out the escape opportunity because he or she did not know that the 
door was open. This is a case of potential unfreedom. 
In addition to actual freedom, there is perceived freedom. Though 
typically related, these kinds of freedom can diverge; one can think one is 
free while one is not, or think one is not free in spite of considerable choice. 
Both actual freedom and perceived freedom can affect happiness, possibly 
independently.  
 
4.2.2. Indicators of freedom in nations  
How can these three kinds of freedom be measured and compared across 
nations? 
 
Actual freedom 
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Below I present the available indicators for the three kinds of actual 
freedom in nations and check whether the conceptual distinction is reflected 
in the data. Full detail for the operalization is presented on the technical 
appendix. 
 
Social freedom. External restriction to choice can be measured in different 
domains. In this study I use available information on choice restrictions in 
the domains of economic life, political life and private life of citizens (or 
individuals within that nation).  
o Economic freedom is measured by absence of restrictions on 
business using available indexes that differ slightly in the aspects 
they cover. I combined three indexes to get an average ‘Economic 
freedom’ index: the Economic Freedom of the World, the Heritage 
Index and the Freedom House Index. Indexes are detailed in 
Appendix. 
o Political freedom is measured using absence of restrictions for 
individuals to participate in the political process, such as civil 
liberties within a nation. Nation scores on these matters are 
gathered by Freedom House (2005). Indexes for civil liberties are 
presented in Appendix. 
o Private freedom is measured absence of restrictions on choice in 
the personal sphere of life, such as travel, abortion and marriage, 
first gathered by Veenhoven (2000).  
Data on the above mentioned indicators of social freedom were taken from 
the dataset ‘States of Nations (Veenhoven 2013b) On that basis I calculated 
a comprehensive index of social freedom by adding the z scores of the 
indexes of economic freedom, private freedom and political freedom above 
and then the indicator was adjusted to a [0-1] range.  
 
Psychological freedom. Psychological freedom is a lack of inner 
restrictions for seizing opportunities to choose.  There are several such 
inhibitions and we do have data on the prevalence of some of the 
inhibitions in nations.  
o A first inner constraint is low self-esteem. If you do not feel good 
about yourself, you will be less apt to take control. Self-esteem is 
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commonly measured using the Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale 
(Rosenberg, 1965) and average scores on that scale are available for 
53 nations over the years 1965-2002 (Schmitt & Allik, 2005). The 
variable name is SelfEsteem_2002.  
o A second psychological restraint is acquiescence, that is, a tendency 
to agree with what other people say. This trait is measured using 
‘yes-saying’ to survey questions and is commonly used as an 
indicator of response style. However, a strong tendency to agree to 
any question can also be seen as a ‘lack of guts’, i.e. a lack of 
psychological freedom. Data is available for 56 nations over the 
years 1980-2004 (Smith, 2004). The variable name in States of 
Nations is Acquiescence_2002. 
I calculated a comprehensive index of psychological freedom by adding the 
z scores of the two aspects, giving positive weight to self-esteem and 
negative weight to acquiescence. The indicator was then adjusted to a [0-1] 
range.  
 
  Potential freedom. As noted above, potential freedom is one’s awareness of 
opportunities. As such potential freedom in nations may be reflected by two 
indicators: 
o the number of newspapers per 1000 inhabitants 
o  access to internet per 1000 inhabitants  
The indicator for potential freedom was calculated as the sum of these 
adjusted to a [0-1] range. 
 
Total actual freedom. Finally, the indicator of actual freedom was 
calculated as the sum of social freedom, psychological freedom and 
potential freedom, adjusted to a [0-1] range.  
Relationship between the three types of freedom in nations. I conducted a 
factor analysis in order to see how the different indicators presented above 
were connected to the three indices following Bay’s (1970) classification. 
The results are presented in Table 4.3 below.  I conducted first a factor 
analysis to determine the number of factors. Using the scree plot, three 
factors had an Eigen value superior than 1 and the slope was sharper after 
the third factor; this confirmed the prominence of three factors. The 
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variance explained by these three factors is 76.3%. After a varimax 
rotation, I obtain the factor loadings shown in Table 4.3, values below 0.30 
are not considered. Three factors load distinctively. Nonetheless, there are 
some overlaps between the different types of freedom; freedom to travel 
loads mainly on social freedom, but there is a small loading on factor 2, 
psychological freedom. Economic freedom 2 loads almost as much on 
factor 3, potential freedom as on factor 1, social freedom. Finally, the 
number of newspaper is loading mainly on potential freedom as expected, 
but it loads almost as much negatively on factor 2, psychological freedom.  
Still the three factors reflect Bay’s taxonomy fairly well. 
 
Table 4.3: Indicators of freedom in nations: a factor analysis (N=33) 
 
Perceived freedom 
Perceived freedom in nations can be seen as the degree to which citizens 
feel they are in control of their life. The World Values Surveys contain a 
question on that matter that reads ‘Some people feel they have completely 
free choice and control over their lives, while other people feel that what 
they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please use this scale 
where 1 means ‘none at all’ and 10 means ‘a great deal’ to indicate how 
much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over the way your 
life turns out’. This variable is available for 85 nations between 1990 and 
2005 and is labelled as FreeLife_1990.2005 in the data file States of 
Nations. 
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4.3.  Results 
 
Let us now see how freedom and happiness relate in rich nations. Note that 
I do not report statistical significance of correlations; since the data I use 
cover almost all developed nations such test makes no sense. 
 
4.3.1. Actual and perceived freedom 
As shown in Table 4.4, the zero-order correlations of social, potential and 
psychological freedom with perceived freedom are equivalent (respectively 
+.32, +.29 and +.32) but small  One interpretation is that the measures of 
actual freedom I defined do not capture the limitations to choice very well. 
Another interpretation is that much of the perceived freedom is illusory. 
 
Table 4.4: Zero order correlations between perceived freedom and actual 
freedom indicators (N=33) 
 
 
4.3.2. Happiness and actual freedom  
All correlations between happiness and freedom in Table 4.5 are positive, 
which means that freedom and happiness tend to go hand in hand. The 
zero-order correlations vary from modest in the case of psychological 
freedom (r=+.27) to strong in the case of potential freedom (r=+.60). The 
pattern changes dramatically when controlling for economic prosperity. 
Whereas the partial correlation of psychological freedom with happiness 
increases slightly from +.27 to +30, the correlations with social and 
potential freedom are largely wiped out. This means that the latter two 
kinds of freedom are a by-product of societal development, while 
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psychological freedom is rather independent or even negatively correlated 
to societal development. In other words, social and potential freedom are 
part of a wider set of external conditions for happiness, while psychological 
freedom is about inner capability to deal with these conditions, which is not 
implied in these. 
 
Table 4.5:  Freedom and happiness in 33 nations 2000-2009 
Freedom Correlation with average happiness 
zero-order wealth controlled 
Actual freedom 
- social freedom +.37 +.09 
- psychological freedom +.27 +.30 
- potential freedom +.60 +.11 
Perceived freedom +.64 +.48 
 
4.3.3. Happiness and perceived freedom  
The strongest correlations in Table 4.5 are between happiness and 
perceived freedom in nations. The zero-order correlation is +.64, which fits 
the earlier analysis of Verme (2009). The partial correlation is somewhat 
lower, but with +.48 still sizable.  
 
Paths from freedom to happiness 
So all kinds of freedom correlate more or less with average happiness in 
nations, since these variants of freedom are inter correlated (cf. Table 4.4) 
one kind of freedom may affect happiness through the other. Below I report 
some attempts to disentangle these effects. 
 
Simple path 
To what extent perceived freedom can be explained by actual freedom? I 
aggregate the z-scores of the three types of freedom and build an ‘actual 
freedom’ indicator, and calculate zero order correlations as well as partial 
correlations between actual freedom, perceived freedom and happiness. The 
results are presented in the Figure 4.2 below. The link between actual 
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freedom and happiness is the most important one. When controlling for 
actual freedom, the partial correlation between happiness and perceived 
freedom is much lower (r=+.40) than the zero order correlation, but it still 
does not explain everything. One reason might be that there is an illusory 
freedom that does not find echo in the ground of actual freedom. Another 
reason may again be that the indicators of actual freedom do not cover all 
opportunity to choose.  
 
Figure 4.2: Link between actual freedom, perceived freedom and happiness 
in rich nations for the period 2000-2009 (N=40) 
 
 
 
Full path 
As shown in the previous sections there are differences in actual freedom 
and in perceived freedom, and each correlate with happiness. Social 
freedom and potential represents the freedom of the environment in which 
individuals live; so I expect them to have a large influence on happiness, as 
largely depicted in the literature (Murray (1988), Morrissey (1991), Frijters 
et al. (2004)) but not to be the main contributors of perceived freedom per 
se. Conversely, I expect perceived freedom to be more a mental construal 
than a result of the environment, hence I expect perceived freedom to be 
determined mainly by psychological freedom; therefore, the influence of 
psychological freedom on happiness should be mediated by perceived 
freedom.  
I expect 1) an influence of psychological freedom on happiness via 
perceived freedom and a direct effect, 2) a direct influence of social 
freedom on happiness, 3) a direct influence of potential freedom on 
happiness.  
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I checked this hypothesized path using AMOS 5.0. See Figure 4.3. 
This analysis suggests that the three types of freedom influence happiness 
equally (+.50, +.49 and +.51). There is also a direct effect of psychological 
freedom on perceived freedom. The hypothesized model showed a good fit 
with the data: χ2(3)= 3.52, NFI=0.95, CFI=0.97, RMSEA=0.06. 
 
Figure 4.3: Happiness and freedom in nations 2000-2009; a path model 33 
 
 
 
 
4.3.4. The case of Finland and France 
How does this all fit the difference in happiness between Finland and 
France? Finland scores better on all aspects of freedom However, whereas 
the difference in social and potential freedom are not that dramatic, the 
differences in psychological freedom and perceived freedom are very 
strong, as shown in Table 4.6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
33
 CFI=0.95, RFI=0.97, RMSEA=0.06, N=33 
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Table 4.6: Actual and perceived freedom in France and in Finland, z scores 
range [0-1] 
 
 
4.4. Discussion 
 
Explanations 
So much of the difference in average happiness between Finland and 
France seems to be in psychological freedom. This raises the question of 
what explains these disparities in psychological freedom. Socialization 
naturally comes to mind. Socialization is deeply embedded in a culture and 
involves several aspects. The first is parental rearing. When asked about 
what are the important values to teach a child, French parents, for instance, 
tend to be keener to answer ‘obedience’ than their Finnish counterparts, 
35% in France versus 28% in Finland. Finnish parents tend to value much 
more ‘independence’, 57% in Finland versus 24% in France. We can 
imagine this has an influence on the psychological freedom for the 
inhabitants of rich countries. 
 A second explanation could be in education and in particular in 
teaching practices. Two kinds of teaching practices can be distinguished: 
horizontal teaching and vertical teaching (Algan, 2011). In horizontal 
teaching, children are encouraged to work in groups and self-motivate, in 
the vertical teaching lecturing and note taking is favored. France has the 
most vertical teaching system whereas the Finnish system appears among 
the most horizontal ones. We can easily imagine that psychological 
freedom and feelings of freedom follow the same pattern and there is a link 
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between teaching practices and happiness. This will be described in depth 
in the next chapter. 
 Another possible explanation for the disparity in psychological 
freedom is religion. Protestantism dominates in Finland and Catholicism in 
France. Several studies have shown that Catholicism tends to foster 
hierarchical relations. The church is hierarchical in itself with its many 
different levels, pope, bishops, priests, monks, etc., that is led from the top 
down and where there is little room for interpretation. Protestantism, in 
contrast, sees less need for intermediaries between the believer and God 
and leaves the believer more freedom. Thus, the Catholic’s ‘top-down 
approach’ will create less psychological freedom than the Protestant’s 
‘bottom-up approach’. This viewpoint is explored in detail in Chapter 6.  
 
 Limitations 
 
Cases: It should be noted that the number of nations used here is fairly 
limited, with just above thirty countries for which full data set is available. 
This analysis should be replicated once more data become available. 
Measurement: the measurement of freedom in nations was not ideal either. 
Regarding social freedom, I was limited by the data available to build an 
indicator of personal freedom; a few indicators, especially the ones built by 
Humana (1992), were a grade from 1 to 4. While this might be fine to 
compare all nations, this is not the best indicator when comparing 
developed nations, as most of them have the best grade. Likewise, the 
results from the World Values Survey cannot be used as they are based on 
surveys, and my intention was to avoid a response factor effect and use 
objective data (i.e., either data that is either measurable or drawn from 
experts’ ratings). Therefore, I was limited in the construction of some 
indicators, particularly for personal freedom. This also means we need 
more objective indicators of types of freedom such as contraception, 
homosexuality or euthanasia.  
Regarding psychological freedom, I used acquiescence and low self-
esteem as a proof to lack of guts. I see self-esteem as a prerequisite to take 
risks and seize opportunities, which is congruent with the definition of 
psychological freedom. Likewise, acquiescence, which according to 
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Schmitt et al. (2007) is more present in the collectivistic cultures, obviously 
carries a cultural load and can be seen as a form of social code. Together 
with the social code, acquiescence might carry a form of mental restrictions 
to answer bluntly. A way to complete this indicator would be to add a 
proper indicator of risk avoidance.  
Finally, I feel the operationalization of potential freedom is decent. 
However, the way I defined these three types of freedom is just a first step. 
I certainly hope to see future improvement in the construction of these 
indicators. 
Causality: This study reports a cross-sectional analysis and that method sets 
limits to identifying causality. Possibly part of the correlation is due to 
effects of happiness on freedom, rather than reversely and this is most 
likely to be the case with psychological freedom. Trend analysis can answer 
that question when more data points become available in the future. 
 
4.5.  Conclusion 
 
Much of the difference in average happiness across rich nations seems to be 
due to variation in freedom, not only perceived freedom, but independent of 
that also actual freedom and in particular psychological freedom. One 
reason why the Finns report happier than the French seems to be that they 
feel more free. Their greater actual freedom seems to be not only a matter 
of less restrictiveness in Finish society but also in the minds. 
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Appendix  
Variables used in comparative analysis of 49 nations  
 
Variable Measurement Name in data file States 
of nations 
Happine
ss 
Average answer to question ‘Taking all 
together, how satisfied or dissatisfied 
are you with your life as a whole these 
days?’ 
HappinessLS10.11-
2000s
34
 
Content
ment 
Average answer to question ‘Here is a 
picture of a ladder, suppose that the top 
represents the best possible life and the 
bottom the worst possible life. Where 
on this ladder would you place your 
current life?’  
HappinessBW11_11to15
aged_2001.2006
35
 
Hedonic 
level of 
affect 
The affective component of happiness is 
measured on the basis of responses to a 
series of 14 questions on how one has 
felt yesterday, which figured in the 
Gallup World Polls (Gallup, 2009). 
Typical questions are whether one had 
felt ‘depressed’, ‘stressed’ or rather had 
felt ‘well rested’ and ‘smiled a lot’ 
yesterday. Respondents could answer 
‘yes’ or ‘no’. I computed an affect 
balance score per nation, subtracting the 
HappinessYesterdayABS
_2006.08
36
 
                                                 
34
 Veenhoven R. (2011b) States of Nations, Happiness, Average happiness, Erasmus 
University of Rottodam, accessed on 1/11/2011 Available at: 
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm. 
35
 Veenhoven R. (2011b) States of Nations, Happiness, Average happiness, Erasmus 
University of Rottodam, accessed on 1/11/2011 Available at: 
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm. 
36
 Veenhoven R. (2011b) States of Nations, Happiness, Average happiness, Erasmus 
University of Rottodam, accessed on 1/11/2011 Available at: 
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm. 
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percentage of negative feelings from the 
percentage of positive feelings. The 
variable name in the data file States of 
Nations is 
HappinessYesterdayABS_2006.08. 
Psycholo
gical 
freedom 
Rosenberg (1965) Self Esteem Scale: 
10-item questionnaire  
a: I feel that I am a person of worth, at 
least on an equal plane with others, b: I 
feel that I have a number of good 
qualities, c: All in all, I am inclined to 
feel that I am a failure, d: I am able to 
do things as well as most other people, 
e: I feel I do not have much to be proud 
of 
f: I take a positive attitude toward 
myself, g: On the whole, I am satisfied 
with myself, h: I wish I could have 
more respect for myself, i: I certainly 
feel useless at times, j: At times I think I 
am no good at all 
 
SelfEsteem_2002
37
 
 Acquiescence: Revised NEO 
personality inventory 
Acquiescence_2002
38
 
Political 
freedom  
Civil liberties: respect of civil liberties 
in nations is estimated on the basis of 
CivilLiberties_2004
39
 
                                                 
37
 Veenhoven R. (2011b) States of Nations, Personality, Erasmus University of Rottodam, 
accessed on 1/11/2011 Available at: 
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm. 
38
 Veenhoven R. (2011b) States of Nations, Personality, Erasmus University of Rottodam, 
accessed on 1/11/2011 Available at: 
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm. 
39
 Veenhoven R. (2011b) States of Nations, Freedom, Democracy, Erasmus University of 
Rottodam, accessed on 1/11/2011 Available at: 
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm. 
 109 
 
expert rating of eleven aspects: 1. Free 
and independent media, 2. Open public 
discussion, free private discussion, 3. 
Freedom of assembly and 
demonstration, 4. Freedom of political 
organization, 5. Equal law, non-
discriminatory judiciary, 6. Protection 
from political terror, 7. Free trade 
unions, effective collective bargaining, 
8. Free professional and other private 
organizations, 9. Free business, 10. Free 
religion, 11. Personal freedoms such as: 
gender equality, property rights, 
freedom of movement, choice of 
residence, choice of marriage and size 
of family. Score are also available for 
132 nations. Scores are given between 1 
and 7 by a team of regional experts and 
scholars (A rating of 1 indicates the 
highest degree of freedom and 7 the 
least amount of freedom) 
Private 
freedom 
1) Abortion: (FreeAbortion_1995): 
Legal grounds, number in law. Grounds 
are: a) to save women’s life, b) to 
preserve physical health, c) to preserve 
mental health, d) rape or incest, e)fetal 
impairment, f) economic or social 
reasons, g)on request. Higher number 
indicates more freedom. 
2)Marriage(FreeMarriage_1990, 'Legal 
restrictions to interracial, interreligious, 
or civil marriage' and 'Equality of sexes 
PrivateFreedom_1990s
40
 
                                                 
40
 Veenhoven R. (2011b) States of Nations, Freedom, Private Freedom, Erasmus 
University of Rottodam, accessed on 1/11/2011 Available at: 
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm. 
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during marriage and for divorce 
proceedings'), as ranked by 
Humana(1992) on a scale from 1 to 4, 
items 36 and 37  
3)Travel (mean of FreeTravel1_1990  
'Freedom to travel in own country' and 
FreeTravel2_1990 'freedom to travel 
outside the country') as ranked by 
Humana(1992) on a scale from 1 to 
4(items 1 and 2),   
Economi
c 
freedom  
Economic freedom Index 1: The first 
index of Economic Freedom of the 
World (EFW) was compiled by  
Gwartney and Lawson (2006) and is 
called the Fraser Index. The EFW index 
contains 38 components designed to 
measure the degree to which a nation's 
institutions and policies are consistent 
with voluntary exchange, protection of 
property rights, open markets, and 
minimal regulation of economic 
activity. The indexes are classified in 5 
categories:  size of the government, 
property rights, access to sound money, 
freedom to trade internationally, 
regulation of credit labor and business.  
Scores on this index are available for 
138 nations around 2006.  
FreeEconIndex1_2006
41
 
 Economic freedom Index 2: Freedom FreeEconIndex3_1995
42
 
                                                 
41
 Veenhoven R. (2011b) States of Nations, Freedom, Economic Freedom,Erasmus 
University of Rottodam, accessed on 1/11/2011 Available at: 
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm. 
42
 Veenhoven R. (2011b) States of Nations, Freedom, Economic Freedom,Erasmus 
University of Rottodam, accessed on 1/11/2011 Available at: 
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm. 
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House Index developed by (Messick 
and Kimura, 1996): A total of eighty-
two countries are rated using six 
criteria: Freedom to hold property, 
Freedom to earn a living, Freedom to 
operate a business, Freedom to invest 
one’s earnings, Freedom to trade 
internationally, and Freedom to 
participate in the market economy. For 
the first four items, countries are scored 
0, 1, 2, or 3, with 3 being the most free. 
For the last two items, countries are 
scored 0, 1, or 2, with two being the 
most free. The index is based on the 
simple sum of these six scores. The 
highest possible score, indicating the 
most freedom, is 16. The lowest 
possible score is 0. Scores on this index 
are available for 69 nations in the years 
1995-96.  
Potential 
Freedom  
Internet Use: Availability of internet 
users per 1000 people as defined by the 
United Nations-United Development 
Reports(2007)-table 13  
InternetUse_2005
43
 
 
 Newspaper Use: Newspaper 
consumption per 1000 people as defined 
by the United Nations-United 
Development Reports(1998)-table 34 
Newspapers_1995
44
 
 
 
                                                 
43
 Veenhoven R. (2011b) States of Nations, Modernity, Informatization, Erasmus 
University of Rottodam, accessed on 1/11/2011 Available at: 
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm. 
44
 Veenhoven R. (2011b) States of Nations, Modernity, Informatization, Erasmus 
University of Rottodam, accessed on 1/11/2011 Available at: 
http://worlddatabaseofhappiness.eur.nl/statnat/statnat_fp.htm. 
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Chapter 5: Education and happiness45 
 
In Chapter 5, I investigate the link between education and happiness and 
raise the following question: how are the teaching methods and the level of 
happiness related in developed nations?   
 
5.1. Introduction 
 
The differences in average happiness in nations have been explained mainly 
using social structural variables, for which considerable international 
statistics are available. By lack of data, cultural explanations have received 
less attention. Still there are indications that culture does matter. Inglehart 
(2000) has found strong correlations between happiness and value patterns 
in nations, people being happier in nations where individualistic values 
prevail. Likewise Senik (2011) has highlighted the influence culture has on 
happiness on immigrants in France. 
 
Focus on education 
In this chapter I look into the effects of education on happiness in nations. 
Education is likely to be a powerful determinant of happiness, since we 
spend a substantial part of our life in school. Merton(1949) states that 
together with family and religion, education is one of the main mechanisms 
for transmitting culture.  
  A special reason for focusing on education is that, as we saw in 
Chapter 4 in the illustrative case between France and Finland, a 
considerable part of the difference in average happiness across developed 
nations is in the psychological autonomy of its citizens. This calls for an 
explanation of this difference in ‘national character’.  
In the previous chapter I have considered the link between various 
types of freedom (social, psychological, potential) and happiness. In 
particular I found that psychological freedom is playing a key role in 
                                                 
45
 This chapter is published as Brulé G. and Veenhoven R. (2014) Democratic teaching and 
happiness in developed nations. Advances in Applied Sociology, 4:11. 
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explaining the difference of happiness in the illustrative case of France and 
Finland. In this context I explore in this chapter whether the observed 
differences in self-direction are reproduced in school education. In my view 
the difference is not in what pupils learn in school, since curricula are quite 
similar in developed nations. I rather look at how pupils learn, since 
teaching practices involve much implicit learning. In that context I focus in 
particular on ‘participatory teaching.’ I expect that participatory teaching 
fosters psychological autonomy, which in its turn fosters happiness. Thus, 
can participatory teaching provide some understanding in the somewhat 
lower reported life satisfaction in France? Below I describe the plan to 
attempt to bring some answers. 
 
Plan of this chapter 
Below I will consider teaching styles and how these are measured. I 
construct an index of ‘participatory teaching’ and inspect how the scores on 
that index differ across nations. 
  On this basis I will then explore the relation between happiness and 
participatory teaching in nations. For reasons of comparability I have 
limited myself to comparing developed societies. I used data on teaching in 
37 nations and I checked whether differences in this kind of teaching 
correspond to differences in average happiness in nations, both in the 
general public (Study 1) and among secondary school pupils (Study 2). I 
find a strong correlation in Study 1, but not in Study 2. 
  Having established these basic facts, I go on to explore a possible 
causal path, and test the hypothesis that participatory teaching adds to 
happiness through its effect on psychological autonomy. In that context I 
explore the link between participatory teaching and freedom, I then 
investigate its link with happiness and explain why participatory teaching 
influences happiness for adults and not for teenagers. Finally, I 
acknowledge the limitations of my study.  
 
5.1.1. Participatory teaching  
As noted, I focused not on what pupils learn in school, but on how they 
learn. I looked for teaching practices likely to influence self-direction. 
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Concept 
I have built on work by Algan (2011) who distinguishes two types of 
teaching: vertical teaching and horizontal teaching. The former refers to 
lecturing and note-taking, while the latter is based on work in groups and 
cooperation among students. Below I describe how these matters are 
measured and how I combined the results to obtain an index of 
‘participatory’ teaching. 
 
Measurement 
Two studies have been done to assess teaching practices across nations and 
the results show considerable differences.  
 
The Civic Education Study (CES) is a survey of pupils and teachers in the 
eighth grade, in 25 countries
46
 in 1999. Pupils are teenagers around 13-14 
years old. The survey was run by the International Association for the 
Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA).  Both pupils and staff 
completed questionnaires. The pupils from each country were selected in a 
two-step process; first by random selection of schools and then by random 
selection of pupils in the selected schools. The teachers and school 
principals of the selected schools also completed a questionnaire.  
The teacher questionnaire involved questions about teaching 
practices: ‘In your class, a) How often do students work in groups? b) How 
often do students work on projects? c) How often do students study 
textbooks? d) How often do students participate in role play, e) How often 
does the teacher lecture? , f) How often does the teacher include 
discussions? g) How often does the teacher asks questions?’. The answers 
were given the values 1 never, 2 sometimes, 3 often and 4 very often.  
Following Algan’s method, I focused on the two ends of the 
spectrum of teaching practices from the CES, ‘Teacher lectures’ on one 
side and ‘Students work in groups’ on the other. The former indicates 
                                                 
46
 Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, England, Estonia, 
Finland, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Sweden, Switzerland and the 
United States 
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vertical teaching practices, the latter horizontal teaching. These dimensions 
have also been referred to as respectively ‘teacher centered’ and ‘student 
centered’ education.  A ‘z-score’ was calculated, ranging from 0 for the 
country with the most vertical teaching (France) to 1 for the country with 
the most horizontal teaching (Sweden). 
 
The Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) is a 
multi-country comparative test of student cognitive achievement in 
mathematics and science, conducted in 1995 by the IEA, the same 
international consortium that constructed the CES database. The TIMSS 
also contains information about grade 8 students and covers 37 countries
47
. 
Students, school principals and teachers were questioned using a 
representative sample of schools and students from the different nations 
studied. Teaching practices were measured using the individual student 
surveys conducted in all classrooms in each of the sampled schools.  
The survey covers class subjects including: mathematics, science, 
biology, chemistry and the earth sciences. I focused on the teaching 
practices in mathematics, as this allowed us to make comparison between a 
maximum number of countries. Additionally, the focus on mathematics was 
expected to be a good case for comparing how pupils learn, because of the 
great similarity in what is being learned.  
The questions on teaching practices used in my analysis were: ‘In 
school, how often do you do these things? Copy notes from the board 
during the lessons? Work together in pairs and small groups in class?’ The 
answers ranged from 1 all the time, 2 often, 3 sometimes, to 4 never. A z-
score was calculated, ranging from 0, the country with the most vertical 
teaching (Romania) to 1, the country with the most horizontal teaching 
(Switzerland). 
 
Pooled data:  In order to have the highest number of countries I combined 
                                                 
47
 Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, 
Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, United Kingdom and the United 
States 
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the ratings obtained in the two studies, the TIMSS and the CES. When both 
studies covered the same country, an average score was used. 
 
Index of participatory teaching in nations 
I combined the scores for nations on horizontal and vertical teaching, by 
subtracting the latter from the former. The resulting index indicates the 
extent to which horizontal teaching dominates in a country. I call it the 
index of participatory teaching. The results for 37 nations are shown in 
Table 5.1. 
 
Table 5.1: Participatory teaching ranking in 37 nations  
Switzerland 0.95 
Denmark 0.87 
Sweden 0.85 
Iceland 0.85 
Netherlands 0.85 
United Kingdom 0.84 
Canada 0.82 
Norway 0.74 
United States 0.72 
Slovak Republic 0.72 
Lithuania 0.71 
Australia 0.70 
Poland 0.64 
Germany 0.64 
Israel 0.58 
Slovenia 0.56 
Latvia 0.53 
Belgium 0.51 
Finland 0.51 
Hong Kong 0.49 
Estonia 0.48 
Portugal 0.47 
Spain 0.47 
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Italy 0.44 
Bulgaria 0.37 
Hungary 0.34 
Czesc Republic 0.33 
Austria 0.28 
Korea, Republic of 0.27 
Romania 0.27 
Cyprus 0.26 
Turkey 0.21 
Greece 0.19 
Russian Federation 0.18 
Japan 0.10 
Ireland 0.06 
France 0.00 
 
Differences across nations 
Looking at Table 5.1 it can be seen that France is the country where 
teaching appears as the least participatory and that the country where 
teachers seem to use the most participatory methods in Switzerland. The 
lows score of France fits a wider south European pattern and is possibly 
enhanced by the selective nature of the French schooling system. The high 
score of Switzerland fits a north-western European pattern and is possibly 
fostered by the high degree of direct democracy in the Swiss political 
system. This South of Europe-North of Europe will be explored more in 
depth in the next chapter for power distance.   
 
Not a matter of money 
Do these differences in teaching style reflect cultural differences, or are 
they a by-product of financial investment in education? This could be the 
case as vertical teaching is likely to be cheaper than horizontal teaching. 
There is indeed a correlation between ‘participatory teaching’ and the 
percentage of GDP spent in education, however it is small (r= +.24) and a 
look at the relationship between participatory teaching and educational 
expenses shows considerable divergence: for instance participatory 
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teaching is less common in France and Spain than in the Netherlands, while 
these countries spend equally on education (11% of GDP). Ireland scores 
the second lowest on participatory teaching, although it spends the most on 
education. 
 
 
5.2. Study 1 : Participatory teaching and happiness in the 
general public in developed nations 
  
Are these differences in participatory teaching in nations related to 
happiness? I explored this in a comparison of average happiness in the 
general public of 27 developed nations. 
 
5.2.1. Method 
 
Cases 
For reasons of comparability and availability of data, I restricted the data to 
that for developed nations (as described in previous chapter, a nation is 
considered as ‘developed’ when its GDP is superior to $20,000). Of the 37 
nations for which we have data on both participatory teaching and 
happiness 27 fit this criterion. These nations are: Austria, Australia, 
Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hong Kong, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and the United States. 
 
Measures 
Happiness in these nations is measured using the average response to the 
question: ‘Taking all together, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you with 
your life as a whole these days?’, Please answer by ticking a number 
between 0 to 10, where 0 stands for most ‘dissatisfied’ and 10 for most 
‘satisfied’. In the World Database of Happiness this question is classified as 
a measure type O-SLW-c-sq-n-11-a (Veenhoven 2012d). Responses to this 
question and equivalent ones are gathered in the collection ‘Happiness in 
Nations’ of the World Database of Happiness (Veenhoven 2011b).  
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Participatory teaching in nations is measured using the prevalence of 
horizontal teaching over vertical teaching (cf. section 1.2). 
 
5.2.2. Results 
I started with a scatter plot of participatory teaching (horizontal) against and 
happiness (vertical). See Figure 5.1. We see a linear pattern of correlation, 
in which Switzerland stand out as the country with most participatory 
teaching and the highest happiness and Japan as a case of little participatory 
teaching and low happiness. Ireland shows a particular pattern, with a 
relatively high level of happiness in spite of little participatory teaching. 
 
Figure 5.1: Happiness and participatory teaching in 27 developed nations: 
scatter plot 
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Given this linear pattern it makes sense to compute a correlation: r = +.60
48
. 
To appraise the strength of this correlation I compared it with other 
variables in the same nation set. The correlation between happiness and 
percentage of GDP spent on education  was +.30, which means that from a 
happiness perspective, teaching methods are more important for happiness 
than the amount of money a nation invests in education. The correlation 
between happiness and participatory teaching is also stronger than that for 
happiness and income inequality (-.25) or public health expenditures (+.37). 
The strength of the correlation for happiness and participatory teaching is 
comparable to institutional factors such as gender equality (+.60) and 
government effectiveness (+.73). So we have really hit on something 
important.  
Analyzing horizontal and vertical teaching separately does not 
change the picture. Horizontal teaching is positively correlated with 
happiness while vertical teaching is negatively correlated. Separate analysis 
of the two datasets also did not change the picture. Participatory teaching 
correlates positively with happiness in TIMSS data (+.56) and in CES data 
(+.55). 
Next to these bi-variate analyses, I checked for possible 
spuriousness in the correlation, controlling for variables that are likely to 
produce an inflated correlation, without wiping away true correlation
49
. 
Since wealth might be such a factor and there are still differences in 
affluence in this set of developed nations, I controlled buying power per 
head, which reduced the correlation to +.43. I also controlled average IQ as 
an indicator of the quality of the educational system and the murder rate as 
an indicator of order in society. The partial correlations are respectively 
+.63 and +.54 which suggests that there is a considerable correlation 
between participatory teaching and average happiness in developed nations. 
                                                 
48
 Avoiding common practice we do not report statistical significance of correlations 
among macro variables. Tests of significance inform us about the probability that a 
relationship found in a random sample also exists in the population from which that sample 
is drawn. This set of countries was not a random sample and for this reason significance 
testing makes no sense. 
49
 Contrary to common practice we did not control for all other correlates of happiness in 
nations. Given the causal interrelations, that would be like throwing away the baby with 
the bathwater. 
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5.3. Study 2: Participatory teaching and happiness among 
high school pupils in nations 
 
5.3.1. Method 
After analyzing the relationships between participatory teaching and 
happiness in the general public, I also assessed the relationship between 
participatory teaching and happiness in another population, using high-
school pupils. Data on happiness were taken from the Health Behaviour in 
School-aged Children survey (HBSC). In this study, data has been collected 
about health, health behaviors and life satisfaction among 11, 13 and 15 
year olds pupils. The units of sampling are school classes and sample sizes 
are 1550 per age group in nations (Currie, 2008).   
 
Cases 
Data on both happiness of high-school pupils and participatory teaching are 
available for 22 developed countries. The countries included in the dataset 
were: Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Portugal, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom 
and the United States. 
 
Measures 
In the HBSC studies happiness is measured using responses to the question:  
‘Here is a picture of a ladder, suppose that the top represents the best 
possible life and the bottom the worst possible life. Where on this ladder 
would you place your current life?’ (0 worst possible, 10 best possible). 
This question differs from the question used in study 1 in that it invites 
respondents to make a more cognitive evaluation of their life. In the world 
Database of Happiness this question is classified as a measure of 
‘contentment’ and coded C-BW-c-sq-l-11-c (Veenhoven 2012d). 
Participatory teaching was measured in the same way as in study 1. 
 
5.3.2. Results 
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In this case I saw no correlation between average happiness and 
participatory teaching in nations: r = +.02.  Separate analysis of horizontal 
and vertical teaching confirm this correlation as both correlations are very 
low; the correlation between average happiness and horizontal teaching is -
0.03 while correlation between average happiness and vertical teaching is -
0.15. 
 
5.4. Explanations 
 
Why does the average citizen report happier in nations where participatory 
teaching prevails? Below I will argue that participatory teaching enhances 
freedom, psychological freedom in particular. In its turn freedom adds to 
happiness and, especially to happiness in a modern multiple-choice society. 
Why then are high-school pupils no happier in nations where participatory 
teaching prevails? Below I will argue that the main effect on happiness is 
found in long-term personality formation, rather than in short-term 
enjoyment of school hours. 
 
5.4.1. Participatory teaching prepares for freedom 
Much of the differences in average happiness across nations can be 
explained by freedom, the more freedom society allows, the happier 
citizens typically are (Veenhoven 2008). Below I will argue that 
participatory teaching is likely to foster one aspect of freedom in particular, 
that is, psychological freedom, also called ‘psychological autonomy.’ To 
that end I will first discuss the concept of freedom and how it affects 
happiness. 
 
Aspects of freedom 
As we saw in Chapter 4, Bay (1970) distinguishes three aspects of freedom: 
social freedom, psychological freedom and potential freedom. Social 
freedom is about the opportunity to choose and denotes the absence of 
restrictions imposed by other people. Psychological freedom is about the 
capability to choose and denotes an absence of inner restrictions. Potential 
freedom is about access to information on possible options for choice. 
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In Chapter 4, I presented indicators of each of these kinds of 
freedom in nations and a factor analysis confirmed this conceptualization. 
For the purpose of this study I repeated that analysis for the 27 nations at 
hand here. The variables used are described on Appendix A.  I use different 
indicators that neatly load on three distinct factors that fit Bay’s distinction 
between three kinds of freedom. See Appendix B. 
 
How freedom can enhance happiness 
In Chapter 4, the links between the three types of freedom and happiness 
was shown. Each type of freedom will add to the chance that one lives a life 
one wants to live and that one can change one’s way of life if it is no longer 
satisfying. Although there are costs to freedom, such as choice stress, the 
positive effects appear to dominate (Veenhoven 2000, 2008).  
  In this context social freedom enlarges an individual’s opportunities 
to choose, for instance if choice of a spouse is not limited to one of the 
same religion, there is a better chance of finding one that really fits you. 
Opportunities can only be used if one is aware of them, and this is where 
potential freedom comes in. In the example of marrying someone from 
another religion, there can be misinformation about the consequences of 
mixed marriage, such as the contention that children from such marriages 
lack a moral orientation and often end up in jail.  Even if one is well 
informed one may still lack the guts to choose and that is what 
psychological freedom is about. In the above example you may forsake 
your real love and settle for a marriage of reason in order to avoid rejection 
by your mother.  
 
How participatory teaching can enhance freedom 
Participatory teaching may affect freedom in various ways. One can expect 
that citizens in societies where participatory teaching prevails press more 
for freedom practicing in their political behavior what they have learned in 
school. As such participatory teaching could foster social freedom in 
nations. Participatory teaching also adds to an individual’s potential 
freedom in that it trains information seeking and creates more awareness of 
informational manipulation. Participatory teaching is also likely to foster 
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psychological freedom, which will add to the chance that citizens use 
opportunities to choose, and resist pressures to conform. 
 
5.4.2. Test of the causal chain:  
Participatory teaching  freedom  happiness 
I checked this explanation in a further analysis of Study 1. As a first step I 
assessed the correlations of the three freedom variant with participatory 
teaching and average happiness. See table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.2: Correlations of freedom with participatory teaching and 
happiness in 27 developed nations 
 
Freedom 
correlation with 
participatory 
teaching 
correlation with happiness 
zero order participatory 
teaching 
partialled out 
Social freedom +.62 +.63 +.55 
Psychological 
freedom 
+.69 +.59 +.17 
Potential freedom +.42 +.55 +.58 
 
  Two very strong correlations appear between participatory teaching 
and psychological freedom (r=+.69) and between psychological freedom 
and happiness (+.59), which fits the explanation that participatory teaching 
appears to add to happiness by fostering psychological autonomy. Yet the 
data also show effects through other variants of freedom. In order to assess 
the independent effect of each kind of freedom I computed partial 
correlations, which are shown in right hand column of Table 5.2. 
  Looking at these partial correlations, we can see that the correlation 
between psychological freedom and happiness (+.59) almost disappears 
when controlling for participatory teaching (+.17). Likewise, we can see in 
table 5.3 that the relationship between participatory teaching and happiness 
in nations (+.60) is halved when psychological freedom (+.32) is partialled 
out. Conversely, the link between participatory teaching and psychological 
freedom (+.69) is little reduced when happiness is controlled (+.52).  
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Table 5.3: Correlation of happiness with participatory teaching in 27 
developed nations 
Zero order correlation 
+.60 
Partial correlations 
controlling 
social freedom +.32 
psychological 
freedom 
+.32 
potential freedom +.48 
 
 
We can also see that social freedom is involved in the link between 
participatory teaching and happiness as the partial correlation is the same as 
in the case of psychological freedom (+.32). Participatory teaching does not 
seem to have an influence in the link between social freedom and happiness 
as the partial correlation (+.55) is almost the same as the zero order 
correlation (+.62). The partial correlation between participatory teaching 
and happiness (+.45) is higher than in the case of psychological freedom. 
Participatory teaching has no influence on the correlation between potential 
freedom and happiness.  
  In this analysis, psychological freedom appears to be the main 
mediator in the relation between participatory teaching and happiness in 
nations.  Participatory teaching seems to enhance psychological freedom 
and social freedom, which are both strongly correlated to happiness. To 
verify this hypothesis I performed a path analysis. Results are presented in 
Figure 5.2.  
 
Figure 5.2: Participatory teaching, freedom and happiness in 27 developed 
nations: path analysis 
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In this analysis we see again that participatory teaching adds to happiness 
through its effect on psychological freedom in the first place.  In this case 
the influence of potential freedom is a bit higher, while the influence of 
social freedom is lower than in the earlier partial correlation analysis. The 
difference is probably in the 5 cases lost in this analysis. Though the model 
fit could be better, the pattern of links is confirmed.  
 
5.4.3. Why is there no correlation among high school pupils? 
The effect of participatory teaching on happiness appeared to be strong in 
Study 1 among adults in 27 nations, but non-existent in Study 2 among high 
school pupils in 22 nations. How can we explain this difference? At first 
one would expect that the effect of teaching style on happiness to be 
stronger among those sitting on the school bench. 
  A methodological explanation might be found in the measure of 
happiness used. In Study 1 happiness among adults was measured using a 
question about ‘life-satisfaction’ while in Study 2 high-school pupils rated 
their life on a ladder ranging from the ‘best possible’ to the ‘worst 
possible.’ The former question taps ‘overall happiness,’ while the latter taps 
the cognitive component of happiness, called ‘contentment’ in Veenhoven 
(2012d).  Is average ‘contentment’ less sensitive to participatory teaching 
and freedom? I checked in Study 1 among general population samples, for 
which data on contentment are also available. I found the link between 
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participatory teaching and contentment for adults to be in the same range as 
for life satisfaction (+.55). Possibly the question on contentment is not the 
most appropriate for youngsters, who typically have less crystallized ideas 
of what the best possible life is like, as mentioned in Chapter 2. High-
school pupils will be more aware of how happy they feel most of the time, 
so future studies on high school pupils should use affective measures of 
happiness. For the time being I do not know whether this will make a 
difference to the results I get.  
  A more substantive explanation is that there is little difference in 
freedom among high-school pupils. At that age there is not much to choose 
to do and one’s choices are limited by adults, such as one’s parents and 
teachers. So even if participatory teaching prepares them for freedom, it 
would make little difference in their present situation and hence seems to 
have little effect on their happiness. 
  A related explanation is that the effects of participatory teaching on 
freedom manifest later in life, when personality has crystallized and when 
real choices have to be made. In other words, psychological freedom has no 
use during teenage years, as the number of choices is limited. Participatory 
teaching is a favorable ground to develop an internal locus of control, and 
later on, this control orientation favors freedom.  
  One effect is that inner controlled citizens are more likely to press 
for social freedom in their society and thus create more opportunity to 
choose. Another effect is that this psychological mindset will add to the 
chance that they take advantage of these opportunities to choose and 
develop a life-style that fits them well. As a result they will be happier.   
So it seems that the seeds of participatory teaching flourish only in 
adulthood in its long-term effects on an individual’s psychological freedom. 
Teenagers reap these fruits later in life.  
 
5.4.4. Net effect of teaching style  
The development of psychological autonomy depends on more than just 
teaching style in school and is particularly influenced by socialization at 
home. This begs the question of whether there is any independent effect of 
teaching style. If not, the correlation between participatory teaching and 
happiness will disappear when home socialization for independence is 
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controlled. I checked using data of the World Values Survey that involves 
questions about the importance of things that children can be encouraged to 
learn at home, one of which is ‘independence’. I computed the percentage 
of affirmative answers in nations and partialled that variable out
50
. This 
halved the correlation, but did not wipe it out. This does suggest an 
independent effect. 
 
5.5. Limitations 
 
It should be noted that the number of nations for which all data is available 
is fairly limited; a larger number of nations with systematic, reliable data 
would make the conclusions more robust.  
 Another limitation is in the cross-sectional nature of this analysis, 
which can suggest causality, but cannot prove that. Cross-national panel 
studies could solve that problem, but for the time-being such data is not 
available. 
The data used here are at the macro level of nations. My explanation 
assumes effects at the micro-level, in particular that participatory teaching 
fosters the development of more autonomous personalities, which later in 
life results in better choices and hence in greater happiness. Though 
autonomy ranks high as a goal in participatory education, I found no 
empirical evidence for long-term effects of this kind of teaching on the 
development of related personality traits such as self-esteem and control 
orientation. I neither found any individual level data on school environment 
in youth and happiness in adulthood. So for the time being, I must make do 
with these findings at the macro level and these suggest a robust effect of 
participatory teaching on happiness. 
 
5.6. Conclusion 
 
Adults report happier in nations where participatory teaching prevails. The 
effect of participatory teaching seems to lie in its fostering of freedom in 
society. Participatory teaching might provide a countervailing power 
                                                 
50
 N = 18 
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against attempts to impose limits on individual’s choice and could help 
individuals develop the psychological autonomy required to use these 
opportunities.  
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Appendix A 
Measures of variables used in cross national analysis 
 
Variable Measurement Used in 
study 
Name in data file 
States of nations 
Happiness 
 
Average answer to question ‘Taking all 
together, how satisfied or dissatisfied are you 
with your life as a whole these days?’ 
1 HappinessLS10.1
1-2000s 
Average answer to question ‘Here is a picture 
of a ladder, suppose that the top represents the 
best possible life and the bottom the worst 
possible life. Where on this ladder would you 
place your current life?’ 
2 HappinessBW11_
11 
to 
15aged_2001.200
6 
Economic 
prosperity 
The purchasing power per capita is obtained 
by dividing the nation’s GDP at purchasing 
power parity (PPP), i.e. all goods and services 
produced in the country valued at prices 
prevailing in the United States. 
1-2 RGDP_2005 
Participato
ry teaching  
Participatory teaching is computed from two 
studies: the CES study and the TIMSS. 
 
CES: the teacher questionnaire involved 
questions about teaching practices: ‘In your 
class, a) How often do students work in 
groups? b) How often do students work on 
projects? c) How often do students study 
textbooks? , d) How often do students 
participate in role play, e) How often does the 
teacher lecture? , f) How often does the 
teacher include discussions, g) How often 
does the teacher asks questions?’. The answers 
were given the values 1 never, 2 sometimes, 3 
often and 4 very often.  
 
TIMSS: Students, school principals and 
teachers were questioned using a 
representative sample of schools and students 
from the different nations studied. Teaching 
practices were measured using the individual 
student surveys conducted in all classrooms in 
1-2 ParticipatoryTeac
hing_1995.99 
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each of the sampled schools. The survey 
covers classes on: mathematics, science, 
biology, chemistry and the earth sciences. 
 
Psychologi
cal 
freedom 
Index of: 1) Rosenberg (1965) Self Esteem 
Scale: 10-item questionnaire  
a: I feel that I am a person of worth, at least on 
an equal plane with others, b: I feel that I have 
a number of good qualities, c: All in all, I am 
inclined to feel that I am a failure, d: I am able 
to do things as well as most other people, e: I 
feel I do not have much to be proud of f: I take 
a positive attitude toward myself, g: On the 
whole, I am satisfied with myself, h: I wish I 
could have more respect for myself, i: I 
certainly feel useless at times, j: At times I 
think I am no good at all.  2) Acquiescence: 
Revised NEO personality inventory.  
1 
 
SelfEsteem_2002 
Acquiescence_20
02 
 
Economic 
freedom 
Index of: 1) Economic freedom Index 1: The 
first index of Economic Freedom of the World 
(EFW) was compiled by  Gwartney and 
Lawson (2006) and is called the Fraser Index. 
The EFW index contains 38 components 
designed to measure the degree to which a 
nation's institutions and policies are consistent 
with voluntary exchange, protection of 
property rights, open markets, and minimal 
regulation of economic activity. The indexes 
are classified in 5 categories:  size of the 
government, property rights, access to sound 
money, freedom to trade internationally, 
regulation of credit labor and business.  Scores 
on this index are available for 138 nations 
around 2006. 2) Economic freedom Index 2: 
Freedom House Index developed by (Messick 
and Kimura, 1996): A total of eighty-two 
countries are rated using six criteria: Freedom 
to hold property, Freedom to earn a living, 
Freedom to operate a business, Freedom to 
invest one’s earnings, Freedom to trade 
internationally, and Freedom to participate in 
the market economy. For the first four items, 
1 FreeEconIndex1_
2006 
FreeEconIndex3_
1995 
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countries are scored 0, 1, 2, or 3, with 3 being 
the most free. For the last two items, countries 
are scored 0, 1, or 2, with two being the most 
free. The index is based on the simple sum of 
these six scores. The highest possible score, 
indicating the most freedom, is 16. The lowest 
possible score is 0. Scores on this index are 
available for 69 nations in the years 1995-96. 
Political 
freedom  
Index of: 1) Civil liberties: respect of civil 
liberties in nations is estimated on the basis of 
expert rating of eleven aspects: a) Free and 
independent media, b) Open public discussion, 
free private discussion, c) Freedom of 
assembly and demonstration, d) Freedom of 
political organization, e) Equal law, non-
discriminatory judiciary, f) Protection from 
political terror, g) Free trade unions, effective 
collective bargaining, h) Free professional and 
other private organizations, i) Free business, j) 
Free religion, k) Personal freedoms such as: 
gender equality, property rights, freedom of 
movement, choice of residence, choice of 
marriage and size of family. Score are also 
available for 132 nations. 
1 CivilLiberties_20
04 
Private 
freedom 
Index of: 1) Free abortion: Legal grounds, 
number in law. Grounds are: a) to save 
women’s life, b) to preserve physical health, 
c) to preserve mental health, d) rape or incest, 
e)fetal impairment, f) economic or social 
reasons, g)on request. Higher number 
indicates more freedom. 
2) Free marriage, 'Legal restrictions to 
interracial, inter-religious, or civil marriage' 
and 'Equality of sexes during marriage and for 
divorce proceedings'), as ranked by Humana 
(1992)  
3) Free travel: freedom to travel outside the 
country') as ranked by Humana (1992) on a 
scale from 1 to 4(items 1 and 2),   
1 FreeAbortion_19
95 
FreeMarriage_19
90 
FreeTravel1_199
0 
FreeTravel2_199
0 
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Potential 
Freedom  
Index of: 1) Availability of internet users per 
1000 people as defined by the United Nations-
United Development Reports(2007)-table 13 
and 2) Newspaper use:  Newspaper 
consumption per 1000 people 
1 
 
InternetUse_2005 
Newspapers_199
5 
IQ IQ tests in general population samples 
completed with estimates based on 
observations in comparable countries. 
1 IQ_2006 
Murder 
rate 
Murder rates per 100,000 inhabitants  1 MurderRate_2004
.09 
Value 
independe
nce 
% affirmative answers to a question on 
importance of ‘independence’ as a quality that 
children can be encouraged to learn at home 
1 ValueChildIndepe
ndence_2000s 
 
Source: Data file ‘States of Nations’ (Veenhoven 2012d). 
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Appendix B 
Factor analysis
51
 of indicators of freedom in 27 developed nations 
 
Data: appendix A 
 
 
                                                 
51
 The three factors had an Eigen value greater than 1 and the slope was sharper after the third factor. 
This confirmed the prominence of three factors. The variance explained by these three factors 
represents 76.3%. After a varimax rotation, we obtain the factor loadings presented here; values 
below 0.30 are not considered. 
Indicators of freedom Factors 
  
Social Freedom 
 
Factor 1 
 
Psychologi
cal freedom 
Factor 2 
 
Potential 
freedom 
 
Factor3 
 
Freedom of marriage  .97   
Freedom to travel .89 -.32  
Freedom to abortion .37   
Suppression Civil 
Liberties 
-.94   
Economic freedom 1 .70   
Economic freedom 2 .58  .52 
Acquiescence  0.99  
Self-esteem  0.58  
Internet users   .91 
Newspaper use  -.59 .62 
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Chapter 6: Hierarchy and happiness
52
 
 
In Chapter 6, I explore the links between hierarchy and happiness, and 
more specifically I attempt to answer the following question: can hierarchy 
explain the relatively low level of happiness in Latin European nations?  
 
6.1. Introduction 
Life in Mediterranean countries is often characterized by the term dolce vita 
(sweet life in Italian), which carries the idea of a pleasurable life in the sun, 
with good food and rich cultures enjoyed by friendly relaxed people. This 
stereotype fits the experience of tourists fairly well, but contradicts with the 
results of survey research on happiness. Cultural differences between the 
South and the North of Europe have been highlighted in terms of culture 
and religion by Weber (1905) and Inglehart (2000). A look at the World 
Map of Happiness (Veenhoven 2011a) reveals that people live happier in 
the rainy north of Europe than in the sunny south, France being closer to the 
South than to the North in terms of happiness. Why is there a significant 
difference between the North and the South of Europe in terms of life 
satisfaction? Some possible answers to this question are explored in this 
chapter.  
 I will begin this chapter by explaining how I distinguish between 
‘Northern’ and ‘Latin’ nations in Europe. Next, I will discuss the evidence 
for lower happiness in Latin Europe than in the North and consider the 
possibility of cultural measurement bias. I will then review possible 
explanations for this North-South difference with a particular focus on 
social hierarchy. I will show that the more hierarchical cultures of the Latin 
European countries have a role in explaining part of the difference in 
happiness. I will also show that France follows the southern pattern. Having 
established these facts, I theorize about origins of this difference, drawing 
on macro-sociological theories.  
                                                 
52
 This chapter is published as Brulé & Veenhoven (2012). Why Are Latin Europeans Less 
Happy? The Impact of Hierarchy, Polyphonic Anthropology – Theoretical and Empirical 
Cross-Cultural Fieldwork, Prof. Massimo Canevacci (Ed.),ISBN: 978-953-51-0418-6 
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In this analysis of European nations ‘Northern’ countries will 
include Scandinavia (Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Finland and Iceland) and 
the Netherlands. ‘Latin’ countries denote the following Mediterranean 
countries: Portugal, Spain, France, Italy and Greece. North European 
Germany, Poland and the Baltic countries are left out because average 
happiness in these nations is still influenced by war and regime change in 
the past century. The South European Balkan countries were not included 
for the same reason. For comparison matters, three representative countries 
of each group are selected: Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands for 
Northern countries, France, Italy and Spain for Latin Countries.  
 
6.2. Are Latin Europeans really less happy? 
 
Let us now take a closer look at average happiness in the Northern and 
Latin countries of Europe.  
 
6.2.1. Happiness in Northern and Latin European nations 
The differences in overall happiness and its components between Northern 
and Latin European nations are presented in Table 6.1. There is a consistent 
difference: inhabitants of Latin European nations are clearly less satisfied 
with their life as a whole, they feel less well affectively and report a greater 
difference between how their life is and how they want it to be. 
 
Table 6.1. Average happiness in Northern and Latin European nations 
around 2005 
Region Nation 
Life 
satisfaction 
(Overall 
happiness) 
Mood 
(affective 
component) 
Contentment 
(cognitive 
component) 
Northern Denmark 8.3 60 3.9 
Netherlands 7.7 58 3.9 
Sweden 7.8 56 4.1 
Average 7.9 58 4.0 
 
Latin 
 
France 
 
6.6 
 
42 
 
3.5 
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Italy 6.7 39 3.3 
Spain 7.3 49 3.6 
Average 6.9 43 3.5 
 
North-South difference 
In points on scale  1.0 15 0.5 
In % actual scale range in 
Europe 
27% 37% 32% 
 
 
This difference in the appreciation of life as a whole is paralleled by similar 
differences in satisfaction with particular life-domains, some of which are 
presented in Table 6.2. 
 
Table 6.2. Life, work and financial satisfaction in Northern and Latin 
European nations around 2005 
 
   
Region Nation 
Satisfaction 
with      
job
53
 
Satisfaction 
with home 
life
54
 
Satisfaction 
with financial 
situation of 
household
55
 
 
Northern 
 
Denmark 
 
8.2 
 
8.7 
 
7.3 
Netherlands 7.6 8.1 7.5 
Sweden 7.7 8.4 6.8 
Average 7.8 8.4 7.2 
 
Latin 
 
France 
 
6.9 
 
7.6 
 
6.0 
Italy 7.3 7.7 6.8 
Spain 7.1 7.6 6.1 
Average 7.1 7.6 6.3 
                                                 
53 Data file States of Nations(Veenhoven 2011d), JobSatisfaction_1980_2005 
54 Data file States of Nations(Veenhoven 2011d), HouseholdSatisfaction_1980_2005 
55 Data file States of Nations(Veenhoven 2011d), FinancialSatisfaction_1980_2005 
 140 
 
 
North-South difference 
In points on scale 0.7 0.8 0.9 
In % actual scale range in 
Europe     
23% 23% 21% 
 
6.2.2. Cultural measurement bias? 
These counterintuitive results have raised suspicion about the comparability 
of happiness across cultures. Several possible sources of cultural 
measurement bias have been suggested.   
 One possibility could be that the words used in survey questions 
have different connotations in Latinate languages than in Germanic 
languages. Yet several arguments plea against this explanation. One is that 
the survey questions in Table 5.1 used various words, particularly in the 14 
questions about yesterday’s mood. Another counter indication is that no 
such divide between North and South appears in the International 
Happiness Scale Interval Study (Veenhoven 2009), where native speakers 
are asked to rate numerical equivalents of verbal response options, such as 
‘very happy’. 
 Another possible explanation is that national response tendencies 
play us false and in this context, Ostroot and Snyder (1985) have suggested 
that French cynicism results in lower responses to questions about 
happiness than those given in the US, while both the French and the 
American respondents may feel equally well. If so, we can expect that the 
difference will be less pronounced in the responses to questions about 
yesterday’s affect, since this is closer to the respondent’s direct experience 
and the affect balance score does not involve an encompassing judgement. 
Yet Table 6.2 does not show such a difference. 
 Any such cultural measurement bias must reflect in the low 
correlation of average happiness with objective living conditions, if these 
measures merely tap hot air, scores on them will not be coupled with e.g. 
economic affluence and respect for human rights in nations. Yet cross-
national research shows the reverse, about 80% of the differences in 
average happiness in nations can be explained by a handful of objective 
societal characteristics, see for example Ott (2010). So if cultural 
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measurement bias is involved at all, the bias must be limited. The issue of 
cultural measurement bias is discussed in more detail in Veenhoven (1993) 
Chapter 5/2.1. 
 
6.3. Why are people less happy in Latin countries? 
  
Comparative research on happiness shows typically that people live 
happiest in the most modern nations of this world, see for example 
Inglehart et al. (2008) and Berg & Veenhoven (2010). To what extent can 
this explain the difference discussed here? The most comprehensive 
indicator of modernity of nations is their economic prosperity, and this is 
commonly measured using the indicator buying power per capita. For that 
purpose I used variable RGDP_2005 from the data file ‘States of Nations’. 
A plot of happiness versus buying power in European countries is given in 
Figure 6.1. 
 As we can see from Figure 6.1, average happiness ranges from 4,5 
(Macedonia) to 8,3 (Denmark). The circles highlight the difference between 
Latin and Northern European countries on both variables; the difference in 
happiness is great, while the difference in affluence is relatively small. So, 
economic affluence is only small part of the story. 
 
Figure 6.1. Life satisfaction by economic prosperity in Europe around 
2005
56
 
                                                 
56 Variables in States of Nations (Veenhoven 2011d): HappinessLSBW10.11_2000.09 and RGDP_2005 
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What other factors can be involved in explaining the differences between 
these two clusters, one formed with Latin European nations on one hand, 
one formed with Northern European nations on the other hand? A look in 
the literature shows that happiness in nations also depends on the degree of 
freedom societies allow their members (Veenhoven 2000), on the degree to 
which citizens trust each other (Helliwell 2003) and on the quality of 
government within that society (Ott 2010). A common effect seems to be 
that these societal conditions add to the chance that citizens find a way of 
life that fits their nature. In terms of institutional economy, this societal 
constellation adds to the ‘optimal allocation’ of human resources.  
Societies can limit individual choice in several ways. One way is by 
setting normative constraints on self-direction. This is typically the case in 
collectivistic cultures and happiness is indeed lower in nations where 
collectivistic values prevail than in nations where individualist values rank 
highest (Veenhoven 1999). Likewise, happiness is lower in nations where 
men and women have to meet traditional gender roles in contrast to nations 
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where female emancipation has led to a more varied repertoire of life style 
options (Bjornskov et. al. 2007). 
A related factor, not yet considered in much detail, is the degree of 
social hierarchy in a society. Social hierarchy involves differences in power 
and prestige. Power differences might reduce a person’s self-direction, the 
more power other people have over you, the lower the chance that you can 
live the way you would like. Differences in prestige will also reduce self-
direction in a more subtle way: if other people are held in much higher 
esteem than you are, you might be less self-confident and therefore less apt 
to go your own way. Bay (1970) refers to this limitation as ‘psychological 
(un)freedom’, as defined in Chapter 4. 
Let us see whether hierarchy can indeed help explain the difference 
found in happiness between the North and the South of Europe, and if so, to 
what extent. If France follows the southern pattern, let us see if it possible 
to find some possible answers to response the wider question of the French 
relative unhappiness. 
 
6.3.1. Definition of hierarchy 
Social ‘hierarchy’ involves differential access to power and prestige. 
Hierarchy exists in all social institutions, though not to an equal degree. 
Hierarchy is typically more pronounced in institutions such as the army and 
work organizations, than within the family and groups such as sport clubs. 
The degree of hierarchy in these institutions varies across societies and 
there is also societal difference in the degree to which these hierarchies 
converge. 
  
6.3.2. Indicators of hierarchy in nations 
Hierarchy as such is not easily measurable, at least not at the level of 
nations. In this study I used four indicators. The first was the amount of 
hierarchy inhabitants perceived to exist in their country. The second 
indicator was the degree to which people felt that they were being 
controlled by others. The third indicator was the degree to which hierarchy 
was morally accepted. The fourth indicator was the Hofstede’s (1994) 
Power Distance Index (PDI), which is used to depict both the degree of 
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hierarchy actually perceived to exist and the degree of hierarchy deemed 
desirable. Therefore, this last indicator summarizes the previous items.  
 
Perceived hierarchy: In the context of the GLOBE study in 62 societies 
(House et al. 2004: 537-9) middle managers were asked to rate their 
agreement with the following statements: 1) In this society, followers are 
expected to obey their leader without question, 2) In this society, power is 
concentrated at the top. 3) In this organization, subordinates are expected to 
obey their boss without question, and 4) In this organization a person’s 
influence is primarily based on one’s ability and contribution to the 
organization. Agreement was rated on a numerical scale, ranging from little 
(1) to much (7) power distance. The highest average score was observed in 
Hungary (5,6) and the lowest in Denmark (3,9). The variable code in data 
file States of Nations is PracticePowerDistance_1996.  
 
Perceived fate control: Another indicator of hierarchy in nations is the 
degree to which citizens perceive they are in control of their situation; the 
less control citizens perceive they have, the more hierarchical their society 
is likely to be. The World Values Survey (Inglehart 2000) contains several 
questions on this matter, two of which concern control in the workplace and 
one is about control of one’s life in general. 
The first question on self-direction at work reads: ‘Thinking of your 
job, do you often or occasionally feel that you are being taken advantage of 
or exploited, or do you never have this feeling?’ 1: often; 2: sometimes; 3: 
never. Responses to this question are available for 16 nations. The variable 
code in States of Nations is FeelExploited_1990s. A second question 
concerns perceived freedom at work and reads: ‘How free are you to make 
decisions in your job?’ 1: not at all; 10: a great deal. Responses to this 
question are available for 41 nations. The variable code in data file States of 
Nations is FreeWork_1990s.  
 
The question  about control in life in general reads ‘Some people feel they 
have completely free choice and control over their lives, while other people 
feel that what they do has no real effect on what happens to them. Please 
use this scale where 1 means ‘none at all’ and 10 means ‘a great deal’ to 
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indicate how much freedom of choice and control you feel you have over 
the way your life turns out’. This variable is available for 63 nations and is 
labelled as FreeLife_1990s in the data file States of Nations. 
 
Approval of hierarchy: One source of data on the social approval of 
hierarchy is the above mentioned GLOBE study in which middle managers 
have first rated how much power distance exists in their society and 
organization. Subsequently they rated how much distance they feel should 
be in their society and organization, in response to the same four topics. 
Desired distance was again rated on a numerical scale ranging from not 
desired (1) to much desired (7). Scores ranged from 2,2 in Finland to 3,5 in 
Albania (House 2004: 540). This variable is available for 56 nations. The 
variable code in States of Nations is ValuePowerDistance_1996. 
 
Hofstede’s Power Distance Index: In the context of Hofstede’s (1994) 
landmark study of work values in business organizations employees all 
over the world answered the following questions; 1) How frequently are 
employees afraid to express disagreement with their managers? 2) How 
would you describe the actual decision-making style of your boss 
(paternalistic, authoritarian vs. else) and 3) What decision-making style 
would you prefer your boss to have? The first two questions depict actual 
hierarchy and the last approval of hierarchy. The summed Power Distance 
Index (PDI) summarizes the previous indicators by mixing perception and 
preference. The latest update of the Hofstede study covers 74 nations and 
regions (Hofstede & Hofstede 2005). Ratings are available in the ‘States of 
Nations’ data file as variable PowerDistance_1965.2002. 
 
6.3.3. Hierarchy and Happiness in the South and the North 
How do these measures of hierarchy in nations relate to average happiness? 
Below I will consider the correlation. I present below the indicators of 
perceived hierarchy and approval of hierarchy as well as one mixed 
indicator. 
 
Indicators of perceived hierarchy 
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Happiness and perceived hierarchy in nations: When looking at middle 
manager’s perceptions of power distance at work, a very large difference 
between the Northern and Latin countries can be observed, as the difference 
of average of the two sets of country covers 59% of the whole European 
range as highlighted in Table 6.3 below. 
 
Happiness and perceived control in nations: Hierarchy is also reflected in 
individuals perceived freedom at work as well as freedom in general and in 
perceived control in life, the less freedom and control individuals perceive 
in a country, the more hierarchical that society apparently is.  
 
Indicator of valuation of the hierarchy 
 
Happiness and acceptance of hierarchy in nations: One might think that 
people in Latin countries value hierarchy and power distance more than in 
the North. Yet there is little difference in the valuation of the hierarchy 
between the South and the North. There is even a slightly greater preference 
for equality among Latin Europeans. Consequently, the difference between 
‘power distance as it is’ and ‘power distance as it should’ is much larger in 
the South than in the North, which obviously entails frustration and 
unhappiness.  
 
Mixed (perceived and valuation of hierarchy) indicator 
 
Happiness and power distance index: Hofstede’s Power Distance Index 
encompasses the previous results and is probably the most robust indicator 
of social hierarchy to date. Again Northern European countries stand out as 
egalitarian and happy, while Latin European nations combine a hierarchical 
orientation with relatively low happiness. The main results in terms of 
acceptance of the hierarchy and perception of freedom in the two sets of 
countries are shown in Table 6.3.  
 Once more we see that the difference between Northern and Latin 
Europe fits this general pattern. Both perceived individual freedom and 
happiness are higher in the Northern countries and both are lower in Latin 
countries. This data corroborates well with the data from the World Values 
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Survey of Table 6.3, where it appears that the freedom of choice in 
Northern Europe is about one point higher than in the South. Reduced 
individual freedom at work might increase frustration at work and 
unhappiness. This is even more striking when looking at the percentages of 
people feeling exploited in their work, which represents more than half of 
Latin Europeans.  
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Table 6.3. Perception and valuation in the equality of hierarchy in 
Northern and Latin countries
57
                                                 
 
  
Perception 
of hierarchy Perception of freedom 
Acceptanc
e of 
hierarchy 
Power 
Distance 
Index 
  
Practised 
Power 
Distance1 
Free in 
decision-
making at 
work 
(scale 1-10)2 
Feel 
exploited 
at work  
(in %)3 
Perceived 
freedom and 
control in 
life 
(scale 1-10)4 
 
Hierarchy 
as it should5 
Hofstede 
PDI6 
Northern 
countries 
DK 
3.89 7.4 39 7.1 2.76 18 
     NL 
4.11 7.3 38 6.2 2.45 38 
 SE 
4.85 7.4 39 7.3 2.70 31 
Mean 
value 4.28 7.4 39 6.9 2.64 29 
Latin 
countries 
FR 
5.28 6.3 62 6.3 2.76 68 
IT 
5.43 6.7 46 6.1 2.47 50 
ES 
5.52 6.5 45 6.7 2.26 57 
Mean 
value 5.41 6.5 51 6.4 2.50 58 
North-South 
difference       
In points on scale 
1.13 0.9 12 0.5 0.14 29 
In % actual scale 
range in Europe 68% 30% 50% 23% 10% 35% 
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The clusters South Europe-North Europe as defined on the Figure 6.1 with 
the variables purchasing power-happiness show some substantial 
differences in terms of power distance and freedom at work. France really 
fits the Latin European cluster and shows the largest power distance. For 
some variables, such as perceived freedom, the clusters are somewhat less 
obvious, with some overlapping of the variables, whereas the clustering still 
makes sense when looking at variables such as happiness or power 
distance, which are the key variables in exploring the link between 
hierarchy and happiness. Let’s try to make sense of this comparison by 
taking a broader picture. General trends at the European level are given in 
Table 6.4, that shows the correlation between happiness, power distance 
and perceived freedom indicators.  
 
Table 6.4 Correlations between happiness, power distance and perceived 
freedom indicators 
 
 
Interesting to notice are the very significant correlations of free life, free 
work and PDI with life satisfaction (respectively +.75, +.74 and -.77). This 
seems to indicate that perceived freedom is a very strong life satisfaction 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
 
 
Happiness 
 
Practised 
Power 
Distance 
 
Value Power 
Distance  
Free Work 
 
Free Life 
 
PDI 
1.Happiness - -.45  
N=19 
-.39 
N=19 
+.75 
N=26 
+.74 
N=40 
-.77  
N=28 
2.Practised 
Power Distance 
- - -.27  
N=19 
-.60 
N=17 
-.26  
N=19 
+.61 
N=17 
3.Value Power 
Distance 
- - - +.24  
N=17 
-.35 
N=19 
+.12  
N=17 
4.Free Work - - - - +.72 
N=27 
-.62 
N=21 
5.Free Life 
 
6.PDI 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
-.60 
N=28 
    - 
 
 
 150 
 
predictor at the European level, something already shown by Verme (2009) 
at a more global scale. The zero order correlation between PDI and 
happiness among European countries is -.77 and it is sensibly the same (r=-
.66) when controlling with GDP. Also worthwhile noticing are the strong 
correlations of PDI with perceived freedom at work (r=-.62) and in life in 
general (r=-.60). We can regret that the data on each country of Europe is 
not more systematic, as this would make the analysis stronger. 
 A large difference in power distance, which appears as a strong life 
satisfaction predictor in Europe, seems to tell us that the lower happiness 
found in Latin European countries, particularly in France as the power 
distance is the largest within Latin societies, is at least partly due to the 
greater levels of hierarchy that exist in these societies. 
 
6.4. Why are Latin European countries more 
hierarchical? 
 
Hierarchy exists in all societies, but the degree of inequality differs between 
societies. Various explanations have been proposed for these differences. 
 One line of explanation for societal differences in hierarchy focuses 
on the present and looks for contemporary drivers of hierarchy. A structural 
explanation in this context is that globalization is weakening the control of 
nation states, thereby giving free way to the powers of market capitalism. 
See for example Aghion & Williamson (1998). A related cultural 
explanation holds that growing individualism is undermining moral 
restraints to egoism and promoting self-actualization at the cost of fellow 
man. See for example Elliott & Lemert (2006). Since these contemporary 
conditions are not much different between the north and the south of 
Europe we see no evident explanations along this line. 
 Another line of explanation focuses rather on the past and looks for 
antecedents of present day hierarchy. A structural theory of that kind holds 
that the growing division of labor is creating increasing mutual 
interdependencies and that this is giving rise to reduction of social 
inequalities (e.g. Lenski & Nolan 2004, Chapter 6). Explanations that focus 
on political institutions see contemporary hierarchy as an echo of earlier 
power struggles (e.g. Gurr et al. 1990). In this vein cultural explanations 
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stress the role of religion and hold that moral teachings of the past have 
shaped present day hierarchy. 
 This latter approach has evident applicability to the case at hand, 
since Catholicism has historically dominated the South of Europe and 
Protestantism the North. There is a large literature that describes the 
differences in orientation to hierarchy within these two strands of 
Christianity. See for example Gustafson (1978), Martin (1985), House 
(2004, Chapter 17) and Bruce (2004). 
 Still it is possible that even before the Reformation hierarchy was 
less pronounced in the North of Europe than in the South and that the 
change to Protestantism was a consequence of that orientation rather than a 
cause. In that context it is worth taking a longer view and considering what 
macro-sociology has taught us about the development of social inequality 
in human societies. 
 
6.4.1. Hierarchy over societal evolution 
Lenski & Nolan (2004) describe several pathways in the developmental 
history of human society. The main path is depicted as a sequence of the 
following society types, each of which are described below.  
 
Hierarchy in hunter-gatherers: The first human societies consisted of small 
bands of about 40 people that lived a nomadic life, roaming large 
territories. These simple societies were typically quite egalitarian, since this 
way of life provides little opportunity to harvest any appreciable economic 
surplus as hunter-gatherers are mainly focused on maintaining a subsistence 
level. This kind of society was dominant in most of human history and 
seems to have existed for at least 50,000 years. Other types of societies 
developed only some 10,000 years ago and were based on modes of 
existence that involved more social hierarchy.  
 
Hierarchy in horticultural societies: Hunter-gather societies were gradually 
driven out by horticultural societies, based on slash-and-burn agriculture. 
This way of existence created a surplus, which came to be taken by warrior 
classes. This resulted in an unprecedented social inequality, which grew 
ever stronger when competition within the warrior classes resulted in ever 
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larger hierarchically organized empires. Slavery was quite common in this 
phase of societal evolution. 
 
Hierarchy in agrarian societies: The invention of the plow brought about 
the permanent use of land and this made humans even more dependent on a 
plot of land and more vulnerable to exploitation by one another. Social 
inequality reached its historical maximum in the feudal system that came to 
existence in most advanced agrarian societies. 
 
Hierarchy in industrial societies: Only a few hundred years ago inventions 
such as steam machine triggered the Industrial Revolution. This way of 
existence resulted in a considerable decline of social inequality, among 
other things because the fine grained division of labor has created many 
mutual dependencies. 
 
In alignment with this main developmental path, Nolan and Lenski 
describe, several side paths, among which fishing and maritime societies. 
 
Hierarchy in fishing societies: Fishing societies developed in places close 
to the sea, where fish provided an additional source of subsistence. These 
societies are also quite egalitarian, among other things because exploitation 
by warriors is less easy in this case. 
 
Hierarchy in maritime societies: Maritime societies developed from fishing 
societies, taking advantage of their strategic situation to develop trading and 
commerce. Egalitarianism continued in this phase, again because this way 
of existence involves less vulnerability to dominance by others.  
 
6.4.2. Feudal heritage stronger in the South, maritime heritage 
stronger in the North 
In this context we can make sense of the present day difference in hierarchy 
across the Northern and Latin countries of Europe. When societies drifted 
away from the hunter-gatherer type of society, the Latin and Northern 
European areas seem to have followed somewhat different paths, due to 
different geographical and demographical constraints, as well as 
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opportunities. Conditions in Northern Europe were more suited for the 
fishing and the maritime track, as appeared in the flourishing Viking 
societies before the Middle Ages and in maritime expansion of England and 
the Netherlands following the Middle Ages. More hierarchical agricultural-
based societies came to dominate in Latin Europe and this appears in a 
greater concentration of landownership and greater dominance of church 
and nobility. This is likely to have anchored hierarchy more strongly in the 
culture of Latin societies, whereas the original human bent to equality has 
been better preserved in Northern European countries.  
 
6.5. Why are people less happy in hierarchical society? 
 
A common view (Baltatescu (2005), Verkerk (2005), Sortheix & Lönnqvist 
(2014)) is that happiness depends on the degree to which life fits one’s 
values. In this context we could expect that people are less happy, the 
greater the difference between the degree of hierarchy they perceive to exist 
in their country and the degree of hierarchy they deem desirable. I checked 
this explanation using the above mentioned GLOBE study in which both 
perceived degree and acceptance of hierarchy were assessed in 53 nations. I 
computed the difference between perceived and accepted hierarchy. In 
Table 6.3 one can see that this difference is smaller in the Northern nations 
(1,64), than in the Southern (2,91). I added this difference as the variable 
ValuePracticeGapPD_1996 to the data file States of Nations and found a 
negative correlation with happiness. The correlation is small however (r = -
.14), so this cannot be the whole story. 
A less common view holds that happiness depends more on fit of 
social organization with universal human nature than on fit with culturally 
variable notions of the good life. This view is explained in more detail in 
Veenhoven (1999). Seen in this context the question arises: why would 
human nature be hierarchy averse? 
A plausible answer to this question is that the human species 
evolved in the context of hunter-gatherer society, which was quite 
egalitarian and allowed a great deal of self-direction. From this perspective, 
societal development went against human nature, at least in its agrarian 
phase. This view is presented convincingly by Mariansky and Turner 
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(1992). In their book ‘The social cage’ they argue that humans are social 
animals, but that their need for social ties is limited. In their view, evolution 
has resulted in a human preference for the ‘weak’ social ties that exist in 
hunter-gatherer societies, over the ‘strong’ social ties that came about later 
in agricultural society. ‘Strong’ ties with a clan were required for survival 
in the conditions of agrarian society, but pressed people into a ‘social cage’. 
In the view of Mariansky and Turner, the Industrial Revolution has opened 
the door of that cage and has instigated a mass flight from the oppressive 
social networks of the land to the freedom of city life.    
 
6.6. Conclusion 
 
People report happier in the Northern countries of Europe than in the Latin 
countries. This difference in happiness is paralleled by a difference in 
degree of social hierarchy; Latin countries seem to be more hierarchical and 
this seems to be linked with a lower report happiness compared to a more 
egalitarian North of Europe. France seems to fit the Southern pattern, 
showing a high power distance. Historical development of these societies in 
terms of opportunities and constraints seems to provide some key in this 
explanation.  
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Chapter 7 : Family types and happiness58 
 
In Chapter 7, I explore the relation between family and happiness and raise 
the following question: how do family systems influence the level of 
happiness in Western Europe?  
 
7.1. Introduction 
 
In the expanding literature on happiness in regions within nations has 
received less attention. Oswald and Wu (2009) explored happiness in US 
states and concluded, after controlling for individual characteristics, that 
some states had significantly higher level of life satisfaction than others. 
Research has been done to study life satisfaction across provinces and 
regions such as Morrison (2007) in New Zealand, Clark (2003) in Great-
Britain, Rampichini and Schifini D’Andrea (1998) in Italy or Brereton, 
Clinch and Ferreira (2008) in Ireland. Okulicz-Kozaryn (2011) studied the 
link between income and life satisfaction in regions throughout Europe. The 
differences in happiness across regions, tend to be smaller than differences 
across nations. The findings from this strand of research are gathered in the 
report ‘Findings on Happiness and Region in Nation’ of the world Database 
of happiness (Veenhoven, 2012d). To data this report involves 71 research 
findings.  
 
Position in society 
Next to research on the effect of societal characteristics on average 
happiness, there is much research on the effects of position within a society 
on the happiness of individuals. Much of that research is about socio-
economic position in society, typically measured with income, occupational 
prestige and employment. Likewise there is much research on the effect on 
happiness of one’s position in socio-emotional networks, as measured with 
things like marital status, family size and contacts with kin. Embedding in 
                                                 
58
 This chapter is published as Brulé G. and Veenhoven R. (2014) Average happiness and 
dominant family type in regions in Western Europe around 2000. Advances in Applied 
Sociology, 4, 271-288. 
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socio-emotional networks appears to matter more for happiness than socio-
economic status(Bartolini et al. (2010)).     
 
Much research on happiness and family life 
Most of the research on happiness and embedding in socio-emotional 
networks is about family life. The bulk of research is about the relationship 
between current family life and happiness of adults, such as the difference 
in happiness between married and single individuals (Raschke (1977), 
Hamplova (2006)) or the link between happiness and task division between 
spouses (Lu & Lin, 1998). There is also quite some research on the effects 
of family characteristics on the happiness of children and in that strand also 
on long-term consequences, such as the effects of broken home in 
childhood on happiness in adulthood. Findings of this strand of research are 
also gathered in the World Database of Happiness, in particular in the 
reports ‘Happiness and Family’ (Veenhoven, 2012e) and ‘Happiness and 
Marriage’ (Veenhoven, 2012f), which currently contains respectively 504 
and 880 research findings.  
 
Little view on effect of family type 
In spite of much research on one’s position in the local family system, there 
is little research on the effect of happiness of family systems as such. Still, 
there are good reasons to expect that family type shapes happiness (Goode, 
2005). As a matter of fact, happiness of individuals depends to some extent 
on their ‘social capital’ and some family types may generate more of that 
than others. Happiness depends also heavily on individuals’ psychological 
autonomy, which may not be equally fostered in all family types. In 
particular, we might think that some families promotes  social capital 
whereas some others tend to enhance psychological autonomy; both are 
conducive to happiness so it seems interesting to us to understand if there is 
one that is most important to happiness or if they are both equally 
important.  
According to Duranton (2009), the taxonomy of family systems has 
several advantages. First, it captures two fundamental dimensions, which 
matter within the family and outside the family. For instance, Gross and 
McIlveen (1998) point out that early childhood experiences are influenced 
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by adults’ values and behavior, and that there is a clear percolation between 
family values and society values. Second, this two-dimension classification 
is an ideal level of complexity that enable relatively easy analysis without 
falling in the oversimplification of ‘weak versus strong’ family ties. Finally, 
the family structures are relatively homogeneous in regions and the 
cohabitation of different systems is quite weak so the family types are 
empirically measured and quite homogeneous within regions. However, 
this is tempered by a few examples of coexisting family systems that will 
be further discussed, as they raise some interesting questions. Therefore, I 
aim at tackling one of the main weaknesses in the current literature in 
which the link between family structures and happiness barely goes beyond 
a ‘weak versus strong ties’ debate. In this chapter, I question: can we find 
any link between the family type and the level of reported happiness? Can 
that explain to some extent the relative unhappiness in France? 
 
Implication for family policy 
These considerations might have some important implications when 
considering family policies; indeed, some policies may foster kids’ 
autonomy while some others might foster family bonds. A large part of this 
is cultural but one might wonder what to do in certain circumstances: foster 
autonomy or family bonds? The answer is far from being obvious; this 
chapter aims at contributing in answering this question to some extent. As 
we will see, using Todd’s work, I use the laws for the wills in order to see if 
a certain region is dominated by egalitarian ties or not. Finding a difference 
between the regions that are dominated by equal traditions and the ones that 
are not can encourage policy-makers to rethink the laws about the wills. 
Likewise, I determine the links between parents and children by the 
cohabitation or not of different generations and depending if the sons leave 
the parental house once married. A difference between the regions with and 
without dominant cohabiting families might as well provide policy-makers 
to think of the cohabitants of generations. The family type seems to be an 
adequate angle to look at the impact of several family characteristics.  
 
Macro-level analysis 
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Data regarding dominant family types are available at the sub-regional level 
(NUTS 3), the data on happiness at the regional level (NUTS 2); this means 
we need to perform a macro-level analysis at two different levels, the 
national and the regional ones. Not only is macro-level analysis the only 
way for us to investigate the link between family structures and happiness, 
it also enables us to enter the field of the culture of happiness since, as 
Merton (1949) pointed out, the family is the main cultural transmitter. 
Comparing the maps of happiness and family structures is a way to dig into 
the culture of happiness through the lens of family structures.  
 
Plan of this chapter 
Below I will start by explaining what I mean by ‘happiness’ and how 
happiness is measured and to what extent average happiness differs across 
European nations and regions. Next, I will consider family types, following 
Todd (1990) who distinguished 5 types and measured the prevalence of 
these in Europe. On that basis I explore the statistical relation between 
happiness and dominant family types in nations and in regions. I find the 
highest happiness in nations and regions where the ‘absolute nuclear’ 
family type prevails and the lowest where the ‘egalitarian nuclear’ family 
dominates. Having established these basic facts, I go on to explore possible 
explanations, and consider the effects of freedom and equality. 
 
7.2. Happiness 
 
Data on average happiness 
In this study I use happiness as measured in the bi-annual Eurobarometer 
surveys; these surveys are carried out by the European Commission to 
monitor public opinion. These data are aggregated at the regional level; by 
regional level in this study, I mean NUTS units (Nomenclature of 
Territorial Units for Statistics).  
  The question is the following: ‘On the whole how satisfied are you 
with the life you lead? 4: very satisfied, 3: fairly satisfied, 2: not very 
satisfied, 1: not at all satisfied’. This question has been used at least once 
every year since the start of the Eurobarometer in 1973. In this study I use 
the Eurobarometer 44.2 Bis (1996) surveys, which involve respondents 
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aged 15 years and over, resident in each of the Member States (about 3,000 
respondents in Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, The Netherlands, Austria, 
Portugal, Finland, and Sweden; about 6,000 respondents in West Germany, 
Spain, France, Italy and Great Britain). From this dataset I computed 
average scores per nation and within nations also by region; for the regions 
I used the ‘‘administrative regional units’’. They thus represent the whole 
territory of the Member States according to the EUROSTAT-NUTS II(see 
http://www.ec.europa.eu/eurostat/ramon/nuts/home_regions_en.html). The 
regional value is taken as the average of different regions, which all consist 
of thousands of respondents; just a few regions have a very limited number 
of respondents and should be taken with great care: Corse (Fr, 66 
respondents), La Rioja (Sp, 347 respondents), Basilicata (It, 483 
respondents), Baden Würtenberg (DE, 309 respondents), Cumbira (UK, 
483 respondents), East Midlands (UK, 157 respondents), Uppsala Ostra 
Mellansverige (SE, 159 respondents), Etelä Savo (FI, 125 respondents).  
 
7.3. Family types 
 
Comparative research on family systems, initiated by Le Play (1871) has 
shown considerable differences in family systems around the world, such as 
the difference between stem families and the nuclear family and between 
matrifocal families and patrifocal patterns. Various consequences of 
prevalence of one family type or another have been considered, such as 
effects on economic growth (Sagart, Todd and Little, 1992). Todd (1990) 
defines families according to two main characteristics: the relationship 
between parents and children and the equality between children. For the 
first characteristics, the relationship between parents and children can be 
defined as authoritarian on one side or libertarian on the other side. In 
order to measure this characteristic, Todd used family registers and 
inspected these throughout Europe.  
Several generations co-living under the same roof is a sign of the 
prominence of the parents’ authority on the children and was therefore 
categorized as ‘authoritarian’. In such families, the elder son does not leave 
the family house once after his wedding; he stays under the authority of the 
father. Likewise, unmarried daughters stay under the authority of the father 
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in the first place and then under the authority of the brothers. On the other 
hand, when families are nuclear (merely composed of their nucleus), i.e. 
when the parents alone or with their children, the links between the 
generations are considered loose and the family system ‘libertarian’. In 
such families, when individuals grow up or once they get married (or even 
before), they leave the parental house and found their own family.  
 Beside this authoritarian/libertarian distinction depicting the link 
among generations, Todd also defines equality within generations: equality 
define family structures where this value or practice is present, unequal 
when this value or practice is not present or unconsidered. In order to 
classify families in one category or the other, Todd looks into the 
documents of the wills: when the will clearly defines the willingness of 
distributing equally the goods among the siblings (or at least the brothers), 
the family system is considered as ‘equal’; if not or if the wills can be 
distributed unequally among children, then the family system is considered 
as ‘unequal’.  
 
Todd’s family types 
The combination of two possibilities on each axis (freedom and equality) 
gives four main types of family structures. 
1) Families that combine equality and liberalism are called egalitarian 
nuclear.  
2) The other nuclear families are called absolute nuclear as liberty seems 
to be the only value considered.  
3) In the ‘egalitarian nuclear’ system, there is a prominence of stronger 
relations between the children, at least until the inheritance is 
completely divided after the parents’ death. When ‘authority’ is 
combined with ‘inequality’, the family is considered as authoritarian 
stem family. In such a family, the property is typically passed to the 
eldest son and the values of inequality are institutionalized. 
4) Conversely, when ‘authority’ is combined with ‘equality’, the family is 
considered as communitarian. In such families, the sons stay living in 
the parental house, under the authority of the father but the goods and 
the property are expected to be distributed equally among the siblings 
(or at least the brothers) after the death of the parents.  
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5) To these four types of family structures, Todd adds another one, the 
incomplete stem family; he observed that in certain areas where 
authoritarian and egalitarian laws prevailed (which would entail a 
‘communitarian’ type of family), in the facts, the distribution was 
largely inegalitarian (a ‘stem family’ type of heritage). Contrary to 
communitarian types, the married brothers do not cohabit together, and 
contrary to stem family types, there are laws that pledge for an 
egalitarian distribution. In these areas, the strength of the primogeniture 
tradition tends to override any such egalitarian lawmaking. Therefore, 
this fifth ‘hybrid’ type completes the picture.  
 
In his latest work, Todd has defined 16 family types (Todd, 2011), all 
derived from the five basic levels, but the high level of complexity as well 
as the lack of corresponding maps makes it impractical to use, but I will 
occasionally refer to it. Table 7.1 below summarizes the different types of 
family. 
 
Table 7.1: Family types in Todd’s classification 
 Egalitarian Inegalitarian 
Authoritarian Communitarian Stem (complete or 
incomplete) 
Libertarian Egalitarian nuclear Absolute nuclear 
 
Data of prevalence of the family types in regions 
In order to obtain the data for the ‘liberty’ characteristics, Todd first used 
censuses from Western European countries in the 1950s and 1960s. As the 
conditions in Europe at that period were particular in this after-war period, 
for instance due to potentially more pronounced cohabitation, he cross-
checked the data obtained with nearly 200 historical monographs in order to 
verify the validity of the data obtained and checked whether these 
monographs contradicted his classification. Apart from a few adjustments, 
Todd claims that the family structures are surprisingly stable throughout 
time, and that there were very little difference with monographs that were 
500 years old and more.  For instance, the prevalence of stem families in 
French Brittany (Finistère), Galicia, Wales and Scotland coincides with 
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areas where Celtic populations took refuge two millennia ago. The area 
corresponding with the current communitarian central Italy ties in closely 
with the area of Etruscan civilization in pre-Roman times. 
  As for the measurement of the ‘equality’ characteristics, Todd also 
used relatively recent data for the whole of Western Europe while verifying 
whether or not the patterns he discovered find some echo in historical 
monographs. In order to objectivize this equality factor, he analyzed the 
mechanism of repartition of family property among siblings after the death 
of the parents. Equality is considered at its maximum when family property 
is divided evenly among siblings or (more usually) among brothers. This 
factor can be observed looking into inheritance laws and practices. In some 
regions, the laws oblige an equal repartition of heritage while in some other 
regions, there is a remarkable indifference to the principle of equality; in 
this case, the parents are either free to divide the way they feel is the most 
appropriate, or the parents are forced to choose an unique child that will 
inherit everything.  
Todd has performed the analysis throughout more than 200 regions. 
Most regions are labeled with one family type, some other with two. Figure 
6.1 below shows the map of Europe according to the different types. 
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Figure 7.1: Family types in Europe
 
Source: Todd(1990) 
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7.4. Method 
 
My research question is whether these family types are equally conducive 
to happiness in contemporary society. To answer that question I compare 
average happiness in geographical areas to see if happiness is higher in 
areas where a particular family pattern dominates. This is a macro-level 
analysis.  
 
Units 
As ‘areas’ I consider both nations and regions. Since I use data on family 
type gathered by Todd, I limit to 13 European countries.  In order to obtain 
the matrix presenting the happiness level and the family type of all regions 
of the 13 countries, I combine the data of Todd and of the Eurobarometer; 
the finest level of detail in the Eurobarometer is the regional level (NUTS 
2) whereas Todd use the infraregional level (NUTS 3). Therefore we need 
to aggregate the data of Todd to match the level of the Eurobarometer 
(NUTS 2). 
Some regions are largely homogeneous in terms of family type so 
the family type of the whole region is trivial; however, in a few rare cases, 
regions are composed of more than one family type. In this case, I had to 
find out which family type was dominant in the given region. To so do, I 
counted the geographical sub-units (NUTS 3) for each family type and took 
the most represented family type for the whole region (NUTS 2). For 
instance, Brittany (France) is composed of 4 sub-units (‘départements’): 3 
are dominated by the absolute nuclear family type and 1 by the stem family 
type; therefore the dominant family type for Brittany is the absolute nuclear 
one.   
 
Analysis 
I first compared nations and inspected whether average happiness is higher 
or lower in nations where a particular family type dominates. Such 
differences may be due to other national characteristics than family type 
and therefore I compared next across regions within nations. Finally, I 
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checked whether these latter differences can be attributed to other regional 
characteristics.  
 
7.5. Results  
 
I found that average happiness is highest in regions where family pattern of 
‘absolute nuclear’ prevails and lowest in the regions where ‘egalitarian 
nuclear’ family dominates. This pattern appears both in the comparison of 
nations and in the comparison of regions with in nations.  
 
7.5.1. Comparison at the aggregated level 
Data on average happiness and dominant family type in the 13 European 
nations are presented in Table 7.2. The values were obtained taking the 
average values of happiness in regions across Europe, without any national 
aggregation.  
 
 
Table 7.2: Average happiness per family type in Europe 
 
One clear difference strikes the eye, the dramatic difference in average 
happiness between countries where the ‘absolute nuclear’ family type 
dominates (such as Denmark) and the countries where the ‘egalitarian 
nuclear’ family is quite common (such as Spain). These differences in 
family type account for up to 40% of the range in average happiness, which 
is the difference between happiness in regions dominated by egalitarian 
nuclear families (2.84) and those dominated by absolute nuclear 
families(3.24) on a total range of almost 1 point throughout Europe 
between the least happy and the happiest region(2.65-3.62). There is no real 
difference between the two (or three) authoritarian models, even if 
 Happiness Countries Number of regions 
Communitarian 3.06 Fi, It 18 
Stem complete  3.07 Be, De, Ie, Fi, Fr, 
Pt, Se, Sp 
85 
Stem incomplete 3.00 Be, Fr, It, Nl, Uk,  31 
Egalitarian nuclear 2.84 Fr, It, Sp, Pt 29 
Absolute nuclear 3.24 Dk, Fr, Nl, Uk 41 
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happiness in stem family (complete or incomplete) is slightly higher than in 
communitarian family.  Looking at the aggregated levels of happiness at the 
European level, regions where the ‘absolute nuclear’ dominates seem to be 
the most fertile ground for happiness of the citizens, whereas regions where 
‘egalitarian nuclear’ dominate seem to be the least.  
However, these differences in average happiness across European 
nations are due to other things than family type, some were presented in the 
previous chapters. The difference fit an earlier observed North-South 
difference in happiness, which has been attributed to variation in values 
(e.g. Inglehart, 1977) and governance quality (Ott, 2010). Possibly the 
correlation with family type is just a byproduct of such differences and has 
little effect on happiness by itself. Let’s have a closer look at this to see if 
these first impressions resist a finer analysis.  
 
7.5.2. Comparison across regions within nations 
Let us now look at the effects of the family types within nations. The 
regional level has several advantages, because, as we will see, it is often a 
better scale to observe variation in dominant family types. Second, it 
enables also to largely cancel out the national level effects. Policies are 
mostly enforced at a national level and regions are typically subjected to the 
same rules. Out of the 13 countries, 7 are either homogeneous in terms of 
family types (Belgium, Germany) or lacking of complete or comparable 
data (Finland, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland) to be analyzed and 
cannot help us in the infranational comparisons. I will therefore base my 
analysis on 6 nations: France, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, the 
United Kingdom. They will help us in different ways and to different 
extent.  
The ranking of happiness throughout nations per family types is 
presented in Figure 7.2. Details of happiness and family types for all 
countries are presented in Appendix. Happiness ranges from 2.65 
(egalitarian nuclear in Portugal) to 3.62 (absolute nuclear in Denmark).  
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Figure 7.2: Average happiness ranking per dominant family type in 13 
European nations around 2000 
 
 
 
Dominant family type: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
France 
France is an interesting nation to compare family types, as it is the only 
  Absolute Nuclear   
 
  Stem Family   
Communitarian 
  Incomplete Stem Family 
Egalitarian Nuclear 
  Egalitarian Nuclear+Communitarian 
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country that has all five family types, even if the communitarian type is 
mixed with the dominant egalitarian nuclear one. The pattern of difference 
in France fits largely with the above pattern of differences across nations.  
The happiest regions are Alsace, the Germanic-influenced region with its 
stem family model and the Celtic-influenced Brittany and Pays de la Loire, 
in which the absolute nuclear family type dominates. When gathering per 
family type, almost the same order withstands with the absolute nuclear 
model, present in the West of France first again, then the stem family model 
(complete and incomplete) and then the egalitarian nuclear. 
   What is striking in the French case and not visible at the European 
level is the fact that the regions that have a coexistence of two family 
models, that is egalitarian nuclear with communitarian influences 
(Limousin (2.71) and Auvergne (2.64)) are by far the unhappiest and are 
among the least happy regions of Western Europe. According to 
Todd(2011, p 409), the area that covers Limousin and Auvergne is the only 
‘bi-local communitarian’ type in Europe and can also be seen as a hybrid 
type stuck between the egalitarian nuclear type of the Paris basin and the 
stem family from the Aquitine basin. Maybe this particular hybridism of 
system is not favorable for happiness. An explanation could be that the 
coexistence of two family systems might lead to anomie, introduced by 
Durkheim (1897) in the context of coexisting religions for instance; co-
existing families might lead to a similar effect. However, this observation 
could also be tempered as this coexistence can also be observed in the south 
eastern region of Provence-Alpes-Côte d’Azur; no major difference can be 
observed between the level of happiness of the region (2.81) and the 
average level of egalitarian nuclear families (2.80). 
The difference between average happiness in egalitarian nuclear and 
absolute nuclear families (0.12) accounts for 40% of the total range of life 
satisfaction in France, i.e. the difference between Auvergne (2.64) and 
Alsace (2.96). The differences between stem family and egalitarian nuclear 
families (10%) and between incomplete stem family and egalitarian nuclear 
families (20%) are in between. The happiness pattern per family type in 
France is very close to the European one, and the aggregated trend is 
largely verified in the French case. 
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Italy 
Italy is the second country with the most diversity in family types with just 
the absolute nuclear family type missing. Happiness in the Italian family 
types reveals the same logic in terms of happiness with stem family ranking 
first, then communitarian and then egalitarian nuclear. The happiest part is 
the North-East, and particularly the agricultural region of Trentino (3.13), 
then come the communitarian central Italy, which according to Todd, 
coincides with the Etruscan occupation in pre-Roman times, and then the 
egalitarian nuclear, present in the North-West and in the South of Italy.  
This confirms the difference at the nation level and regions with dominant 
communitarian families are happier than regions with dominant egalitarian 
nuclear ones. The difference between (incomplete) stem families and 
egalitarian nuclear families (0.16) accounts for a substantial 42% of the 
total Italian difference, between Sardegna (2.75) and Trentino (3.13). 
 
The Netherlands 
The Netherlands do not show large differences in family models; the North, 
protestant is largely formed with absolute nuclear families while the south 
and east, more agricultural, is populated with stem families. There are no 
differences in happiness; in general, the Netherlands are very homogeneous 
in terms of happiness with a difference of only 0.12 between the unhappiest 
region (Groningen) and the happiest (Gelderland). Still, the Dutch case 
shows a reverse order compared to the aggregated order; the average level 
of happiness for regions dominated by stem families (3.41) is slightly 
higher than the average level of happiness for regions dominated by 
absolute nuclear families (3.37).  
 
Portugal 
In Portugal, the North of the country is populated with stem families, while 
the south the egalitarian nuclear pattern dominates. The former show a 
slightly higher level of happiness (2.69) compared with the latter (2.68), 
with the North and the Center being happier than the south and the Lisboan 
region. However, these results should be interpreted with care as this 
concerns only two regions in the North and two in the South, the other ones 
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being not identified in terms of family models. However, this is consistent 
with the European hierarchy.  
 
Spain 
Spain shows the same pattern as Portugal with stem families in the North 
showing a slightly higher level of happiness than egalitarian nuclear 
families in the South. The difference between the two sets of countries 
represents 35% of the total Spanish range given by the difference between 
Aragon (3.01) and Andalucía (2.75).  
 
United Kingdom 
United Kingdom is divided in two parts, a western part dominated by stem 
families and an eastern part dominated by absolute nuclear families. 
Happiness in relatively homogeneous (total range: +.19) compared with 
countries of similar populations such as France (total range: +.32) and Italy 
(+38). Average happiness is slightly higher in regions where absolute 
nuclear families dominate (3.18) compared with regions where stem 
families dominate (3.12). The difference represents 25% of the total British 
range. The British trend confirms the wider one with a slightly higher level 
of absolute nuclear families in comparison with stem families. 
 
7.5.3. Control for possible spuriousness 
Is the difference in happiness really in family or is it in regional 
characteristics that happen to go with family such as agrarian business or 
income per head?  
 
Economic prosperity? 
Let’s have a look at the regional wealth, as measured with disposable 
regional income. The family structures might just be a consequence of a 
certain level of development or wealth, and if so the difference in happiness 
could be a matter of wealth rather than family organization. For instance, 
the cohabitation of several generations might just be a consequence of an 
impossibility for the young generations to afford accommodation. 
However, if we look at the different countries, it appears not to be the case. 
France is relatively homogeneous in terms of income per head, but it seems 
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rather clear that happiness is not a consequence of difference in income as 
regions dominated by egalitarian nuclear families are the richest and the 
unhappiest, while absolute nuclear and incomplete stem families are the 
least wealthy and the happiest. Portugal follows the same pattern with the 
south being richer and unhappier, while the North is poorer and happier. 
Spain and Italy follow a different pattern as the unhappy regions, 
dominated by egalitarian nuclear families are also the poorest. All in, it 
means the conclusions are unlikely affected by income per head for 
Southern Europe. 
   In the Netherlands the income per head is the same in regions 
dominated by absolute nuclear families and by regions dominated by 
incomplete stem families. In the United Kingdom, regions dominated by 
absolute nuclear families are globally richer than regions dominated by 
incomplete stem families, even if, because of the difference in the 
aggregation level, we could not have the disposable income per head for all 
regions, so I made an average with the regions with available information. 
A quantitative analysis confirms this view with adjusted means 
being the same as the unadjusted means in the different countries. See in 
the respective country tables in Appendix. 
This confirms the fact that family types and prosperity or modernity 
seem to be uncorrelated. As Todd states in another co-written article, ‘the 
various family cycles do not correspond very well to particular levels of 
cultural or economic development. Nuclear and stem cycles, in particular, 
appear among both very developed and very primitive groups.’ (Sagart, 
Todd & Little 1992). 
 
Agrarian economy? 
We could imagine that another factor could be the agrarian share in each 
region that could affect the family type and Todd (1990) confirms this 
intuition: there is a link between agrarian system and family type. The 
farmer ownership is a fertile ground for stem family to flourish with the 
property inherited by the oldest son for instance. Large farms and 
egalitarian nuclear families mix well as the large farm is divided into 
independent sub-systems, even if it is far from being systematic as in 
England, absolute nuclear families flourish in large farms; however, 
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absolute nuclear families are more present in tenant farming with a relative 
independence of the farmer to the owner and of the children to the parents. 
Communitarian families seems to accommodate well in sharecropping 
cultures with the refusal of a monetary system and the possible constitution 
of large communities. 
These differences of agriculture types can explain the differences in 
family type. Could the difference in happiness be a secondary effect of the 
agrarian share? Looking at Todd (1990), we can see that once again, the 
situation differs a lot depending on the countries. In France, the agrarian 
regions of the West and South-West are among the happiest, whereas the 
North and North-East, that has virtually no agriculture has the unhappiest 
regions. In Spain, the regions that have the least agrarian share are either 
among the happiest in the North of Spain or among the unhappiest with the 
South-West of Spain. Italy has its happiest regions in the North, which is 
the least agrarian part. The situations are thus very different from a country 
to another, but all in all, there seems to be no agriculture effect on the 
happiness of the inhabitants of the regions, at least not in the agrarian share 
of the people. Actually, the influence of agriculture on happiness might be 
more in the type of farming more than in the importance of the agrarian 
community. Ownership and relationships between owners and farmers 
might be more decisive than the share of the community in the regions. 
Therefore, agriculture would be more a factor of explanation than a bias in 
the analysis between happiness and family types.   
 
7.5.4. In sum: 
1. Average happiness is higher in regions where the ‘absolute nuclear’ 
family type dominates than in the ‘egalitarian nuclear’ model 
2. Average happiness in regions where the ‘stem family’ model dominates 
is systematically higher than regions where ‘egalitarian nuclear’ 
dominates 
3. Average happiness is higher in regions dominated by a ‘stem family’ 
model than in regions that are communitarian or with a communitarian 
inflexion 
4. Regions where ‘nuclear absolute’ and regions where stem family 
dominate have a comparable level of happiness 
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By combining these observations, we can draw the following conclusions: 
1. Regions dominated by inegalitarian families have a level of well-being 
that is systematically higher than in regions with egalitarian families; 
horizontal freedom, the relative independence of kids towards each other, 
seems to be of primary importance. 
2. As far as relationships between the generations are concerned, the link is 
way less obvious. In particular, the advantage of absolute nuclear families 
over stem families at the aggregated level does not resist a more local 
analysis: while the pattern observed at the aggregated level is maintained in 
the French case, the difference between the two family types is very small 
in the British case and even reversed in the Dutch case. Therefore, it is not 
possible to accept the observation made at the aggregated level. If 
libertarian relationships seem slightly more favorable than authoritarian at 
the aggregated level, the observation cannot be maintained at the regional 
level; the link between vertical freedom, the relative independence of 
children towards vis-à-vis parents, and happiness is almost non-existent.  
At the regional level, intergenerational freedom seems to have very little 
influence on people’s happiness whereas intragenerational level seems to 
have a strong influence.  
 
7.6. Discussion 
 
So this exploration does reveal a consistent difference. Below I will 
consider a possible explanation and note some limitations. 
7.6.1. Explanations 
Why live people happier in areas where absolute nuclear family type 
dominates than in areas where the egalitarian nuclear family type prevails? 
Regions where stem families (authoritarian only) have levels of well-being 
that are systematically higher than in communitarian (authoritarian and 
egalitarian), which is the system that offers the least variance. In that 
context I will first review the evidence that freedom fosters happiness. Next 
I will consider why the absolute nuclear family pattern is most conducive to 
freedom and why the egalitarian type is not, and following the same logic 
why it is more present in the stem family than in the communitarian family.   
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Why has vertical freedom no impact on well-being?  
It is a fairly intriguing fact; in the line of previous studies where the strong 
link between vertical freedom and happiness, for instance in companies, has 
been highlighted, we could have expected similar results among families, 
but as a matter of fact, the link is far from being obvious, and when it is 
present, it is fairly limited. How to explain this? Maybe the advantages and 
drawbacks between libertarian and authoritarian family balance each other. 
Maybe the gain in freedom is counterbalanced by a feeling of insecurity 
due to the weak bonds between generations; conversely, the feeling of 
security among authoritarian families may compensate a relative lack of 
freedom.  
 
Why is horizontal freedom so important?  
Among all the different facts, this is the clearer and most redundant pattern. 
At the aggregated level and at the regional level, regions dominated by the 
inegalitarian or non-egalitarian families are systematically happier than 
regions dominated by egalitarian families. Why is that? We see at the 
family level a pattern we have observed in Chapter 3, freedom, in all its 
form, whether it is actual (social, psychological, potential) or perceived, is 
one of the most important determinants of happiness. But then what type of 
freedom? Horizontal freedom seems to be a fertile ground for happiness to 
develop whereas this observation seems much less true for vertical 
freedom. How to explain this?  
Forced equality reduces the freedom of parents and in a way reduces 
the chances of optimal allocation. It might be indeed more sensible to give 
the property and the goods to the child that is the most likely to make a 
good use of it instead of distributing them equally among kids that are 
unequally responsible. In many ways, forced equality reduces freedom, and 
this seems to be confirmed by this comparison between egalitarian and 
absolute nuclear families. This seems to be confirmed by the fact that 
‘authority only’, present in stem families, seems to be higher than authority 
combined with equality (communitarian), as the examples of France and 
Italy show.  
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Is equality a brake to happiness? Whereas some equality might be 
morally desirable, it does not seem to pay off in terms of happiness, as it 
might not allow the best way to reach an ‘optimal allocation’. Another 
explanation is that in a system that values more equality, you depend less 
on yourself and more on the system; in other words, your locus of control is 
less internal than in the case of ‘freedom only’, where everything depends 
on you and your locus of control is purely internal. Focusing on income 
distribution in America, Oishi, Kesebir and Diener (2011) have shown that 
there was some link between income inequality and happiness among low 
income respondents, but not among high income respondents. They also 
showed that for low income respondents the link between income 
inequality and income was mediated by perceived unfairness. This article 
shows also that the correlation between equality and happiness is not as 
clear and positive as one could expect. Whereas this might sound selfish, 
this seems to be the best way to reach happiness. This might even question 
the ethics of happiness ‘is happiness ethical’? This has been largely 
discussed by Veenhoven (2010). Maybe the angle brought by this article 
will add another light on this ongoing debate.  
 
7.6.2. Limitations 
This first exploration of the link between family type and happiness is 
probably not the last word. Future research should deal with the following 
limitations. 
 
Level of analysis 
 When dealing with comparing levels of life satisfaction and another 
variable such as family types, an ideal approach would naturally go towards 
a multilevel analysis in order to confront a macro-level analysis with micro-
level data, that is to say data at the individual level. Whereas this data exists 
for life satisfaction thanks to Eurobarometer, this data is not available for 
family types. The macro-analysis, comparing aggregated level with the 
regional level is therefore the best we can do.  
  
Classification of family types 
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Despite the conclusions drawn from this study, a few restrictions can be 
observed; first, when talking about liberty and especially equality, it is not 
always easy to distinguish laws, practices and values. As Todd himself 
recognized by creating a fifth hybrid type in 1990 (incomplete stem family 
with practices not meeting laws) and by creating 16 family types in his later 
work, it is not always easy to classify every region with a single table. As 
for any taxonomy, we need to be aware that ‘liberty’ or ‘equality’ are not 
binary, i.e. ‘free’ or not ‘free’, ‘equal’ or ‘not equal’, but rather a continuum 
and that two regions with the same family type might present some 
variations in equality and freedom. This is a general limitation of any 
taxonomic work: too much complexity makes the comparison unpractical 
or even unfeasible whereas too much simplicity makes the conclusions less 
robust. I tried to work with an adequate level of complexity; this could 
naturally be discussed. 
 
Confounding factors 
In this study I checked two possible confounders, economic prosperity and 
agrarian share and none of them can explain the difference of happiness 
across regions. An anthropological approach could show that the type of 
culture has more to do than the agrarian share itself. In Chapter 5, I studied 
the link between the type of fishing/agrarian society and the current 
happiness of people; a future interesting work could be to look more into 
the link between the type of culture and the happiness of people. 
 
Causality 
Empirical research can show a statistical relationship, but often we can only 
guess about the causal factors behind. In this case I made an educated guess 
in terms of freedom. Though plausible, this will not be the only possible 
explanation. 
 
7.7. Conclusion 
Average happiness appears higher in European areas where the ‘absolute 
nuclear’ family type dominates, that is, families characterized by a 
relatively low level of family commitment and low emphasis on equality. 
On the opposite, there seems to be a lower level of happiness in regions 
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where egalitarian nuclear families dominate, as it is the case in France for 
instance. Regions dominated by families with a relative horizontal freedom 
present higher levels of reported well-being. Conversely, there seems to be 
no difference between regions dominated by families with and without 
vertical freedom.  
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Appendix 
Happiness and family types in France 
  
Life 
satisfaction 
Family 
type 
Average 
happiness 
per 
family 
type 
Regional 
disposable 
income 
Average 
regional 
income 
per 
family 
type 
Adjusted 
means for 
happiness 
Pays de la 
Loire 2.89 AN  
10,230  
 
Bretagne 2.94 AN 2.92 10,229 10,229 2.92 
Limousin 2.71 EN+C  10,535   
Auvergne 2.64 EN+C 2.67 10,556 10,450 2.67 
Provence-
Alpes-Côte 
d'Azur 2.81 EN  
10,758  
 
Lorraine 2.77 EN  10,238   
Île de 
France 
(Paris) 2.83 EN  
13,159  
 
Haute-
Normandie 2.77 EN  
10,610  
 
Corse 2.88 EN  9,012   
Champagne-
Ardenne 2.76 EN  
10,353  
 
Centre 2.78 EN  10,815   
Bourgogne 2.82 EN  10,890   
Basse-
Normandie 2.79 EN  
10,270  
 
Franche-
Comté 2.80 EN 2.80 
10,439 10,654 
2.80 
Poitou-
Charentes 2.80 ISF  
10,205  
 
Nord Pas de 
Calais 2.81 ISF  
8,942  
 
Alsace 2.96 ISF 2.86 11,010 10,052 2.86 
Rhône-
Alpes 2.81 SF  
10,970  
 
Picardie 2.76 SF  10,381   
Midi-
Pyrénées 2.87 SF  
10,204  
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Languedoc-
Roussillon 2.85 SF  
9,716  
 
Aquitaine 2.84 SF 2.83 10,559 10,336 2.83 
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Happiness and family types in Italy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regions 
Life 
Satisfaction 
Family 
types 
Happiness 
per family 
type 
Regional 
disposable 
income 
Average 
regional 
income 
per family 
type 
Adjusted 
means for 
happiness 
Emilia 
Romagna 2.93 C  
15,925   
Lazio 2.81 C  12,908   
Marche 2.92 C  12,642   
Molisee 
Abruzzi 2.88 C  
10,309   
Toscana 2.89 C  13,566   
Umbria 2.88 C 2.89 12,500 12,975 2.90 
Basilicata 2.79 EN  8,844   
Calabria 2.77 EN  8,146   
Campania 2.77 EN  8,161   
Liguria 2.90 EN  13,953   
Lombardia 2.98 EN  15,401   
Milano 2.95 EN     
Puglie 2.77 EN  8,642   
Sardegna 2.75 EN  9,100   
Sicilia 2.75 EN 2.83 8,430 10,084 2.82 
Friuli. 
VeneziaGiulia 2.93 ISF  
13,784   
Trentino 3.13 ISF     
Valle 
d'Aostae 
Piemonte 2.95 ISF  
14,969   
Veneto 2.95 ISF 2.99 13,518 14,090 2.99 
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Happiness and family types in the Netherlands 
Regions 
Life 
Satisfaction 
 
 
Family 
types 
 
 
Happiness 
per family 
type 
 
Regional 
disposable 
income 
Average 
regional 
income 
per 
family 
type 
Adjusted 
means 
for 
happiness 
Friesland 3.41 NA  12,500   
Groningen 3.33 NA  12,700   
Noord-
Holland 3.39 NA  
15,200   
Utrecht 3.39 NA  15,200   
Zeeland 3.35 NA  13,000   
Zuid-
Holland 3.37 NA 3.37 
14,500 13,850 3.37 
Drente 3.41 SF  14,000   
Gelderland 3.45 SF  14,000   
Limburg 3.36 SF     
Noord-
Brabant 3.39 SF  
14,400   
Overijssel 3.44 SF 3.41 13,000 13,850 3.42 
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Happiness and family types in Portugal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Regions 
Life 
Satisfaction 
 
 
Family 
types 
 
 
Happiness 
per family 
type 
 
Regional 
disposable 
income 
Average 
regional 
income per 
family type 
Adjusted 
means for 
happiness 
Alentejo 2.69 EN  7,128   
Lisboa 
et Vale 
do Tejo 2.62 EN 2.65 
9,001 8,064 2.68 
Centro 2.70 ISF  6,902   
Norte 2.75 ISF 2.72 6,579 6,740 2.69 
Acores 2.79 unknown     
Algarve 2.67 unknown     
Madeira 2.84 unknown     
Madeira 2.71 unknown     
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Happiness and family types in Spain 
Regions 
Happiness 
 
 
Family 
type 
 
Happiness 
per family 
type 
Regional 
disposable 
income 
Average 
regional income 
per family type 
Adjusted 
means for 
happiness 
Andalucia 2.84 EN  6,989   
Baleares 2,92 EN  10,258   
Castilla 
Leon 2.96 EN  
8,638 
 
 
Castilla-
Mancha 2.92 EN  
7,543 
 
 
Extremadura 2.94 EN  
6,344 
 
 
La Rioja 2.91 EN  
9,816 
 
 
Madrid 2.87 EN  10,217   
Murcia 2.85 EN  7,174   
Valenciano 2.90 EN 2.90 8,356 8,370 2.90 
Aragon 3.01 SF  9,598   
Asturias 2.93 SF  8,182   
Cantabria 2.94 SF  8,657   
Cataluna 2.89 SF  10,184   
Galicia 2.97 SF  7,636   
Navarra 3.00 SF  10,715   
Pais Vasco 2.98 SF 2.96 10,482 9,350 2.96 
Canarias 2.90 unknown  8,007   
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Happiness and family types in the United Kingdom 
Regions 
Life 
Satisfaction 
 
 
Family 
types 
 
 
Happiness 
per family 
type 
 
Regional 
disposabl
e income 
Average 
regional 
income 
per 
family 
type 
Avon.Gloucestershire.Wiltshir
e 3.24 NA  
  
Bedfordshire.Hertfordshire 3.21 NA    
Berksshire.Buckinghamshire.
Oxfordshire 3.20 NA  
  
Borders.Central.Fife.Lothian.
Tayside 3.16 NA  
  
Cleveland.Durham 3.19 NA    
Dorset.Somerset 3.20 NA    
East Anglia 3.21 NA    
Essex 3.23 NA    
Grampian 3.24 NA    
Greater London 3.08 NA  14,110  
Hampshire.Isle of wight 3.18 NA  12,115  
Hereford and 
Worcester.Warwickshire 3.17 NA  
12,146  
Humberside 3.12 NA    
Isle of Wright 3.22 NA    
Kent 3.05 NA  11,910  
Leicestershire.Northamptonshi
re 3.21 NA  
11,430  
North Yorkshire 3.19 NA  12,753  
Northumberland. Tyne and 
Wear 3.14 NA  
10,182  
Schropshire.Staffordshire 3.11 NA  11,075  
South East Essex 3.19 NA    
South East Kent 3.16 NA    
South Yorkshire 3.06 NA    
South-East 3.23 NA    
Surrey.East/west Sussex 3.23 NA  13,870  
West Yorkshire 3.15 NA  10,698  
Cornwall.Devon 3.19 NA 3.18  12,029 
Clwyd.Dyfed.Gwynedd.Powy 3.16 SF    
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s 
Cumbria 3.20 SF    
Derbyshire.Nottinghamshire 3.12 SF    
Dumphries-
Galloway.Strathclyde 3.08 SF  
  
Greater Manchester 3.11 SF  10,590  
Gwent.Mid-S-W Glamorgan 3.09 SF    
Highlands.Islands 3.19 SF    
Lancashire 3.11 SF  10,585  
Leinster Meath 3.07 SF  
  
Merseyside 3.08 SF  10,535  
West Midlands 3.06 SF 3.12 
10,138 10,462 
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Chapter 8: Concluding remarks and 
future work 
 
 
8.1. Summary 
 
Outline 
This dissertation is about geographical variations of happiness. The concept 
of happiness used, unless explicitly stated otherwise, is that of life 
satisfaction, that is the extent to which respondents say they are satisfied 
with the lives they lead. I also look at the two components of happiness: the 
first is affective and refers to how one feels most of the time and the second 
is cognitive and refers to how well off one thinks he or she is in comparison 
to ingrained standards.   
The study is divided into two parts. The first part is about cross-
national patterns of happiness. It provides a brief overview of a) the 
different combinations of the two components of happiness (affective, 
cognitive), and b) the various distributions of individual ratings in different 
countries. The second part is about relative happiness in France. Here I 
compare average levels of happiness in France with levels in other 
countries.  
 
Cross-national patterns of happiness  
Differences in the combination of the components of happiness 
In assessing how much we like the life we live, we draw on two sources of 
information: how well we feel most of the time and to what extent life 
brings us what we want from it. The sub- appraisals are referred to as 
‘components’ of happiness: an affective component called ‘hedonic level’ 
and a cognitive component called ‘contentment’. These components do not 
necessarily parallel and I assess how they coincide in 133 nations. I identify 
large geographical clusters within which there is consistency in the way 
people answer questions about affective and cognitive appraisals of life; 
these are the Islamic nations, Africa, ex-communist nations, Asia, Latin 
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America and developed nations. Scores on both components are low in 
Islamic nations, medium in Asia and high in developed nations. Other 
geographical clusters show dissonant combinations, such as Latin America 
where a high affective appraisal combines with a medium cognitive 
appraisal. I compared this clustering with those in the literature (Inglehart, 
Nadoulek, Huntington) and I find similarities and differences for each, that 
I go on to discuss.    
 
Differences in response patterns 
Comparing happiness across countries, I found that two countries with 
equal average values can vary greatly in the distribution of individual 
ratings. One of the differences is the percentage of respondents who answer 
by giving the maximum score of 10, which is in some cases much higher 
than the percentage of respondents who answer 9. I call this the 10-excess 
phenomenon. This pattern is particularly visible in Latin American and in 
Islamic nations, and is not as present in developed nations. It does not give 
information on the relatively low average life satisfaction in France. 
Analyses of the phenomenon seem to suggest that a cultural effect is 
involved: moderation in expressing one’s thoughts and feelings is not 
equally valued in all countries and cultures. 
 
Exploring the relative unhappiness in France 
French people report being relatively less happy than one would expect 
given their high objective standard of living. The different cross-sectional 
studies reported in this dissertation seem to indicate that freedom can 
explain that observation.  
 
Aspects of freedom  
Several aspects of freedom are considered in this dissertation. A first 
distinction is between actual freedom, i.e. the opportunities to choose and 
perceived freedom, i.e. the actors’ views of these opportunities. Secondly, 
actual freedom can be broken down into three sub-types of freedom, as 
defined by Bay: social freedom, i.e. the absence of external constraints to 
choose, psychological freedom, i.e. inner capabilities to choose, and 
potential freedom, i.e. awareness of possibilities. French people report that 
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they feel substantially less free than people in other developed nations. 
They also score relatively low on indicators of psychological freedom, i.e. 
self-esteem and perceived fate control. This finding was particularly clear 
in the case study of the differences between France and Finland. The two 
countries were comparable in terms of social and potential freedom, but 
they were very different in terms of psychological freedom. Once this was 
established, the next step was to explore the reasons for the lower level of 
psychological freedom in France.  
 
Participatory teaching 
I then looked at socialization practices and analyzed data on teaching 
practices in different nations. I focused on participatory teaching, a 
pedagogic practice that involves children actively. Participatory teaching 
dominates in Scandinavia but is uncommon in France, where education is 
mostly top-down. Prevalence of participatory teaching has little to do with 
teenagers’ happiness, but appears to be strongly related to average 
happiness of adults. Participatory teaching seems to foster psychological 
freedom in the long term, better preparing future adults to make choices and 
helping them to build a sense of mastery. Within the group of prosperous 
countries, participatory teaching is least developed in France. Whereas 
education spending in France is comparable to or higher than in other 
developed nations, the prevailing vertical, top-down pedagogy in France 
seems to be related to adults’ unhappiness. 
 
Hierarchy  
Another possible reason for the relatively low level of happiness in France 
is the relatively great ‘power distance’ in work organizations. As the social 
freedom of actors is reduced in a top-down hierarchy, their happiness seems 
to decline. Homo hierarchicus is less happy than homo aequalis and the 
former type is still dominant in France. This corresponds to a wider 
European pattern: the difference between the level of hierarchy ‘as it is’ and 
‘as it should be’ is larger in Latin Europe than in Northern Europe. 
 
Family systems 
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What is surprising in this context is that the positive relationships between 
freedom and happiness observed at the organizational and educational 
levels are far from being obvious at the family level. The picture is different 
when considering intergenerational freedom (libertarian/authoritarian 
relationships between parents and children) and intragenerational freedom 
(egalitarian/inegalitarian relationships among the siblings). The libertarian 
model that seems to dominate at the family level in most French regions 
does not seem to improve the level of happiness. Intergenerational freedom 
has little influence on the level of happiness. A possible explanation is that 
the benefits and drawbacks of an authoritarian relationship offset each 
other. Authoritarian family types may result in a denser family network 
than libertarian family types and may thus be more conductive to 
happiness. At the intragenerational level, the egalitarian family type is 
linked with a lower level of happiness compared with inegalitarian family 
type. It may be concluded from these results that not every form of freedom 
enhances happiness: different types of freedom have different relationships 
with happiness. 
 
Concluding remarks 
The French example is instructive on many levels as it illustrates a wider 
Latin European pattern with a fairly strong hierarchy, which is also 
observed in countries such as Italy or Spain. Organizations in those two 
countries are roughly as vertically structured as in France, although social 
and potential freedom are higher in France than in those two nations. 
However, the top-down nature of French teaching practices is stronger, 
which seems to reduce happiness by restricting psychological freedom. The 
hierarchy of French society, in combination with its internalization in the 
psyche of French people through education and later through hierarchical 
relationships in professional organizations, seems to be the largest limiting 
factor for happiness. 
 
8.2. Challenges for future research 
 
Singling out cause and effect 
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Reverse causality is often an issue in correlational research and in cross-
sectional studies in particular. In this study, I have mainly considered 
happiness as the effect of freedom, ignoring the effects of happiness on 
freedom. However, there are several ways happiness could influence 
freedom.  
As Lyubomirsky et al. (2005) showed, happiness among individuals 
leads to pro-social behaviors, such as engaging in social interactions or 
volunteering work. Therefore, it is not too far-fetched to imagine that 
happiness could lead to more political freedom, freedom of expression or 
freedom of sexuality, in other words to more social freedom (cf. Chapter 4).  
As for potential freedom (cf. Chapter 4), individuals with positive 
affects may be more aware of their environment, as implied by the 
‘broaden-and-build’ theory (Frederickson 2004), according to which 
positive emotions broaden the thought-actions repertoire, and thus increase 
one’s abilities to process new information and seize opportunities.  
Finally, as far as psychological freedom (cf. Chapter 4) is 
concerned, we can consider that self-esteem, which is a part of 
psychological freedom, develops throughout life, whereas it takes years 
before children get a clear conception of happiness. In that sense, it is likely 
that psychological freedom precedes happiness or unhappiness. Naturally, 
they might later reinforce each other, with happier people feeling more 
confident.  
All in all, the relationship between average happiness in nations and 
freedom is likely to be bi-directional. It is as yet not possible to assess 
exactly the relative strengths of these effects and their variation across time 
and place. 
 
Beyond the limitation of the present research 
Several limitations of this research have been highlighted in sub-section 
1.6.4. In order to tackle the shortcomings present in the current research, 
more sophisticated analysis can be performed once more systematic data 
are present. As the global surveys are being repeated, there is a good chance 
that we will be able to look back at these findings in the near future. 
Alternatively, qualitative analysis may also reveal more nuance in what 
people mean when responding to survey questions. 
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Beyond the nation state 
Happiness is multi-layered and complex and it can be studied at various 
levels, i.e. global, national, regional, family, community and personal. Until 
now, the national scale has been the most widely studied, probably because 
of the importance of nation-states during the 19th and 20th centuries and 
the predominance of these units for studying the lives of people. Strong 
barriers have been erected between nation-states, which have developed 
senses of national identity and provided collective self-enhancing narratives 
for their citizens. Happiness and identity are intimately connected; 
therefore, looking at national levels of happiness makes sense as people still 
define themselves as citizens of a nation. One might wonder about the 
weight of nationhood for citizens of the future. The national part of identity 
may be eroded by the ‘global’ and the ‘local’. If citizens’ identities are less 
determined by national ties in future, there might be a rising interest in 
studying happiness either on a larger scale (i.e. in settings with a common 
institutional or cultural background such as the European Union or Latin 
America) or on a smaller scale (such as a neighborhood or a specific city). 
 
Policy relevance 
Why do we study self-reported happiness? One of the reasons is to find 
ways to create greater well-being for a greater number of people. Several 
ways to improve well-being have been identified, but the implementation of 
this knowledge still lags. Therefore, another challenge of happiness studies 
is to impact policy making. To achieve this, happiness research must make 
a few points clear: the benefits of designing policies following a happiness 
agenda should be well understood, research tools should be understandable 
to the general public and there should be strong scientific consensus as to 
the value of these tools and the results obtained from the research. Arriving 
at this consensus should involve the entire community of happiness 
research -- sociologists, economists, psychologists and anthropologists 
among other disciplines. Placing happiness on the political agenda is partly 
the responsibility of scientists, but associations, think tanks and civil action 
to educate politicians are also necessary to push this issue onto the political 
agenda. An obvious first step is to make sure clear indicators such as life 
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satisfaction are available to policy makers, as these are in principle just as 
easy to use and readable as GDP.  
 
Resolving competing views 
Our understanding of happiness has dramatically increased in recent 
decades, and is improving almost daily as the empirical research in this 
field flourishes. Empirical research has resolved several theoretical 
discussions, such as whether happiness is relative (e.g. Veenhoven 1991) 
and whether happiness is bound to a personal ‘set point’ around which 
environmental conditions cause only temporary variations (e.g. Headey 
1993). Still, there are open issues which future empirical research must 
settle. One such issue is whether happiness is self-destructive. Though it is 
now clear that happiness tends to positively affect human functioning, there 
is still the possibility of adverse effects, which relates to the question of 
how much happiness is too much. Another open issue is how happiness 
relates to moral behavior, i.e. does happiness make us morally better?  
 
Overcoming disciplinary isolation 
When looking at the overlap in research between psychology, economics 
and sociology, it is clear that each field contributes in its own way to this 
cross-disciplinary topic of happiness. Psychology set the foundation to 
make happiness a scientific field and economics has followed. Surprisingly 
only a few sociologists (such as Veenhoven) have pursued studying 
happiness from a sociological perspective. In general, both sociologists and 
anthropologists have been reluctant to enter the field and to construct a 
‘sociology of happiness’ and an ‘anthropology of happiness’, a 
phenomenon Veenhoven accurately describes as a ‘blind eye for 
happiness’. However, as Bartram has written, “building on existing 
findings, sociologists would be well-placed to clarify the social context of 
happiness, as against an individualist orientation more common in other 
disciplines, as well as the unintended consequences of policy initiatives and 
happiness discourses”, and further, “…avoiding a direct engagement might 
weaken our ability to influence the public discourses that affect policy 
outcomes and other processes that actually determine well-being”. Pointing 
to current concerns, Bartram concludes that “…these concerns are better 
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treated as reasons to engage with the field rather than to shun it; indeed 
sociologists might be well placed to redress certain shortcomings in 
happiness research” (Bartram 2011, p 4).  
I would push Bartram’s advice a bit further; I think that sociology 
and anthropology are necessary to reflect upon the existing body of 
research at several levels. In addition to a field that is dominated by 
economists and psychologists and that primarily looks through the prism of 
the individual, sociology is the appropriate discipline to bring some 
reflexivity. If the field of happiness studies is currently largely bi-
dimensional, I feel the field would gain a lot from adding a third dimension 
from sociology. In particular, reflexivity is needed to make sure that the 
tools we are using and the body of research we are building are robust and 
are used in proper context. Also, that we do not miss unforeseen 
consequences.  
The voice of happiness studies has a tremendous potential to be 
heard in classical research and in the outside world, but only if properly 
structured -- that is with a sound scientific basis and strengthened by 
interdisciplinary debate, in which more sociologists are included. If the 
field of sociology was more significantly engaged in the field of happiness 
studies, both happiness studies and sociology would benefit. Happiness 
studies would gain in terms of reflexivity and sociology would be able to 
expand its research domain.   
Morin (1984) states that there is a need to move towards more 
complexity, i.e. to manage to embrace diversity in unity. What does that 
mean in the field of happiness? While it is important to recognize the 
universality of happiness as a feeling, we need to embrace the difference of 
social-cultural structures that relate to happiness, both positively and 
negatively. This means we will need to de-partition the different fields that 
historically founded the science of happiness, i.e. psychology, economics, 
sociology and the other fields, and generate systematic communication 
between these fields in order to use the strength of each discipline and to 
tackle their shortcomings. This concatenation of interdisciplinary work 
urgently needs to find a concrete place in the broad academic world. To 
achieve this, economists, psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, 
philosophers and historians need to communicate on those issues. 
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Unfortunately, the walls between the disciplines undermine the quality of 
the work that is being done in the science of happiness. 
I see happiness as a particularly suitable candidate for creative co-
operation between researchers from different disciplines and I believe that 
the current dynamic around the topic of happiness can be converted into a 
powerful force to lower these barriers.  
 
My future research 
For scientific, epistemological, and philosophical reasons, I feel the work 
on response factors and the 10-excess, presented in Chapter 3, needs to be 
continued. Scholars working on happiness need to be able to show that they 
understand measures of happiness in order to generate a consensus around 
their findings and to make them compelling. This implies a better 
understanding of differences such as cultural measurement specificities. I 
plan to keep on working on the distributions of self-reported happiness 
responses in countries to better understand the diversity of responses across 
nations and regions, which is one of the blind spots of happiness studies in 
my view. There are a few specific aspects that need to be pursued: 1) 
Different response patterns seem to be related to a different appreciation of 
moderation versus exuberance. If cultural bias seems to play a modest role 
overall (some cultural ways of responding are highlighted in Chapter 3), 
some further work is needed to understand better these influences. 2) 
Measurement problems: what does it mean when a respondent chooses a 
particular happiness score? Some improvement has been achieved recently 
(de Jonge 2015), but more work is required in this field in order to know 
more precisely what people mean when they rate their happiness. 3) 
Statistical issues: if cultural effects are to be corrected, such as by the 
corrections applied in Chapter 3, more refined analyses are required.   
To identify exactly what the 10-excess is will probably require some 
field analysis and some interviews in order to know what people have in 
mind when they answer ‘10’. The work done in Chapter 3 excludes some 
hypotheses, but it is still unclear exactly what makes people lean more 
towards the ‘10’ than the ‘9’ in some areas compared to some others. Are 
we facing a bias stricto sensu or a mere response effect? Directly linked to 
this question is the possible correction of bias that one might want to 
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implement. If the distributions contain a bias, a correction might be 
desirable. An obvious question is what type of correction? I have come up 
with one solution in Chapter 3, but it can certainly be improved if deemed 
necessary. Finally, when looking at the distribution in Chapter 3, other 
biases seem to be involved: the ‘0 effect’ and ‘5 effect’ to name two. In the 
years to come I will investigate this further because I feel it will contribute 
to the field of happiness studies.  
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Dutch summary 
 
Geografie van geluk 
Een vergelijkende studie met focus op Frankrijk 
 
Dit proefschrift gaat over geografische verschillen in geluk. Tenzij expliciet 
anders aangegeven, wordt  'geluk' gedefinieerd als de mate waarin mensen 
zeggen tevreden te zijn met het leven dat zij leiden. Ik onderscheid twee 
componenten van geluk. De eerste is affectief en betreft de mate waarin 
iemand zich overwegend prettig voelt. De tweede is cognitief en betreft de 
mate waarin iemand zijn verlangens verwezenlijkt ziet. 
 Het onderzoek is in twee delen opgedeeld. Het eerste deel bestudeert 
trans-nationale gelukspatronen. Dit deel geeft een kort overzicht van a) de 
verschillende combinaties van de twee componenten van geluk (affectief en 
cognitief) en b) de verschillen in verdeling van individuele scores in 
verschillende landen. Het tweede deel gaat over het relatief lage niveau van 
geluk in Frankrijk. In dit deel vergelijk ik het gemiddelde geluksniveau in 
Frankrijk met dat in andere landen. 
    
 
Transnationale gelukspatronen 
 
Verschillen in de combinaties van de gelukscomponenten tussen landen 
Bij beoordeling van ons leven als geheel gebruiken we twee bronnen van 
informatie: hoe goed we ons het grootste deel van de tijd voelen en in 
hoeverre het leven ons brengt wat we ons wensen. Deze sub-evaluaties 
worden de 'componenten' van geluk genoemd: een affectieve component, 
die het 'hedonische niveau' (of stemming) wordt genoemd, en een 
cognitieve component die 'tevredenheid' wordt genoemd. Deze 
componenten gaan niet altijd samen en ik onderzoek de mate van 
correspondentie in 133 landen. Daarbij worden verschillende patronen 
zichtbaar in grote geografische clusters van landen: de Islamitische landen, 
Afrika, voormalige communistische landen, Azië, Latijns-Amerika en 
ontwikkelde landen. In een aantal geografische clusters zie ik 
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overeenkomstige scores op beide componenten: in Islamitische landen laag 
op beide, in Azië gemiddeld op beide en in ontwikkelde landen hoog op 
beide. In andere geografische groepen zie ik juist verschillende scores op 
beide componenten: in Latijns-Amerika bijvoorbeeld hoog op affectieve 
beoordeling en gemiddeld op cognitieve beoordeling. Een vergelijking van 
deze resultaten met de literatuur (Inglehart, Nadoulek, Huntington) levert 
zowel overeenkomsten als verschillen op. 
  
 
Verschillen in verdeling van geluk binnen landen 
Bij het vergelijken van geluk tussen verschillende landen, blijkt dat twee 
landen met dezelfde gemiddelde waarde zeer grote verschillen kunnen 
vertonen in de verdeling van individuele scores. Eén van de verschillen is 
het percentage respondenten dat de maximum score van 10 geeft. Dit is in 
sommige gevallen veel hoger dan het aantal respondenten dat 9 scoort. Dit 
‘10-excess’ fenomeen komt vooral voor in Latijns-Amerika en in 
Islamitische landen, en veel minder in ontwikkelde landen. Het geeft geen 
verklaring voor relatief lage levensvoldoening in Frankrijk. Er lijkt sprake 
van een cultureel verschil: matiging in de uiting van gevoelens en 
gedachten wordt niet in alle landen in gelijke mate gewaardeerd.  
 
Verkenning van de relatieve ongelukkigheid in Frankrijk 
Fransen zijn relatief minder gelukkig dan wat men zou verwachten op 
grond van hun hoge objectieve levensstandaard. De verschillende 
deelstudies uit dit proefschrift wijzen er op dat vrijheid hier deels 
verantwoordelijk voor is. 
 
Aspecten van vrijheid 
In dit proefschrift komen verschillende aspecten van vrijheid aan de orde. 
Een eerste onderscheid wordt gemaakt tussen werkelijke vrijheid (de 
mogelijkheden om keuzes te maken), en de beleefde vrijheid (hoe iemand 
tegen deze mogelijkheden aankijkt). Volgens Bay kan werkelijke vrijheid 
onderverdeeld worden in drie categorieën: sociale vrijheid (de afwezigheid 
van externe belemmeringen in het maken van keuzes), psychologische 
vrijheid (innerlijke capaciteit om te kiezen), en potentiële vrijheid (het 
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bewustzijn van de mogelijkheden). Fransen geven aan zich beduidend 
minder vrij te voelen dan mensen in andere ontwikkelde landen. Fransen 
scoren ook relatief laag op indicatoren van psychologische vrijheid 
(zelfvertrouwen en beleefde controle over hun lot). Dit kwam vooral naar 
voren in de case-study naar de verschillen tussen Frankrijk en Finland. 
Deze twee landen scoren vergelijkbaar op sociale en potentiële vrijheid, 
maar zeer verschillend op psychologische vrijheid. Nadat dit vastgesteld 
was, is verkend wat de redenen van de lage score op psychologische 
vrijheid in Frankrijk zijn. 
 
Participatief onderwijs 
Bij die verkenning is gekeken naar socialisatie in verschillende landen en in 
het bijzonder  naar participatief onderwijs, een pedagogische benadering 
die kinderen actief betrekt bij het onderwijs. Participatief onderwijs 
overweegt in Scandinavië, maar is minder gebruikelijk in Frankrijk. In 
Frankrijk is het onderwijs voornamelijk éénrichtingsverkeer. Hoewel van 
weinig invloed op het geluk van tieners, lijkt participatief onderwijs wel 
sterk gerelateerd aan het gemiddelde geluk van volwassenen. Participatief 
onderwijs lijkt op de lange termijn psychologische vrijheid te kweken. Het 
bereidt toekomstige volwassenen beter voor op het maken van keuzes en 
helpt hen een gevoel van beheersing te ontwikkelen. Binnen de groep 
welvarende landen is participatief onderwijs in Frankrijk het minst 
ontwikkeld. Hoewel in Frankrijk relatief minstens evenveel geld wordt 
uitgegeven aan onderwijs als in andere ontwikkelde landen, lijkt het 
gebruikelijke éénrichtingsverkeer onderwijs in Frankrijk gerelateerd te zijn 
aan het ongeluk van de volwassenen. 
 
Hiërarchie 
Een andere mogelijke reden voor het relatief lage geluksniveau in Frankrijk 
is de relatief grote machtsafstand op de werkvloer. Deze beperking van 
sociale vrijheid lijkt mede verantwoordelijk voor het lagere geluk. Homo 
hierarchicus is minder gelukkig dan homo aequalis, en de eerste is in 
Frankrijk nog steeds het meest voorkomend. Dit komt overeen met een 
breder Europees patroon: het verschil in hiërarchisch niveau 'zoals het is' en 
'zoals het zou moeten zijn' is groter in Zuid Europa dan in Noord Europa. 
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Gezinstypen 
Anders dan ik op grond van het bovenstaande verwachtte, blijkt het 
libertaire gezinsmodel, dat in Frankrijk lijkt te overheersen, het 
geluksniveau niet te verhogen. De resultaten van dit onderzoek duiden er op 
dat vrijheid tussen generaties weinig invloed heeft op het geluksniveau. Een 
mogelijke verklaring is dat de voor- en nadelen van een hechte familieband 
elkaar opheffen. We kunnen uit deze resultaten concluderen dat niet alle 
vormen van vrijheid geluk bevorderen: verschillende soorten vrijheid 
beïnvloeden geluk op verschillende manieren. 
 
Conclusie 
Het Franse voorbeeld is op veel niveaus leerzaam omdat het een breder 
Zuid-Europees patroon illustreert met een vrij sterke hiërarchie. In landen 
zoals Italië en Spanje zijn organisaties ongeveer net zo verticaal 
gestructureerd als in Frankrijk, hoewel sociale en potentiële vrijheid in 
Frankrijk groter zijn. Aan de andere kant heeft Frankrijk een strikter 
éénrichtingsverkeer in het onderwijssysteem, wat geluk lijkt te verminderen 
door psychologische vrijheid te belemmeren. Van de verschillende aspecten 
van vrijheid die onderzocht zijn, lijkt de onderwijsmethode een belangrijke 
bijdrage te leveren aan de verklaring van de verschillen in geluk. De 
hiërarchie van de Franse samenleving, in combinatie met de internalisering 
in de Franse psyche via het onderwijs en later via hiërarchische relaties op 
de werkvloer, lijkt grootste limiterende factor voor geluk te zijn. 
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